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Introduction 
The purpose of the course “Economics of Transnational Crime” is 
to give students comprehensive understanding of contemporary patterns 
and economic characteristic of transnational crime in the context of 
globalization.    
The main tasks of the course are:  
 to provide essential knowledge in the field of criminology; 
 to  provide basic knowledge on the global criminal markets;  
 to invite students to critically reflect on the nature and 
limitations of international criminal law conventions; 
 to provide the economic rationale for the transnational crimes;  
 to use the economist’s tools to examine the cost of transnational 
crime and its economic impact on society.   
After successful completion of the course the students will be able 
to gain knowledge in: 
 elementary understanding of crimes typology; 
 understanding of the economic reasons behind committing 
crimes; 
 deep understanding of the fundamental concepts of criminal law 
and their relation to business; 
 good understanding of size of transnational criminal markets; 
 economic consequences and costs of different types of 
international crimes. 
After successful completion of the course the students will be able: 
 to outline the problems of defining the transnational crimes; 
 to classify the international crimes; 
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 to conduct economic analysis of transnational crimes; 
 to debate the effects of globalization on the proliferation of 
crimes across borders; 
 to apply the instruments of effective judicial mechanisms for 
combating the crimes internationally; 
 to measure the size of transnational criminal markets; 
 to demonstrate detailed factual knowledge of the various 
criminal groups, networks and sectors examined in the course. 
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CHAPTER 1. THE CONCEPT OF CRIME IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
1.1. Definitions and Elements of a Crime 
1.2. Criminal Cases vs Civil Cases 
1.3. Nature, Functions and Sources of the Criminal Law 
1.4. Classification of Crimes 
1.5. International Criminal Court  
Key words: crime, actus reus, mens rea, criminal harm, criminal act, 
criminal law, criminal courts  
 
1.1. Definitions and Elements of a Crime 
 
A crime is any act or omission that violates a law which results in a 
punishment [42]. All crimes have the following four elements in 
common [8]: 
1. A voluntary act known as actus reus. Actus reus, sometimes 
called the external element or the objective element of a crime, is the 
Latin term for the “guilty act” which, when proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt in combination with the mens rea, “guilty mind”, produces 
criminal liability. 
2. A culpable state of mind known as mens rea. Mens rea (a guilty 
mind) is the person’s purposeful intention to perform the act that was 
illegal. 
3. “Concurrence” between the mens rea and the actus reus. Both an 
act and intent to do the act must occur together. A person cannot be 
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punished for mere thoughts of doing something harmful. For instance, I 
say, “I intend to rob a bank”, but never commit the act, I cannot be 
found guilty of bank robbery. 
4. Causation of harm (or risk). It requires that harm must result 
from an act. 
The legal definitions of all crimes do contain certain elements [24]. 
If the government cannot prove the existence of these elements, it cannot 
obtain a conviction in a court of law. Other elements are not part of all 
crimes, but are only found in crimes that prohibit a particular harm. 
Often, a difference in one particular element of a crime can distinguish it 
from another related offense, or a particular degree of the same offense. 
At common law, for example, manslaughter was distinguished from 
murder by the mental element of malice aforethought.  
The criminal act. Nobody can read minds, and the First 
Amendment [24] means that people can say pretty much whatever they 
want. What you think and say (within limits) is protected. It is what you 
do-your behaviors- that the criminal law seeks to regulate. Lawyers use 
the legal Latin phrase actus reus to describe this element of a crime. It is 
commonly translated into English as the guilty act. The term act can be a 
bit confusing. Most people tend to think of the term act as an action 
verb-it is something that people do. The criminal law often seeks to 
punish people for things that they did not do. When the law commands 
people to take a particular action and they do not take the commanded 
action, it is known as an omission. The law commands that people feed 
and shelter their children. Those who do not are guilty of an offense 
based on the omission. The law commands that people pay their income 
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taxes; if they do not pay their taxes, the omission can be criminal. 
Threatening to act or attempting an act can also be the actus reus 
element of an offense. In addition to acts and omissions, possession of 
something can be a criminal offense. The possession of certain weapons, 
illicit drugs, burglary tools, and so forth are all guilty acts as far as the 
criminal law is concerned. Actual possession is the legal idea that most 
closely coincides with the everyday use of the term. Actual possession 
refers to a person having physical control or custody of an object. In 
addition to actual possession, there is the idea of constructive 
possession. Constructive possession is the legal idea that the person had 
knowledge of the object, as well as the ability to exercise control over it. 
Criminal intent. A fundamental principle of law is that to be 
convicted of a crime, there must be a guilty act (the actus reus) and a 
culpable mental state. Recall that culpability means blameworthiness. In 
other words, there are literally hundreds of legal terms that describe 
mental states that are worthy of blame. The most common is intent. The 
Model Penal Code boils all of these different terms into four basic 
culpable mental states: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and 
negligently [51, 95]. 
Purposely. According to the interpretation of the Model Penal 
Code, a person acts purposely when “it is his conscious object to engage 
in conduct of that nature” [24]. 
Knowingly. A person acts knowingly if “he is aware that it is 
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result” [24]. In 
other words, the prohibited result was not the actor’s purpose, but he 
knew it would happen. 
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Recklessly. A person acts recklessly if “he consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk”. Further, “The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s 
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person 
would observe in the actor’s situation” [24]. 
Negligently. A person acts negligently when “he should be aware 
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or 
will result from his conduct” [24]. The idea is that a reasonably carefully 
person would have seen the danger, but the actor did not. 
At times, the legislature will purposely exclude the mens rea 
element from a criminal offense. This leaves only the guilty act to define 
the crime. Crimes with no culpable mental state are known as strict 
liability offenses. Most of the time, such crimes are mere violations such 
as speeding. An officer does not have to give evidence that you were 
speeding purposely, just that you were speeding. If violations such as 
this had a mental element, it would put an undue burden on law 
enforcement and the lower courts. There are a few instances where 
serious felony crimes are strict liability, such as the statutory rape laws 
of many states [24]. 
Concurrence. For an act to be a crime, the act must be brought on 
by the criminal intent. In most cases, concurrence is obvious and does 
not enter into the legal arguments. A classic example is an individual 
who breaks into a cabin in the woods to escape the deadly cold outside. 
After entering, the person decides to steal the owner’s property. This 
would not be a burglary (at common law) since burglary requires a 
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breaking and entering with the intent to commit a felony therein. Upon 
entry, the intent was to escape the cold, not to steal. Thus, there was no 
concurrence between the guilty mind and the guilty act [24]. 
Criminal harm and causation. In criminal law, causation refers 
to the relationship between a person’s behavior and a negative outcome. 
Some crimes, such as murder, require a prohibited outcome. There is no 
murder if no one has died (although there may be an attempt). In crimes 
that require such a prohibited harm, the actus reus must have caused that 
harm [24]. 
Criminologist Paul Tappan defines crime as “an intentional act or 
omission in violation of criminal law…, committed without defense or 
justification, and sanctioned by the state as a felony or misdemeanor” 
[17]. 
Possible punishments determine the differences between 
misdemeanors and felonies. Misdemeanors are nonserious, minor crimes 
that the government punishes by confinement in a local jail for a year or 
less. Examples include petty theft, simple assault, disorderly conduct, 
and disturbing the peace. Felonies are serious crimes that the 
government punishes by death or incarceration in a prison for at least a 
year. This group includes such crimes as murder, robbery, and burglary 
[17]. 
Crimes versus torts. A crime, or public wrong, is to be 
distinguished from a tort, or private wrong. Actually, the same act may 
be both a crime and a tort. For example, O. J. Simpson’s alleged killings 
of Nicole Simpson and Ron Goldman included the torts of assault, 
battery, and wrongful death. Simpson’s alleged acts gave rise to both a 
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criminal prosecution (seeking punishment) and a civil suit for damages 
[17]. 
Let’s analyze crimes from the American legal perspective. The 
United States has more than a single crime problem. One problem is 
high, though currently declining, rates of street crime (including 
homicide, assault, robbery, and burglary). Much of this type of crime is 
committed by an alienated and self‐destructive underclass. Another is 
the drug‐crime problem, which is linked to the first problem. Some 
drug‐intoxicated individuals commit crimes because they have lost their 
inhibitions while under the influence [92]. 
There are also crimes that stem from the drug business (for 
example, money laundering) and crimes that arise from economic 
necessity, because users need money to buy more drugs. Then, too, there 
is the organized‐crime problem, which is intertwined with the 
drug‐crime problem insofar as drug trafficking is the major source of 
income for organized‐crime groups. In addition, there is a 
white‐collar‐crime problem.  
 
1.2. Criminal Cases vs Civil Cases 
 
The international legal system addresses the wrongdoings that 
people commit with two different types of cases: civil and criminal. 
Crimes are generally offenses against the state (even if the immediate 
harm is done to an individual), and are accordingly prosecuted by the 
state. Civil cases on the other hand, typically involve disputes between 
individuals regarding the legal duties and responsibilities they owe to 
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one another. These cases are adjudicated through civil lawsuits. 
Although there is some overlap, there are several ways in which you can 
tell the differences between a criminal case and a civil case. 
Here are some of the key differences between a criminal case and a 
civil case [84]: 
1) сrimes are considered offenses against the state, or society as a 
whole; 
2) criminal offenses and civil offenses are generally different in 
terms of their punishment; 
3) the standard of proof is also very different in a criminal case 
versus a civil case; 
4) criminal cases almost always allow for a trial by jury; 
5) a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to an attorney; 
6) the protections afforded to defendants under criminal law are 
considerable. 
Criminal cases involve an action that is considered to be harmful to 
society as a whole (hence, these are considered offenses against the 
“state” or the jurisdiction of the prosecution). Civil cases usually involve 
private disputes between persons or organizations [9].  
Civil cases. A civil case begins when a person or entity (such as a 
corporation or the government), called the plaintiff, claims that another 
person or entity (the defendant) has failed to carry out a legal duty owed 
to the plaintiff. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are also referred to 
as “parties” or “litigants”. The plaintiff may ask the court to tell the 
defendant to fulfill the duty, or make compensation for the harm done, 
or both. Legal duties include respecting rights established under the 
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Constitution or under federal or state law. Civil suits are brought in both 
state and federal courts. An example of a civil case in a state court 
would be if a citizen (including a corporation) sued another citizen for 
not living up to a contract.  
For example, if a lumberyard enters a contract to sell a specific 
amount of wood to a carpenter for an agreed-upon price and then fails to 
deliver the wood, forcing the carpenter to buy it elsewhere at a higher 
price, the carpenter might sue the lumberyard to pay the extra costs 
incurred because of the lumberyard's failure to deliver; these costs are 
called damages. If these parties were from different states, however, 
then that suit could be brought in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction if the amount in question exceeded the minimum required by 
statute ($75 000) [9]. 
In civil cases, a person or company asks a judge to settle a civil 
problem, such as [18]: 
• a problem concerning an inheritance; 
• a problem involving a contract;  
• a family problem, such as divorce or custody of children. 
A person can also ask a judge for compensation for damage 
suffered because of someone else’s fault. This type of case is called a 
“civil responsibility” case. For example, if someone sues a plumber for 
poor repair work that caused a flood in her kitchen, the judge can order 
the plumber to pay money to compensate her for the water damage. 
Criminal cases. A person accused of a crime is generally charged 
in a formal accusation called an indictment (for felonies or serious 
crimes) or information (for misdemeanors). The US government, on 
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behalf of the people of the United States, prosecutes the case through the 
United States Attorney’s Office if the person is charged with a federal 
crime. A state’s attorney’s office (often called a “District Attorney”) 
prosecutes state crimes. It’s not the victim’s responsibility to bring a 
criminal case. In a kidnapping case, for instance, the government would 
prosecute the kidnapper and the victim wouldn’t be a party to the action. 
In some criminal cases, there may not be a specific victim.  
For example, state governments arrest and prosecute people 
accused of violating laws against driving while intoxicated because 
society regards that as a serious offense that can result in harm to others. 
When a court determines that an individual committed a crime, that 
person will receive a sentence. The sentence may be an order to pay a 
monetary penalty (a fine and/or restitution to the victim), imprisonment, 
or supervision in the community (by a court employee called a U.S. 
probation officer if a federal crime), or some combination of these three 
things [9]. 
Some crimes involving other people, include [18]: 
          • assault; 
          • murder; 
          • identity theft. 
Other crimes have to do with objects, such as drug possession and 
making fake money.  
More detailed analysis of the differences mentioned above you can 
find in the Tables 1.1–1.2. 
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Table 1.1 – Criminal cases versus civil cases [43, p. 5] 
Characteristics Criminal cases Civil cases 
Concerns Offences against the  state Disputes between private 
individuals 
Parties Prosecutor brings case; defendant 
may remain silent 
Plaintiff brings case;  defendant 
must  answer 
Proof Beyond a reasonable doubt Preponderance of evidence 
Reason To maintain order in society; 
to punish the most blameworthy;  
to deter serious wrongdoing 
To settle disputes peacefully, 
usually between private parties 
Decision A defendant may be convicted if he 
is guilty and acquitted if he is 
innocent 
A defendant may be found 
liable or not liable 
Remedies Fines, jail, death penalty (in some 
countries), and forfeitures 
Money damages; injunctions; 
specific performance 
Examples Murder, theft, driving with excess 
alcohol, engaging in an unfair 
commercial practice 
Contract; tort; property law 
 
Another approach to dissection between criminal cases and civil 
cases is shown in the Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2 – Differences between criminal cases and civil cases [18]  
Criminal cases Civil cases  
Main differences 
1. The principle is always the same: a person 
is accused of a crime (e. g., murder, assault, 
identity theft). 
2. A crime can occur even if there is no 
“immediate” victim (e. g., the crime of drug 
possession) 
1. The principle is always the same: A 
sues B for causing damage to A            
or to something belonging to A. 
2. How does a person cause damage? A 
person causes damage, for example,    
by breaking a contract, by breaking an 
object belonging to someone, or by 
hurting someone 
How the case starts 
1. The government takes a case against the 
person accused of the crime. The government 
is also called the “prosecution”. 
2. It is not the victim who takes the case. 
3. The government has several goals when 
taking criminal cases: making sure people 
respect the law and discouraging criminal 
behavior 
1. The person who suffered damage (or 
her lawyer) takes a case against the 
person she thinks is responsible for the 
damage. 
2. The person taking the case asks to be 
compensated, that is, to have the 
damages repaired. Compensation is 
usually in the form of money 
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Continuation of the Table 1.2 
Criminal cases Civil cases  
Representation by a lawyer 
1. The government is always represented by 
lawyers. These lawyers are called “criminal 
and penal prosecuting attorneys”. They used 
to be called “Crown prosecutors” (the title is 
commonly used in Commonwealth realms). 
2. The accused can be represented by a 
lawyer, who is called the “defense lawyer” 
1. Both the person taking the case and 
the person being sued can be 
represented by a lawyer if they wish 
 
Evidence 
1. The government must convince the judge 
or jury that the accused is guilty “beyond a 
reasonable doubt”. 
2. If the government does not present enough 
evidence, or if the accused raises a 
reasonable doubt, the accused must be found 
not guilty 
1. The person taking the case must 
convince the judge that his version       
of the events is more probable than the 
other version presented. It is not 
necessary to convince the judge that his 
version is true “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” 
Who pays for the case 
1. In most cases, the government pays all the 
costs of the case. 
2. The accused pays costs related                 
to defending himself 
1. The person who takes the legal 
action pays for the expense of taking 
the case (for example, lawyer fees). 
2. The person sued pays for his own 
expenses (for example, lawyer fees). 
3. The person who loses the case 
usually pays the fees related to the 
court case itself (e. g., experts’ fees) 
Deadline for taking a case 
1. When a crime takes place, the lawyer      
for the prosecution decides whether there is 
enough evidence to accuse someone of the 
crime. 
2. Generally, there is no deadline for 
bringing a criminal case against someone     
of a crime. 
3. However, the deadline is six months in the 
case of a crime “punishable by summary 
conviction”. The Criminal Code states 
whether a crime is punishable in this way 
1. People who suffer damage can’t wait 
too long to take legal action. The law 
has certain deadlines. This is called 
extinctive prescription. 
2. The deadlines vary depending on the 
type of case. For example, someone 
who wants to sue for defamation - 
damage to a person’s reputation - has 
one year to take a case 
Role of person who suffered damage or of the victim 
Since the government takes the accused       
to court, the victim is usually a key witness 
in the case 
1. The person who suffered damage 
must prove that the person being sued 
is responsible for the damage. 
2. More specifically, the person suing 
must prove that the other person 
committed a fault and that this fault 
caused the damage 
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Continuation of the Table 1.2 
Criminal cases Civil cases  
Types of orders the judge can make 
1. If the accused is found guilty, the judge can 
order different punishments. For example, one 
can order the guilty person to go to jail, pay a 
fine or do community work. 
2. In some cases, the judge can also require 
the guilty party to compensate the victim      
for any damage 
1. If the judge decides in favour          
of the person who suffered damage, 
she can require the person responsible 
for the damage to compensate the 
other person, by ordering the payment 
of a sum of money, for example. 
2. However, the judge cannot order 
imprisonment in a civil case, unless 
someone is in contempt of court 
 
The purpose of a court case is to shed light on a disagreement or a 
crime, and to make sure people respect the law. At the end of the case, 
the judge makes a decision and sometimes orders financial 
compensation or a punishment [18]. 
As we’ve discussed, civil cases involve disputes between (usually) 
private parties, while criminal cases are considered acts against the city, 
state, county, or federal government. But some acts may result in both 
civil claims and criminal charges. For instance, a person may be sued for 
the intentional tort of assault and/or battery, but also may be arrested and 
charged with the crime(s) of assault and/or battery. Also, there are times 
when a criminal act may give way to civil liability, such as when 
someone is charged with homicide and also sued for wrongful death 
(which typically follows the completion of the criminal trial process). As 
in the assault and battery example above, the criminal charges are 
punishable by fines, prison time, and other penalties, while the lawsuit is 
focused on recovering money to compensate the victim (or the victim’s 
family) for damages [9]. 
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1.3. Nature, Functions and Sources of the Criminal Law 
 
To understand criminal law, it is necessary to distinguish criminal 
from civil law (don’t confuse with criminal cases and civil cases) and to 
know the difference between substantive and procedural law.  
Criminal law is the body of law that relates to crime. It regulates 
social conduct. It includes the punishment of people who violate these 
laws. Criminal law differs from civil law, whose emphasis is more on 
dispute resolution and victim compensation than on punishment. The 
burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt [8]. Criminal law defines 
crimes; sets the procedures for arrests, searches and seizures, and 
interrogations; establishes the rules for trials; and specifies the 
punishments for offenders.  
All law other than criminal law is known as civil law. It includes 
tort law (private wrongs and damages), property law, and contract law. 
Differences between criminal law and civil law are important because 
criminal proceedings are separate from civil actions. Table 1.3 shows 
these differences. 
 
Table 1.3 – Differences between criminal and civil law [86, 25] 
 
Criminal law Civil law 
Crime as public wrong Tort as private wrong 
Punishment as incarceration or death Punishment as compensation 
Government as prosecutor  Injured person as plaintiff 
Homicide, conspiracy, obstruction        
of justice, assault, possession of a 
controlled substance 
Custody disputes, bankruptcy, 
defamation, breach of contract, 
property damage 
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Criminal law encompasses both substantive criminal law and 
criminal procedure. Substantive law defines proscribed behaviors and 
specifies penalties. Laws concerning murder, robbery are substantive in 
that they define unlawful acts. Procedural law consists of rules stating 
how the government proceeds against an individual accused of 
committing a crime. Trial by jury, the right to counsel, the right to 
appeal, and the right to face one's accusers are just a few examples of 
procedural law. Violations of these rights by the government are 
violations of due process. If the government violates procedural law, that 
violation can be grounds for appeal and for a reversal of a criminal 
conviction [86]. The criminal law is concerned with forbidding certain 
forms of wrongful conduct and punishing those who engage in the 
prohibited acts. Criminal proceedings are called prosecutions. In 
criminal cases you have a prosecutor who prosecutes a defendant in the 
criminal courts. The consequences of being found guilty are so serious 
that the standard of proof is higher than in civil cases: the allegations of 
criminal conduct must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If the 
prosecution is successful, the defendant is found guilty (convicted) and 
may be punished by the courts. Punishments available to the court 
include imprisonment, fines, or community orders such as an unpaid 
work requirement. If the prosecution is unsuccessful, the defendant is 
found not guilty (acquitted) [43, p. 4]. Criminal law serves several 
purposes and benefits to society in the following ways [29]: 
1. Maintaining order. Criminal law provides predictability, letting 
people know what to expect from others. Without criminal law, there 
would be chaos and uncertainty. 
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2. Resolving disputes. The law makes it possible to resolve 
conflicts and disputes between quarreling citizens. It provides a 
peaceful, orderly way to handle grievances. 
3. Protecting individuals and property. Criminal law protects 
citizens from criminals who would inflict physical harm on others or 
take their worldly goods. Because of the importance of property in 
capitalist America, many criminal laws are intended to punish those who 
steal. 
4. Providing for smooth functioning of society. Criminal law 
enables the government to collect taxes, control pollution, and 
accomplish other socially beneficial tasks. 
5. Safeguarding civil liberties. Criminal law protects individual 
rights. 
The New-York Criminal Code sets out the basis purposes of 
criminal law as shown in the Table 1.4. 
  
Table 1.4 – Purposes of criminal law [87] 
 
Purpose Description 
Preventing 
harm 
To prohibit conduct that unjustifiably or inexcusably causes   
or threatens substantial harm to individuals as well as to 
society 
Warning To warn people both of conduct that is subject to criminal 
punishment and of the severity of the punishment 
Definition To define the act and intent that is required for each offense 
Seriousness To distinguish between serious and minor offenses and           
to assign the appropriate punishments 
Punishment To impose punishments that satisfy the demands for revenge, 
rehabilitations, and deterrence of future crimes 
Victims To ensure that the victim, the victim’s family, and the 
community interests are represented at trial and in imposing 
punishments 
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Sources of criminal law: 
1. Common law. Common law, which is known as judge‐made 
law, came into existence in England during the twelfth century. Judges 
created common law by ruling that certain actions were subject to 
punishment and defined offenses such as murder, rape, arson, and 
burglary as crimes against the state. Over time, British judges' law 
decisions produced a body of unwritten laws and customs. This law 
formed the basis of the legal system in the American colonies. One of 
the main parts of common law is the law of precedent. Once a court 
makes a decision, it is binding on other courts in later cases presenting 
the same legal problem. The principle of stare decisis relates to the law 
of precedent. It literally means to “let the decision or precedent stand.” 
This principle guides courts in making decisions in similar cases and 
ensures fairness in the judicial process [74]. 
2. Constitutions. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution asserts that 
“This Constitution … shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding” [74].  
If any other types of law conflict with the Constitution, the U.S. 
Supreme Court can strike them down as unconstitutional. States make 
their own constitutions and all local laws are subordinate to them. 
3. Statutes and ordinances. Laws passed by Congress and by 
state legislatures make up most of criminal law. City councils also pass 
ordinances that compose part of criminal law. Each state has a statutory 
criminal code, as does the federal government. Laws defining crimes 
such as homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, and larceny are generally 
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statutory. Some overlap exists between state and federal statutes. For 
example, some federal drug laws supplement state laws. Such laws are 
intended to provide added crime control in areas where local law 
enforcement has been ineffective [74]. 
4. Administrative rules with criminal penalties. U.S. 
governmental agencies and commissions make rules that are 
semilegislative or semijudicial in character. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) are examples of administrative agencies that 
make such rules. These agencies formulate rules, investigate violations, 
and impose sanctions. They enforce rules relating to a variety of crimes, 
including securities fraud, income tax evasion, selling contaminated 
food, and dumping toxic waste [74]. 
5. International treaties. International treaties establish crime as 
genocide (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide), torture (Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), war crimes (Treaty of 
Armistice and Regularization of War), corruption (Criminal Law 
Convention on corruption), etc. 
6. Appellate court decisions. Legal opinions having the status of 
law as stated by the appellate courts (for example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court) become case law. Such law results from appellate court 
interpretations of statutory law or from court decisions where rules have 
not yet been codified in statutes [74]. 
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1.4. Classification of Crimes 
 
There are a number of approaches to categorizing crimes. The 
most significant distinction is between a felony and a misdemeanor 
[10].  
A crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one 
year is a felony. Misdemeanors are crimes punishable by less than a year 
in prison. Note that whether a conviction is for a felony or for 
misdemeanor is determined by the punishment provided in the statute 
under which an individual is convicted rather than by the actual 
punishment imposed.  
Many states subdivide felonies and misdemeanors into several 
classes or degrees to distinguish between the seriousness of criminal 
acts.  
Capital felonies are crimes subject either to the death penalty or to 
life in prison in states that do not have death penalty. The term gross 
misdemeanor is used in some states to refer to crimes subject to 
between six and twelve months in prison, whereas other misdemeanors 
are termed petty misdemeanors.  
Several states designate a third category of crimes that are termed 
violations or infractions. These tend to be acts that cause only modest 
social harm and carry fines. These offenses are considered so minor that 
imprisonment is prohibited. This includes the violation of traffic 
regulations [10]. Such grading is based on the severity of punishment 
(Fig. 1.1).     
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Fig. 1.1 – Diagram of grading crimes [10] 
 
Crimes that are classified as felonies include [55]: 
1) aggravated assault; 
2) animal cruelty; 
3) arson; 
4) drug distribution; 
5) elder abuse; 
6) felony assault; 
7) grand theft; 
8) kidnapping; 
9) manslaughter; 
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10) manufacturing of drugs; 
11) murder; 
12) tax evasion; 
13) treason. 
Florida classifies offenses as felonies, misdemeanors, or 
noncriminal violations [87]. Noncriminal violations are primarily 
punishable by fine of forfeiture of property. The following Table shows 
the categories of felonies and misdemeanors and the maximum 
punishment generally allowable under Florida law. 
 
Table 1.5 – Punishments for felonies and misdemeanors [87] 
 
Type of crime Punishments 
Capital felony Death or life imprisonment without parole 
Life felony Life in prison and a $15 000 fine 
Felony in the first degree Thirty years in prison and a $10 000 fine 
Felony in the second degree Fifteen years in prison and a $10 000 fine 
Felony in the third degree Fife years in prison and a $5 000 fine 
Misdemeanor in the first 
degree 
One year in prison and a $1 000 fine 
Misdemeanor in the second 
degree 
Sixty days in prison and $500 fine 
 
Another approach is to classify crime by “moral turpitude” (evil) 
[10]. Mala in se crimes are considered “inherently evil” and would be 
evil even if not prohibited by law. This includes murder, robbery, 
burglary, larceny, and arson. Mala prohibita offenses are not 
“inherently evil” and are considered only wrong because they are 
prohibited by a statute. This includes offenses ranging from tax evasion 
to carrying a concealed weapon, leaving the scene of an accident, and 
being drunk and disorderly in public.  
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Why should we be concerned with classification schemes? A 
felony conviction in the USA can prevent you from being licensed to 
practice various professions, bar you from being admitted to the armed 
forces or joining the police, and prevent you from adopting a child or 
receiving various forms of federal assistance. In some states, a convicted 
felon is still prohibited from voting, even following release. The 
distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita is also important. For 
instance, the law provides that individuals convicted of “a crime of 
moral turpitude” may be deported from the United States.  
The law originally categorized as infamous those crimes that were 
considered to be deserving of shame and disgrace. Individuals convicted 
of infamous offences such as treason (betrayal of the nation) or offenses 
involving dishonesty were historically prohibited from appearing as 
witnesses at a trial [10].        
Subject matter offences in descending order of seriousness are as 
follows [10]: 
1) crimes against the state: treason, sedition, espionage, terrorism; 
2) crimes against the person: homicide, murder, manslaughter, 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, kidnapping; 
3) crimes against habitation: burglary, arson, trespassing; 
4) crimes against property: larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses, 
receiving stolen property, robbery, fraud; 
5) crimes against public order: disorderly conduct, riot; 
6) crimes against the administration of justice: obstruction of 
justice, perjury, bribery; 
7) crimes against public morals: obscenity.  
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Crimes can be committed against persons or property, but all 
crimes carry a punishment for those who break the law. Federal, state, 
and local governments pass laws to establish what is acceptable behavior 
and what is illegal within society. Following are some common crimes, 
both felonies, and misdemeanors, with general explanations attached 
[54]: 
1. Accessory. People are accessories when they solicit, request, 
command, pursue, or intentionally aid another person to engage in 
conduct constituting an illegal action. 
2. Aggravated assault. Aggravated assault is causing or 
attempting to cause serious bodily harm to another or using a deadly 
weapon during a crime.  
3. Aiding and abetting. Aiding and abetting occurs when a person 
willfully “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” the 
commission of a crime.  
4. Arson. Arson is when a person intentionally burns a structure, 
building, land, or property. 
5. Assault. Criminal assault is defined as an intentional act that 
results in a person becoming fearful of imminent bodily harm. 
6. Battery. Battery is any unlawful physical contact with another 
person, including offensive touching. 
7. Bribery. Bribery is the act of offering or receiving 
compensation for the purpose of influencing any person who is 
responsible for performing a public or legal duty. 
8. Burglary. A burglary occurs when someone illegally enters 
almost any kind of structure for the purpose of committing an illegal act. 
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9. Child abuse. Child abuse is any act or failure to act that results 
in the harm, potential for harm, or threat of harm to a child. 
10. Computer Crime. Computer crime is “any illegal act for 
which knowledge of computer technology is essential for successful 
prosecution”. 
11. Conspiracy. Conspiracy occurs when two or more people plan 
a crime with the intent of committing that crime. 
12. Credit card fraud. Credit card fraud is committed when a 
person uses a credit or debit card illegally to obtain funds from an 
account or to get merchandise or services without paying. 
13. Disorderly conduct. Disorderly conduct is a broad term 
charging anyone whose behavior is a public nuisance. 
14. Disturbing the peace. Disturbing the peace involves behavior 
that disturbs the overall order of a public place or gathering. 
15. Domestic violence. Domestic violence occurs when one 
member of a household inflicts bodily harm upon another member of 
that household. 
16. Drug cultivation or manufacturing. Drug cultivation or 
manufacturing is illegally cultivating, producing, or possessing plants, 
chemicals, or equipment used for the purpose of producing drugs. 
17. Drug possession. Drug possession occurs when someone 
willfully possesses any illegal controlled substance. 
18. Drug trafficking or distribution. Both a federal and state 
crime, drug distribution includes selling, transporting, or importing 
illegal controlled substances. 
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19. Drunk driving. Drunk driving occurs when a person operates 
a motorized vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
20. Embezzlement. Embezzlement occurs when a responsible 
party misappropriates money or property entrusted to them. 
21. Extortion. Extortion occurs when someone obtains money, 
property, or services through an act of coercion. 
22. Forgery. Forgery includes falsifying documents or signatures 
or faking an object of value with the purpose of committing fraud. 
23. Fraud. Fraud is committed when a person uses deception or 
misrepresentation for financial or personal gain. 
24. Harassment. Harassment is unwanted behavior intended to 
annoy, disturb, alarm, torment, upset, or terrorize an individual or group. 
25. Hate crime. Hate crime is a “criminal offense against a person 
or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a 
race, religion, disability, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity”. 
26. Identity theft. Identity theft includes “all types of crime in 
which someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person’s personal 
data in some way that involves fraud or deception, typically for 
economic gain”. 
27. Insurance fraud. Insurance fraud occurs when a person 
attempts to obtain payment from an insurance company under false 
premises. 
28. Kidnapping. Kidnapping is committed when a person is 
illegally confined or moved from one place to another against their will. 
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29. Money laundering. Money laundering occurs when someone 
attempts to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, 
or control of proceeds of illegal actions. 
30. Murder. Usually classified as first-degree or second-degree, 
murder is the willful taking of another person’s life. 
31. Perjury. Perjury occurs when a person gives false information 
while under oath. 
32. Public intoxication.  Someone drunk or under the influence of 
drugs in a public place can be charged with public intoxication. 
33. Robbery. Robbery involves stealing from another person by 
the use of physical force or by putting the victim in fear of death or 
injury.  
34. Shoplifting. Shoplifting is stealing merchandise from a retail 
store or business. 
35. Solicitation. Solicitation is offering compensation for goods or 
services prohibited by law.  
36. Stalking. Stalking occurs when a person, over time, follows, 
harasses, or watches another person. 
37. Tax evasion. Tax evasion involves taking deliberate actions to 
conceal or misrepresent a person’s or business’s income, profits, or 
financial gains or to inflate or falsify tax deductions. 
38. Theft. Theft is a general term describing forms of larceny, 
including burglary, looting, shoplifting, embezzlement, fraud, and 
criminal conversion. 
39. Vandalism. Vandalism occurs when a person intentionally 
damages property that does not belong to them. 
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40. Wire fraud. Almost always a federal crime, wire fraud is an 
illegal activity taking place over any interstate wires for the purpose of 
committing fraud. 
Another classification of crimes include the following issues [92]: 
1. Drug crimes. The drug‐crime category encompasses a range of 
offenses connected with the use, transportation, purchase, and sale of 
illegal drugs. 
2. Street crimes. The most common forms of predatory crime – 
robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft – occur most 
frequently on urban streets. Racial minority citizens account for a 
disproportionately high number of the arrests for street crimes. 
3. Organized crimes. The term “organized crime” refers to the 
unlawful activities of members of criminal organizations that supply 
illegal goods and services. 
4. Political crimes. The political‐crime category contains both 
crimes by the government and crimes against the government. Political 
goals motivate political criminals. 
5. Victimless crimes. Consensual acts (in which people are willing 
participants) and violations in which only the perpetrator is hurt, such as 
the personal use of illegal drugs, are called victimless crimes. 
6. White‐collar crimes. White‐collar crimes are offenses that 
persons commit while acting in their legitimate jobs and professions. 
White‐collar criminals behave in unethical ways for self‐gain (for 
example, embezzlement) or for the benefit of a business (for example, 
corporate price‐fixing). Victims of white‐collar crime include the 
economy, employers, consumers, and the environment. 
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Special attention is needed to be paid to such category of crimes as 
commercial crimes. Commercial crime covers crime such as fraud 
which is deceiving a person or company to get goods and money 
through forgery. It is caused by greed, common criminality and 
uncertainty about employment. It covers such crimes as: credit card 
fraud, e-banking fraud, inheritance fraud, insurance fraud, international 
scam, love scam, parcel scam [93]. 
 
1.5. International Criminal Court 
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a court of last resort for 
the prosecution of serious international crimes. Its treaty, the Rome 
Statute, was adopted in July 1998. The court began work in 2003, 
following ad hoc tribunals set up in the 1990s to deal with atrocity 
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 20 years after 
the Rome Statute, the ICC has made significant headway in bringing 
global attention to accountability. But it has faced setbacks, and as 
human rights crises marked by international crimes continue to 
proliferate, its mandate has proven to be both more needed and more 
daunting than its founders envisioned. To be effective, the court and its 
member countries will need to rise to the challenge [41]. 
The International Criminal Court plays a substantial role in 
international relations and peace processes. The International Criminal 
Court deals mainly with four main crimes [61].  
First, the crime of genocide is characterized by the specific intent 
to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group 
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by killing its members or by other means: causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 
in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.  
Second, the ICC can prosecute crimes against humanity, which 
are serious violations committed as part of a large-scale attack against 
any civilian population. The 15 forms of crimes against humanity listed 
in the Rome Statute include offences such as murder, imprisonment, 
enforced disappearances, enslavement – particularly of women and 
children, torture, apartheid and deportation.  
Third, war crimes which are grave breaches of the Geneva 
conventions in the context of armed conflict and include, for instance, 
the use of child soldiers; the killing or torture of persons such as 
civilians or prisoners of war; intentionally directing attacks against 
hospitals, historic monuments, or buildings dedicated to religion, 
education, art, science or charitable purposes.  
Finally, the fourth crime falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction is the 
crime of aggression. It is the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, integrity or independence of another State. The definition 
of this crime was adopted through amending the Rome Statute at the 
first Review Conference of the Statute in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010.  
As an international court, the ICC’s legal process may function 
differently from that in your national jurisdiction. Below are a few 
highlights giving key information on the legal process [61].    
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Preliminary examinations. The Office of the Prosecutor must 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence of crimes of sufficient 
gravity falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction, whether there are genuine 
national proceedings, and whether opening an investigation would serve 
the interests of justice and of the victims.  
Investigations. After gathering evidence and identifying a suspect, 
the Prosecution requests ICC judges to issue: 
– an arrest warrant: the ICC relies on countries to make arrests and 
transfer suspects to the ICC or 
– a summons to appear: suspects appear voluntarily (if not, an 
arrest warrant may be issued). 
Pre-Trial stage. It consists of initial appearance and confirmation 
of charges hearings. Initial appearance: Three Pre-Trial judges confirm 
suspect’s identity and ensure suspect understands the charges. 
Confirmation of charges hearings: after hearing the Prosecution, the 
Defence, and the Legal representative of victims, the judges decide 
(usually within 60 days) if there is enough evidence for the case to go to 
trial.  
Trial stage. Before three Trial judges, the Prosecution must prove 
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Judges consider all 
evidence, then issue a verdict and, when there is a verdict of guilt, issue 
a sentence. The judges can sentence a person to up to 30 years of 
imprisonment, and under exceptional circumstances, a life sentence. 
Verdicts are subject to appeal by the Defence and by the Prosecutor. 
Judges can also order reparations for the victims. 
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Appeals stage. Both the Prosecutor and the Defence have the right 
to appeal a Trial Chamber’s decision on the verdict (decision on guilt or 
innocence of the accused) and the sentence. The victims and the 
convicted person may appeal an order for reparations. An appeal is 
decided by five judges of the Appeals Chamber, who are never the same 
judges as those who gave the original verdict. The Appeals Chamber 
decides whether to uphold the appealed decision, amend it, or reverse it. 
This is thus the final judgment, unless the Appeals Chamber orders a re-
trial before the Trial Chamber. 
Enforcement of sentence. Sentences are served in countries that 
have agreed to enforce ICC sentences. 
The Court may exercise jurisdiction in a situation where genocide, 
crimes against humanity or war crimes were committed on or after 1 
July 2002 and: 
– the crimes were committed by a State Party national, or in the 
territory of a State Party, or in a State that has accepted the jurisdiction 
of the Court or 
– the crimes were referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) pursuant to a resolution adopted 
under chapter VII of the UN charter. 
As of 17 July 2018, a situation in which an act of aggression would 
appear to have occurred could be referred to the Court by the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
irrespective as to whether it involves States Parties or non-States Parties. 
In the absence of a UNSC referral of an act of aggression, the Prosecutor 
may initiate an investigation on her own initiative or upon request from 
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a State Party. The Prosecutor shall first ascertain whether the Security 
Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by 
the State concerned. Where no such determination has been made within 
six months after the date of notification to the UNSC by the Prosecutor 
of the situation, the Prosecutor may nonetheless proceed with the 
investigation, provided that the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the 
commencement of the investigation. Also, under these circumstances, 
the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of 
aggression when committed by a national or on the territory of a State 
Party that has not ratified or accepted these amendments. 
The ICC is intended to complement, not to replace, national 
criminal systems; it prosecutes cases only when States do not are 
unwilling or unable to do so genuinely. As a judicial institution, the ICC 
does not have its own police force or enforcement body; thus, it relies on 
cooperation with countries worldwide for support, particularly for 
making arrests, transferring arrested persons to the ICC detention center 
in The Hague, freezing suspects’ assets, and enforcing sentences. While 
not a United Nations organization, the Court has a cooperation 
agreement with the United Nations. When a situation is not within the 
Court’s jurisdiction, the United Nations Security Council can refer the 
situation to the ICC granting it jurisdiction. This has been done in the 
situations in Darfur (Sudan) and Libya. The ICC actively works to build 
understanding and cooperation in all regions, for example, through 
seminars and conferences worldwide. The Court cooperates with both 
States Parties and non-States Parties. 
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The Court works in particularly close cooperation with its host 
state, the Netherlands, regarding practical matters such as constructing 
the Court’s new permanent buildings, transferring suspects to the ICC 
Detention Centre, facilitating their appearances before the Court, and 
many other matters. Countries and other entities, including civil society 
groups such as NGOs, also cooperate with the Court in numerous ways, 
such as raising awareness of and building support for the Court and its 
mandate. The Court seeks to increase this ongoing cooperation through 
such means as seminars and conferences. 
Ten key facts about legal processes in the International Criminal 
Court [61]: 
Fact 1. The ICC does not prosecute those under the age of 18 when 
a crime was committed. 
Fact 2. Before the Prosecutor can investigate, she must conduct a 
preliminary examination considering such matters as sufficient evidence, 
jurisdiction, gravity, complementarity, and the interests of justice. 
Fact 3. When investigating, the Prosecutor must collect and 
disclose both incriminating and exonerating evidence. 
Fact 4. The defendant is considered innocent until proven guilty. 
The burden of proof lies with the Prosecutor. 
Fact 5. During all stages of proceedings (Pre-Trial, Trial and 
Appeals), the defendant has the right to information in a language he or 
she fully understands, thus the ICC proceedings are conducted in 
multiple languages, with teams of interpreters and translators at work. 
Fact 6. Pre-Trial judges issue warrants of arrest and ensure there is 
enough evidence before a case can go to trial. 
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Fact 7. Before a case is committed to trial (during the Pre-Trial 
phase), the defendant is referred to as a suspect. Once the case is 
committed to trial, since at that point the charges have been confirmed, 
the defendant is referred to as the accused. 
Fact 8. Trial judges hear the evidence from the Prosecutor, 
Defence, and the Victims’ lawyers, render a verdict, and if a person is 
found guilty, the sentence and decision on reparations. 
Fact 9. Appeals judges render decisions on appeals from the 
Prosecutor or Defence. 
Fact 10. If a case is closed without a verdict of guilt, it can be 
reopened if the Prosecutor presents new evidence. 
The International Criminal Court comprises four separate organs 
[61]: Presidency, Judicial Divisions, OTP, and Registry.  
The Presidency.  The Presidency is one of the four Organs of the 
Court. It is composed of the President and First and Second Vice-
Presidents, all of whom are elected by an absolute majority of the Judges 
of the Court for a three year renewable term. The judges composing the 
Presidency serve on a full-time basis. The Presidency has three main 
areas of responsibility: judicial/legal functions, administration and 
external relations. In the exercise of its judicial/legal functions, the 
Presidency constitutes and assigns cases to Chambers, conducts judicial 
review of certain decisions of the Registrar and concludes Court-wide 
cooperation agreements with States. With the exception of the Office of 
the Prosecutor, the Presidency is responsible for the proper 
administration of the Court and oversees the work of the Registry. The 
Presidency will coordinate and seek the concurrence of the Prosecutor 
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on all matters of mutual concern. Among the Presidency’s 
responsibilities in the area of external relations is to maintain relations 
with States and other entities and to promote public awareness and 
understanding of the Court.  
Judicial Divisions. The ICC's 18 judges are elected by the 
Assembly of States Parties for their qualifications, impartiality and 
integrity, and serve 9-year, non-renewable terms. They ensure fair trials 
and render decisions, but also issue arrest warrants or summonses to 
appear, authorize victims to participate, order witness protection 
measures, and more. They also elect, from among themselves, the ICC 
President and two Vice-Presidents, who head the Court. The Court has 
three Judicial Divisions, which hear matters as different stages of the 
proceedings: Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals. 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). The Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) is an independent organ of the Court. It is responsible for 
examining situations under the jurisdiction of the Court where genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression appear to have been 
committed, and carrying out investigations and prosecutions against the 
individuals who are allegedly most responsible for those crimes. It is for 
the first time in history that an international Prosecutor has been given 
the mandate, by an ever-growing number of States, to independently and 
impartiality select situations for investigation where atrocity crimes are 
or have been committed on their territories or by their nationals. Like the 
judges of the Court, the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor are elected 
for a non-renewable mandate of nine years. 
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Registry. The Registry is a neutral organ of the Court that provides 
services to all other organs so the ICC can function and conduct fair and 
effective public proceedings. The Registry is responsible for three main 
categories of services:  
– judicial support, including general court management and court 
records, translation and interpretation, counsel support (including lists of 
counsel and assistants to counsel, experts, investigators and offices to 
support the Defence and victims), the detention center, legal aid, support 
for victims to participate in proceedings and apply for reparations, for 
witnesses to receive support and protection;  
– external affairs, including external relations, public information 
and Outreach, field office support, and victims and witness support;  
– management, including security, budget, finance, human 
resources and general services. 
 The seat of the Court is in The Hague in the Netherlands. Over 
120 countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute, representing all 
regions: Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as well as Western European and North America [95].  
 
Conclusions 
 
1. A crime is any act or omission that violates a law which results 
in a punishment. All crimes have four elements in common: a voluntary 
act, a culpable state of mind, a “concurrence”, and causation of harm. 
The legal definitions of all crimes do contain certain elements. If the 
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government cannot prove the existence of these elements, it cannot 
obtain a conviction in a court of law. 
2. The international legal system addresses the wrongdoings that 
people commit with two different types of cases: civil and criminal. 
Criminal cases involve an action that is considered to be harmful to 
society as a whole. Civil cases usually involve private disputes between 
persons or organizations. 
3. Criminal law is the body of law that relates to crime. It regulates 
social conduct. It includes the punishment of people who violate these 
laws. The burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal law 
defines crimes; sets the procedures for arrests, searches and seizures, and 
interrogations; establishes the rules for trials; and specifies the 
punishments for offenders.  
4. There are a number of approaches to categorizing crimes. The 
most significant distinction is between a felony and a misdemeanor. 
Another approach is to distinguish between crimes against the state,  
crimes against the person, crimes against habitation, crimes against 
property, crimes against public order, crimes against the administration 
of justice, crimes against public morals.  
5. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a court of last resort 
for the prosecution of serious international crimes. The ICC plays a 
substantial role in international relations and peace processes. It deals 
mainly with four main crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and crimes of aggression.  
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End-of-chapter tasks: 
 
1. Identify basic components of a crime. 
2. Define a crime, a criminal act, a criminal intent, and a criminal harm. 
3. Dissect criminal cases from civil cases. 
4. List sources of criminal law. 
5. Give an example of felonies. 
6. Dramatize a role play in the International Criminal Court.  
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CHAPTER 2. ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 
 
2.1. Economic Models of Criminal Behavior 
2.2. Rational Choice Approach to Crime  
2.3. Economic Analysis of Criminal Behavior 
2.4. Economic Effects of Crime 
Key words: economic theory, rational model, trade-off, probability of 
conviction, severity of punishment, economic impact, costs of crime     
 
2.1. Economic Models of Criminal Behavior 
 
The economic modeling of criminal behavior is a rather new 
application of economic theory. It arose in the United States in response 
to the growth of crimes which began in 1960’s. Economists brought to 
the study of criminal behavior their usual economic tools: income, costs, 
elasticity, trade-offs, returns to input factors, supply schedules, demand 
schedules and equilibrium levels. The economic theory provides a way 
of thinking about criminal behavior that departs from the prevailing 
psychological and sociological approaches. A psychological approach 
regards criminal behavior as an aspect of deficient personality. A 
sociological approach regards criminal behavior as a special case of 
deviance from social norms within a context of social sanctions and 
rewards. An economic theory of crime regards the criminal mainly as a 
rational actor, maximizing profit within a matrix of costs and 
opportunities [34].     
There are three main economic models of crime [2, p. 273]: 
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 the rational model; 
 the present-oriented, or myopic model; 
 the radical political economic model.   
Each model emphasizes different factors that influence individual 
decisions to commit crime and different ways of combating crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 – Economic models of crime [2, p. 272] 
 
The rational model of crime 
Economics can be defined as a discipline that studies how scarce 
resources are allocated by the forces of supply and demand to meet 
different needs in society. In the same way, economists argue that crime 
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is a result of individuals’ making choices between using their scarce 
resources of time and effort in legitimate or in illegitimate activities. A 
key assumption is that when making these choices, individuals are 
rational and choose the best option based on the available information 
and resources. Individuals are perceived to be promoting their self-
interest by rationally selecting options that provide them with the 
greatest benefits that are expected to exceed the costs associated with 
these options. Theories of crime based on the rational model were 
proposed as early as the eighteenth century by enlightenment 
philosophers such as Bentham and Beccaria. Bentham made the 
following argument: “The profit of the crime is the force which urges 
man to delinquency: the pain of the punishment is the force employed to 
restrain him from it. If the first of these forces be the greater, the crime 
will be committed; if the second, the crime will not be committed” [23]. 
The profit from crime is traditionally measured in terms of 
monetary benefits but can also include physical, psychic, and other 
benefits. The “punishment” or costs of crime include the risk of 
detection, apprehension, and conviction and the severity of punishment. 
Economists do not refute that environmental, psychological, and 
biological factors may affect criminal activity. Nevertheless, they argue 
that individuals are free to choose between different courses of options 
available to them. Therefore, as long as there is a rational element of 
choice available, individuals who decide to commit a crime will react to 
changes in the probability of apprehension and the severity of 
punishment.  
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This framework leads to a key concept, namely, the “opportunity 
cost” of crime. Any decision that involves a choice between two or more 
options has an opportunity cost. An opportunity cost can be defined as 
the value of the next best alternative within the context of making a 
decision. Put differently, an opportunity cost can be viewed as the 
benefits an individual could have received by taking an alternative 
decision or action. In essence, the true cost of crime for a potential 
criminal is the opportunity cost of spending time in prison. The 
opportunity cost varies among individuals irrespective of the length of 
incarceration. The rational framework distinguishes between static and 
dynamic models of crime. In a static model, individuals compare the 
costs and benefits of engaging in crime in a single time period. In a 
dynamic model, the individual considers multiple time periods. 
Decisions made in the past, for example, impact the decision-making 
process in the present. Dynamic models thus account for the element of 
time unlike static models [2, p. 273–274]. 
The static rational model of crime. Becker was the first to 
translate the argument of Bentham into an economic theory of crime in 
his seminal article on crime and punishment. Becker argues that “a 
useful theory of criminal behavior can dispense with special theories of 
anomie, psychological inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits and 
simply extend the economist’s usual analysis of choice” [4]. Becker 
developed a static model in which the individual considers a single time 
period when making a decision on whether or not to commit a crime. He 
contends that a cost/benefit analysis can be used to inform an 
individual’s decision to commit a crime. As individuals do not have 
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perfect information, Becker assumes that rational individuals will seek 
to maximize the expected benefits. Individuals do so by comparing the 
benefit they would derive from a criminal activity with the benefit 
derived from engaging in legal activities. An implicit assumption is that 
there are no risks in terms of the returns from legitimate work. In 
Becker’s model, benefit is defined as a positive function of income. 
Thus, an individual will commit a crime only if his or her expected 
benefit from the offense is positive. The primary focus of the model is 
the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system in this decision 
process. Another assumption in Becker’s model is that of stable 
preferences. This assumption allows one to predict how individuals 
respond to changes in parameters of being caught and punished; for 
example, whether the act of crime or deviance can be made less 
attractive to an individual and whether crime or deviant behavior can be 
averted. Becker addresses this issue by focusing on the probability and 
severity of punishment and its impact on the total amount of crime. 
Becker argues that the probability and severity of punishment can reduce 
the number of crimes by acting as deterrents to crime. The individual’s 
attitude toward risk determines which of the two deterrents would be 
more effective in reducing crime. For example, an individual who is 
risk-averse may react more strongly to changes in the probability of 
apprehension than to changes in the magnitude of the punishment, all 
other things being equal. An increase in the costs of crime reduces the 
expected gain from committing an offense and thus lowers the incentive 
to offend [2, p. 275–276]. 
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The dynamic rational model of crime. Though the rational 
models presented earlier are set in a static framework, an individual’s 
decision to commit a crime also has an impact on the future payoffs 
from choices made in the past or present. Dynamic models integrate past 
experience with forward-looking behavior. The former deals with how 
past arrests impact decisions made in the present. The latter examines 
how decisions made in the present affect future consequences related to 
employment and expected benefits. Using the dynamic model, there is 
evidence that important factors can be used to predict criminal behavior. 
For example, juvenile records are sealed at the age of 18 years, and 
sanctions by juvenile courts tend to be milder than those in the adult 
courts. As such, one would expect higher crime rates among youth 
younger than age 18 [40]. Indeed, Levitt [46] finds that there is a clear 
drop-off in the age of arrest after 18 in states wherein juvenile courts 
issue milder sanctions compared to adult courts than in states wherein 
juvenile sanctions are more severe. Individuals thus seem to change their 
behavior when they anticipate the possible future consequences of their 
actions. Flinn [27] includes the formation of human capital in a time-
allocation model. Flinn argues that human capital is accumulated at 
work. As a result, if time spent on crime lowers time spent at work, the 
amount of human capital accumulated by an individual is reduced. This 
diminishment leads to lower future earnings and consequently less time 
in legal work. Crime and work are assumed to be substitutes in this 
model. Therefore, reduced time at work leads to an increased 
involvement in criminal activities. Williams and Sickles [104] extend 
models by including social capital to measure the effect of social norms 
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on an individual’s decision to engage in crime. The authors assume that 
participation in crime decreases the value of an individual’s stock of 
social capital, namely, marriage and employability. In other words, 
individuals with families or good jobs have more to lose if they are 
caught in a criminal act than individuals without these resources. The 
main conclusion is that criminals behave rationally when they take into 
consideration the consequences of current actions on future outcomes. 
The incentives to commit crime are reduced when the risks of 
apprehension can jeopardize future employment [40]. 
The present-oriented, or myopic economic model of crime 
Human beings are generally impatient. Most people would prefer 
to experience immediate rewards and postpone the associated costs. 
Relaxing the assumption of rational behavior allows economists to study 
cases wherein criminals appear to behave in a non-rational, impulsive, or 
myopic manner. When deliberating about the trade-offs between the 
present and the future, individuals who attach greater weight to the 
present are said to have more “present-oriented” preferences [60]. 
Economists use hyperbolic discounting to formally examine present-
oriented behavior. Hyperbolic discounting is assumed to reveal irrational 
behavior because decisions made in this setting are not time-consistent. 
Time inconsistency refers to a situation whereby an individual’s 
preferences change over time, such that what is preferred at one point in 
time is inconsistent with what is preferred at another point in time. One 
common way this is revealed is when an individual displays undue 
concern with the immediate rather than distant future. A rational 
individual, conversely, compares present and future gains and shortfalls 
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by seeking to match short-term and long-term preferences. A rational 
individual who does not give added weight to short-term benefits from a 
criminal activity will most likely be someone who displays patience. 
The desire for immediate gratification may, however, lead an individual 
to commit a crime that has negative expected returns in the long-term 
[44].When the costs of crime are delayed, the immediate benefits 
support the offender’s impulsiveness, resulting in more crime [50]. The 
threat of punishment does not deter present-oriented individuals because 
the gains from the illegal activity are closer to the present whereas the 
related punishment that he or she might suffer lie in the more distant 
future [3]. 
Lee and McCrary [45] use a large, individual-level, longitudinal 
data set of felony arrests maintained by the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement to measure the deterrence effects of criminal sanctions in 
the period 1989 to 2002. In particular, they examine whether there is any 
significant drop in offense rates among juveniles once they turn 18 years, 
as they are treated as adult offenders and face longer sentences. Their 
assumption is that sufficiently patient individuals will lower their 
offending rates as soon as they turn 18. However, they find that 
criminals do not make behavioral adjustments in anticipation of this 
change in the severity of punishment. This finding suggests that potential 
offenders are very impatient, myopic, or both. Nagin and Pogarsky [57] 
use data on college students to examine under what circumstances 
individuals would cheat. They find that less cheating occurred when the 
risk of apprehension was greater but not when there were higher 
penalties. Furthermore, they find that the prevalence of cheating was 
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higher among more present-oriented individuals. Similarly, Nagin and 
Paternoster [56] use a student questionnaire and find that present-
orientation is significantly related with the probability of committing a 
number of crimes. Urban ethnographers such as Fleisher [26] and 
Anderson [1] find that crime-prone youths are overly present-oriented 
for any type of traditional crime deterrence to be successful. The 
following quote from a young prisoner in a paper by DiIulio summarizes 
the present-oriented concept well: ‘‘You never think about doing thirty 
when you don’t expect to live to thirty’’[19]. Nagin and Paternoster [56] 
argue that individuals who are more present-oriented invest less in social 
bonds. As such, they are less deterred by the prospects of breaking those 
bonds and committing a crime. The astonishing degree to which youths 
commit crimes for not only profit but status, image, and even fun has yet 
to be fully considered by economists. The rational economic models of 
crime described earlier suggest that crime can be reduced by increasing 
the expected costs of criminal activities. The ability to increase this cost 
depends largely on the extent to which potential criminals discount their 
future welfare. If individuals are more concerned with their present 
welfare rather than their future welfare, an increase in the length of 
incarceration may have little impact on criminal behavior. In essence, 
the most effective sanctions of the rational model will do little to 
dissuade the present-oriented or myopic offender. Therefore effective 
enforcement policies for this type of offender should focus on lowering 
the immediate benefits or increasing the immediate costs of a criminal 
activity to discourage present-oriented or myopic behavior.  
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The radical political economic model of crime 
The rational and present-oriented models of crime focus primarily 
on the individual’s decision to allocate time between legal and illegal 
activities. The radical political economic models, conversely, focus on 
key political and socioeconomic factors that sustain crime. The key 
factors in this model are relative deprivation, poverty and inequality, 
unemployment, and class. These factors are all interrelated. The factor 
of relative deprivation focuses on the relative differences in income 
among the different classes in society. According to this view, individual 
identify themselves with the group they belong to in society. The degree 
of deprivation is defined as the distance between the particular group’s 
experiences compared with that of the larger society, which is regarded 
as a proxy for what the group is entitled to. In neoclassical economics, 
individuals determine their chances of employment and income based on 
their level of education and a relatively open labor market. In the 
relative deprivation model, individuals perceive their fate to be similar 
to that of their peers [59]. When Danziger [15] and Danziger and 
Wheeler [16] studied the relationship between the relative deprivation 
approach and criminal activities (burglary and robbery), they found that 
there is a positive relationship between income inequality and criminal 
activities. 
Poverty and inequality. Differences in poverty rates and wealth 
are commonly viewed as factors influencing variations in crime rates. 
Proponents of the federal Great Society programs in the 1960s believed 
that poverty amelioration would eventually lower crime by enhancing 
the living conditions of the poor and thereby reduce their involvement in 
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criminal activities [59]. Gordon [33] argues that capitalism and its 
associated inequalities generate crime. Gordon views criminal behavior 
as part of the structure of capitalist societies and in the socioeconomic 
conflicts resulting from that structure. As a result, crime is an outcome 
of the poor’s trying to create a better existence for themselves.  
Unemployment. Different models examine the different 
relationships between unemployment and crime. Some economic models 
assume that unemployment either lowers the opportunity costs of crime 
or that it increases the need to supplement income from sources other 
than legal employment. Radical theories suggest that unemployment 
increases poverty. The resulting deprivation then lowers the costs of 
criminal activities and punishment. The indirect result is that conflict 
increases [59]. However, how do individuals form expectations about 
their earnings potential in the labor market? If there is a considerable 
gap between what the individual believes is attainable (group 
experience) and what is unattainable (larger society experience), an 
individual perceives this gap as relative deprivation. Hence the 
opportunity costs of crime may be reduced because the returns from 
regular employment are seen as minimal. In contrast, if the larger 
society also suffers from unemployment, the shortage of employment 
opportunities may still be considered equitable. Nickerson, in support of 
this argument, notes that crime rates during the Great Depression were 
stable or falling. Thornberry and Christenson [89] use data from a 
longitudinal cohort study of delinquency in Philadelphia and find that 
unemployment significantly impacts criminal involvement. They find 
that crime rates, especially property crime, are higher during periods of 
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high unemployment. Other studies [105] also find a positive relationship 
between unemployment and crime. Interestingly, Cantor and Land [5] 
find a negative relationship between unemployment and property crime 
in the United States because a general slowdown in the economy 
increases time spent at home and, therefore, the ability to guard one’s 
property. 
Class structure. The attempt to relate criminal activities to 
specific ideas of class conflict is often based on a Marxian analysis. The 
use of laws is assumed to systematically discriminate against the poorer 
classes. Taylor, Walton, and Young [80] suggest that deviant behavior 
may be a reaction to the challenges of living in a conflicted society. 
Class bias is revealed in the attention that crimes, such as burglary or 
theft, receive in comparison with white collar crime, although the latter 
type of crimes represent a larger proportion of monetary losses than the 
former type [72]. This finding supports the liberal perspective that crime 
is really a response to societal prejudice against the poor. Gordon [33] 
contrasts white-collar crimes typically committed by the richer classes 
of society with those committed by the poor. The former type of crimes 
tends to be more nonviolent in nature because they are crimes that must 
be committed in secret. The latter crimes often require direct 
confrontation or intimidation and sometimes the silencing of the victims 
to escape apprehension. Gordon quotes Robert Morgenthau, who writes: 
“those growing up in the ghetto will probably never have the 
opportunity to embezzle funds from a bank or to promote a multimillion 
dollar stock fraud scheme. The criminal ways which we encourage 
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(them) to choose will be those closest at hand – from vandalism to 
mugging to armed robbery” [33].  
So, from a rational perspective, individuals make a choice about 
how best to spend their time. In making the choice, they assess the costs 
and benefits of spending their time in legal or illegal work. Individuals 
thus choose to commit a crime only if the expected benefits from that 
choice exceed the expected costs associated with it. The rational model 
thus focuses on an individual’s incentives to commit crime. This focus 
reflects a faith in the ability to shape individual behavior through the use 
of negative incentives or deterrents. An individual-oriented approach 
relies on the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment 
as tools to keep individuals from participating in criminal activities. One 
key criticism of the rational model is that the planful and thoughtful 
decision-making process does not fit the opportunistic, impulsive, and 
even rash nature of criminal activity.  
Present-oriented individuals generally do not make rational 
decisions when they focus on short-term benefits and ignore the long-
term consequences of their actions. One important result is that the 
deterrence tools used in the rational model will not deter present-
oriented offenders, all other things being equal. An effective deterrence 
strategy should target an individual’s short-term preferences that need to 
be identified across individuals with different motivations and reasons 
for engaging in crime. 
The radical theories focus on the link between crime and 
socioeconomic factors (e. g., poverty and inequality, relative 
deprivation, unemployment, and class structure) whereby an increase in 
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these factors leads to increased crime. However these links are quite 
complex, and the causal relationships are debatable. For example, does 
poverty lead to more crime, or does more crime lead to persistent 
poverty? More research is needed on how the social and economic 
environment affects the costs and benefits of criminal activity. A greater 
understanding of the role of norms and values, opportunities, and 
abilities in predicting crime is also needed. Most economic research on 
crime and delinquency has focused on how law breakers can be deterred 
through the criminal justice system and on the relationship between legal 
employment and illegal activities. This relationship between work and 
crime may be far more intricate than many economic models have 
implied thus far.  
 
2.2. Rational Choice Approach to Crime  
 
The premise of economic theories application to studying criminal 
behavior is that criminals, like everyone else, behave rationally. The 
economic approach implies that criminals don’t differ from the general 
population when it comes to reacting to incentives. Economists contend 
that people are drawn to criminal activities because they expect to be 
better off from engaging in them than not.   
Economic theory regards the criminal as rational actor engaged in 
a number of incentives and disincentives. The fundamental rational 
model assumes that the rational actor allocates time between legitimate 
and illegitimate activities taking into account probability of conviction 
and severity of punishment.     
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Gary Becker, the winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 
1992, is considered to be a founding father of the rational choice model 
of a crime. His 1968 study “Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach” was the first rigorous analysis on crime done by an 
economist and inspired many other economists to follow suit. He 
applied the tools of microeconomics to prove that criminals act 
rationally.  
As all of you know, a defining characteristic of microeconomics is 
that it assumes that our behaviors and choices are rational. For example, 
when we go grocery-shopping with a limited budget, we choose an 
optimal bundle that would give us the maximum level of happiness (or 
“utility” in economics jargon). Why would we ever choose another 
bundle that is not as good but costs the same? Similarly, when we 
choose which car to buy and which house to move into, we would 
always choose the option that is the best for us. Of course, different 
people would have different preferences and come up with different 
“optimal” choices. But it is reasonable to assume that each decision-
maker will choose the best option available for him. Why would anyone 
settle for a less-than-optimal choice instead?  
Economists use this rational choice framework to explain why 
people commit crime. Under this framework, an individual looks at the 
expected gains and losses from crime and compares them with the gains 
and losses from staying out of crime. In other words, an individual 
commits crime if the following inequality holds [67]: 
 (1 − p)us  +  puf(1 − p)us  +  puf  >  u, (2.1) 
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where us represents the expected utility when he successfully 
commits the crime (which may include both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary gains),  
uf represents his expected utility when he commits crime and 
receives punishment (so this is likely to be a negative number), 
 p represents the probability of punishment, 
 u represents his level of utility when he does not commit crime.  
An individual will choose to commit crime if the net expected 
gains from crime (left-hand side of the inequality above) is greater than 
the net gains from not committing crime (right-hand side of the 
inequality). 
Consider the following example [67]. An individual is considering 
whether to become a thief or not. If he “works” as a thief for a week and 
does not get caught, he will earn $ 2 000. If he gets caught, he will have 
to pay the fine of $ 4 000. He thinks there is a 30 % chance of 
punishment if he commits the crime. If he does not steal, he will 
continue to work at a legitimate job which pays him $ 500 per week. For 
now, let’s assume that he is an individual who neither enjoys nor feels 
guilty about stealing. He only cares about the monetary gains and losses 
from crime. 
Comparing his gains and costs from crime and legitimate work, we 
would expect him to choose not to steal because: 
 (0.7)(2000) + (0.3)(−4000) < 500(0.7)(2000) + (0.3)(−4000) < 500 
However, in reality, people care about more than just monetary 
gains and losses when choosing whether to offend or not. People with 
high moral values would choose not to commit crime even if they can 
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make a lot more money by committing crime. For example, peer 
pressure may cause students to participate in delinquent activities with 
their friends, even if there is no monetary gain from doing so. 
But these non-monetary factors can easily be incorporated in the 
rational choice framework. For example, suppose an individual is 
currently working at a job that does not pay very well, but he is very 
much content with the life style associated with his job. We would 
expect that he has a very high value of u (and thus has a very low chance 
of committing a crime). 
Likewise, people may have different ideas about the probabilities 
of arrest and punishment. Even when they live in the same neighborhood 
and are subject to the same criminal justice system, some people may be 
just more optimistic than others about the probability of punishment. 
Clearly, those who more optimistic (low p) should be more likely to 
commit crime than those with high p. Importantly, even if someone has 
a unrealistically low value of p, as long as he chooses to offend because 
his expected gains from crime is greater than his gains from not 
offending, he is still making a rational choice. He may be poorly 
informed, but he can still make a rational choice based on his poor 
information. 
The rational choice framework may appear a bit too simplistic and 
unrealistic at first glance. But it can be easily extended to incorporate 
other relevant factors, such as non-monetary gains and losses from crime 
and individuals’ subjective expectations about the probability of 
punishment. There can be many more different crime-relevant factors 
that influence people’s criminal decisions in different ways, and trying 
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to come up with a model that accurately predicts each individual’s 
criminal decision will be difficult. However, the main contribution of the 
rational choice model of crime is that it views crime as a “choice”: 
individuals commit crime because they find it as a better choice than not 
committing crime (for many different reasons). 
 
2.3. Economic Analysis of Criminal Behavior 
 
Economists approach the analysis of crime with one simple 
assumption – that criminals are rational. A mugger is a mugger for the 
same reason you are the economists – because it is the most attractive 
alternative available to him. The decision to commit a crime, like any 
other economic decision, can be analyzed as a choice among alternative 
combinations of costs and benefits. 
Consider, as a simple example, a point that sometimes comes up in 
discussions of gun control [28]. Opponents of private ownership of 
handguns argue that, in violent contests between criminals and victims, 
the criminals usually win. A professional criminal, after all, has far more 
reason to learn how to use a gun than a random potential victim. The 
argument is probably true, but the conclusion – that permitting both 
criminals and victims to have guns will help the criminals – does not 
follow. To see why, imagine that the result of legal handgun ownership 
is that one little old lady in ten chooses to carry a pistol in her purse. 
Further suppose that, of those who do, only one in ten, if mugged, 
succeeds in killing the mugger; the other nine miss, drop the gun, or 
shoot themselves in the foot. On average, the muggers are winning. But 
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also on average, each one hundred muggings of little old ladies produce 
one dead mugger. Very few little old ladies carry enough money to be 
worth one chance in a hundred of being killed. Economic theory 
suggests that the number of muggings will decrease – not because the 
muggers have all been killed, but because some of them have chosen to 
switch to safer professions. If the idea that muggers are rational profit 
maximizers seems implausible, consider who gets mugged. If a 
mugger’s objective is to express machismo, to prove what a human he 
is, there is very little point in mugging little old ladies. If the objective is 
to get money at as low a cost as possible, there is much to be said for 
picking the most defenseless victims they can find. In the real world, 
little old ladies get mugged a lot more often than football players do.  
Economic analysis can also be used to help understand the nature 
of organized crime. Newspapers, prosecutors, and the FBI often make 
organized crime sound almost like General Motors or IBM – a 
hierarchical organization with a few kingpins controlling thousands of 
subordinates. What we know about the economics of organizations 
makes this an unlikely description of real criminal organizations. One 
major limitation on the size of firms is the problem of control. The more 
layers of hierarchy there are between the president and the factory 
worker, the harder it is for management to monitor and control the 
workers. That is one reason that small firms often are more successful 
than large ones. 
We would expect this problem to be especially severe in criminal 
markets. Legitimate businesses can and do make extensive use of 
memos, reports, job evaluations, and the like to pass information from 
63 
 
one layer of the hierarchy to another. But the very information that a 
criminal uses to keep track of what his employees are doing can also be 
used by a district attorney to keep track of what the criminal is doing. 
What economists call “informational diseconomies of scale” are 
therefore a particularly serious problem in criminal firms, implying that 
such firms should, on average, tend to be smaller, not larger, than firms 
in other markets. 
Criminal enterprises obviously are more difficult to study than 
ordinary ones. Criminal firms seem to be relatively small and the 
organization of criminal industries relatively decentralized – precisely 
the opposite of the pattern described in novels, movies, and the popular 
press. It may well be that “organized crime” is not so much a 
corporation as a sort of chamber of commerce for the criminal market – 
a network of individuals and small firms that routinely do business with 
each other and occasionally cooperate in their mutual interest. 
Economic analysis can also be used to predict the effectiveness of 
law enforcement measures. Consider the current “War on Drugs.” From 
an economic standpoint, its objective is to reduce the supply of illegal 
drugs, thus raising their prices and reducing the amount people wish to 
consume. One enforcement strategy is to pressure countries such as 
Colombia to prevent the production of coca, the raw material used to 
make cocaine. 
Such a strategy, if successful, would shift coca production to 
whatever country is next best at producing it; since coca can be grown in 
many different places, this shift is not likely to result in a very large 
increase in cost. Published estimates suggest that the cost of producing 
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drugs abroad and transporting them to the United States represents only 
about 1 percent of their street price. So, even if we succeed in doubling 
the cost of coca – which seems unlikely, given experience with elasticity 
of supply of other crops – the result would be only about a 1 percent 
increase in the price of cocaine and a correspondingly small decrease in 
the amount consumed. Thus, economic analysis suggests that pressuring 
other countries not to produce drugs is probably not a very effective way 
of reducing their use. 
One interesting issue in the economic analysis of crime is the 
question of which legal rules are economically efficient. Loosely 
speaking, which rules maximize the total size of the economic pie, the 
degree to which people get what they want? This is relevant both to 
broad issues such as whether theft should be illegal and to more detailed 
questions, such as how to calculate the optimal punishment for a 
particular crime. 
Consider the question of laws against theft. At first glance, it might 
seem that, however immoral theft may be, it is not inefficient. If I steal 
ten dollars from you, I am ten dollars richer and you are ten dollars 
poorer, so the total wealth of society is unchanged. Thus, if we judge 
laws solely on grounds of economic efficiency, it seems that there is no 
reason to make theft illegal. 
That seems obvious, but it is wrong. Opportunities to make money 
by stealing, like opportunities to make money in other ways, attract 
economic resources. If stealing is more profitable than washing dishes or 
waiting on tables, workers will be attracted out of those activities and 
into theft. As the number of thieves increases, the returns from theft fall, 
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both because everything easy to steal has already been stolen and 
because victims defend themselves against the increased level of theft by 
installing locks, bars, burglar alarms, and guard dogs. The process stops 
only when the next person who is considering becoming a thief 
concludes that he will be just about as well off continuing to wash dishes 
– that the gains from becoming a thief are about equal to the costs. 
The thief who is just on the margin of being a thief pays, with his 
time and effort, the price of what he steals. Thus, the victim’s loss is a 
net social loss – the thief has no equal gain to balance it. So the 
existence of theft makes society as a whole poorer, not because money 
has been transferred from one person to another, but because productive 
resources have been diverted out of the business of producing and into 
the business of stealing. 
A full analysis of the cost of theft would be more complicated than 
this sketch, and the social cost of theft would no longer be exactly equal 
to the amount stolen. It would be less to the extent that people who are 
particularly skillful at theft earn more in that profession than they could 
in any other, giving them a net gain to partly balance the loss to their 
victims. It would be higher to the extent that theft results in additional 
costs, such as the cost of defensive precautions taken by potential 
victims. The central conclusion would, however, remain – that we will, 
on net, be better off if theft is illegal. 
This conclusion must be qualified by the observation that, to 
reduce theft, we must spend resources on catching and punishing 
thieves. Theft is inefficient – but spending a hundred dollars to prevent a 
ten-dollar theft is still more inefficient. Reducing theft to zero would 
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almost certainly cost more than it would be worth. What we want, from 
the standpoint of economic efficiency, is the optimal level of theft. We 
want to increase our expenditures on law enforcement only as long as 
one more dollar spent catching and punishing thieves reduces the net 
cost of theft by more than a dollar. Beyond that point, additional 
reductions in theft cost more than they are worth. 
This raises a number of issues, both empirical and theoretical. The 
empirical issues involve an ongoing dispute about whether punishment 
deters crime and, if so, by how much. While economic theory predicts 
that there should be some deterrent effect, it does not tell us how large it 
should be. Isaac Ehrlich, in a widely quoted (and extensively criticized) 
study of the deterrent effect of capital punishment, concluded that each 
execution deters several murders [28]. Other researchers have gotten 
very different results. 
One interesting theoretical point is the question of how to choose 
the best combination of probability of conviction and severity of 
punishment. One could imagine punishing theft by catching half the 
thieves and fining them a hundred dollars each, by catching a quarter 
and fining them two hundred each, or by catching one thief in a hundred 
and hanging him. How do you decide which alternative is best? 
At first glance, it might seem efficient always to impose the 
highest possible punishment. The worse the punishment, the fewer 
criminals you have to catch in order to maintain a given level of 
deterrence – and catching criminals is costly. One reason this is wrong is 
that punishing criminals is also costly. A low punishment can take the 
form of a fine; what the criminal loses the court gains, so the net cost of 
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the punishment is zero. Criminals generally cannot pay large fines, so 
large punishments take the form of imprisonment or execution, which is 
less efficient – nobody gets what the criminal loses and someone has to 
pay for the jail. 
A second reason we do not want maximum punishments for all 
offenses is that we want to give criminals an incentive to limit their 
crimes. If the punishments for armed robbery and murder are the same, 
then the robber who is caught in the act has an incentive to kill the 
witness. He may get away, and, at worst, they can hang him only once. 
 
2.4. Economic Effects of Crime 
 
Crime is a major part of every society. Its costs and effects touch 
just about everyone to some degree. The types of costs and effects are 
widely varied. In addition, some costs are short-term while others last a 
lifetime. Of course the ultimate cost is loss of life. Other costs to victims 
can include medical costs, property losses, and loss of income. Losses to 
both victims and nonvictims can also come in the form of increased 
security expenses including stronger locks, extra lighting, parking in 
more expensive secure lots, security alarms for homes and cars, and 
maintaining guard dogs. Considerable money is spent to avoid being 
victimized. Other types of expenses can include a victim or person 
fearful of crime moving to a new neighborhood, funeral expenses, legal 
fees, and loss of school days. 
Some costs of crime are less tangible (not easily or precisely 
identified). These kinds of costs can include pain and suffering, and a 
lower quality of life. There are also the traumatic impacts on friends and 
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the disruption of family. Behavior can be forever changed and shaped by 
crime, whether it be weighing the risks of going to certain places or even 
the fear of making new friends. 
Crime not only affects economic productivity when victims miss 
work, but communities also are affected through loss of tourism and 
retail sales. Even the so-called victimless crimes of drug abuse or 
gambling have major social consequences. Drug abuse affects worker 
productivity, uses public funds for drug treatment programs and medical 
attention, and leads to criminal activity to support the expenses of a drug 
habit.  
Communities and governments spend public funds for police 
departments, prisons and jails, courts, and treatment programs, including 
the salaries of prosecutors, judges, public defenders, social workers, 
security guards, and probation officers. The amount of time spent by 
victims, offenders, their families, and juries during court trials also take 
away from community productivity. By the beginning of the twenty-first 
century it was estimated that the annual cost of crime in the United 
States was reaching upward toward $1.7 trillion [21].  
Economists use various definitions for categorizing the economic 
impact of crime. The two main categories are the primary and secondary 
economic impact of crime, also referred to as direct and indirect 
economic  effects. 
This relationship is illustrated below on the map. 
 
Fig. 2.2 – The economic impact of crime [21] 
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Primary economic impact of crime 
In general, economists use two types of methods to further 
categorize the (primary) costs of crime. The first way is by defining the 
subject who bears the effects (victims, potential victims, society etc.). 
From an economic point of view, criminal offences can be aimed against 
[21]: 
 individuals/households; 
 the commercial sector/companies; 
 the public sector/society. 
A second approach of categorizing, is by breaking down the costs 
in relation to individual incidents. This way, the costs of crime are 
categorized as: 
1. In anticipation of crime: mainly costs of precaution measures 
to avoid crime such as locks, alarm prevention programs and 
surveillance. 
2. As a consequence of crime: for instance, loss of property, 
medical and health care costs, victim support etc. 
3. In response to crime: costs considering police, prosecution, 
court proceedings, sanctions etc. 
Secondary economic impact of crime 
Crime not only leads to financial or physical damage and 
prevention costs, but also indirectly influences the local/regional and 
national economy of a country (the so-called secondary economic 
impact). According to such approach, crime acts like a tax on the entire 
economy: it discourages domestic and foreign direct investments. On a 
macro-economic level crime influences [21]: 
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 economic growth; 
 income; 
 labour force participation; 
 income spent on security measures;  
 reallocation of resources creating uncertainty and inefficiency. 
On a more local and regional level, economists define the 
following types of impact [21]: 
 business impact (crime reduces competitiveness of companies 
and investments); 
 tourism impact; 
 impact on quality of life/social capital; 
 impact on property value. 
Crime serves as an important catalyst for change in the socio-
economic composition of communities. The effect crime has on the local 
property value is one of those catalyst effects. The question whether 
crime rates affect housing prices has been a popular subject of research 
over the last decades. However, although most empirical studies confirm 
that there is a negative impact of crime on housing prices, there is still 
no real consensus on the extent of this impact. The availability and 
quality of crime statistics (e. g, how should one incorporate non-
recorded crime?), dealing with changes over time, the displacement 
effect, and the fact that the housing prices are determined by a complex 
set of factors and not just crime, are the most important reasons of this 
lack of consensus. 
Another effect of crime is that residents become less committed to 
their communities, causing the “social fibre” of the community to be 
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weakened. An example of the loss of social capital is that residents of 
neighbourhoods with a criminal reputation are judged to be associated 
with criminal activities, leading (amongst others) to stigmas that, for 
example, prevent those people from finding jobs. 
Further examples of secondary economic effects of crime [21]: 
 the carbon cost of crime; 
 the opportunity costs of police, rescue, and fire departments; 
 moving costs of residents who want to escape from crime levels 
in “bad” neighbourhoods. 
Let’s consider how total costs of crime can be measured. The total 
costs of crime in England and Wales in the 2015–2016 are estimated to 
be approximately £ 50 bn for crimes against individuals and £ 9 bn for 
crimes against businesses [35]. Violent crimes make up the largest 
proportion of the total costs of individual crime – almost three quarters – 
but only one third of the number of crimes. This is mainly due to the 
higher physical and emotional costs to the victims of violent offences. 
These costs are particularly high for crimes that are more likely to result 
in emotional injuries, such as violence with injury. The offence with the 
highest estimated unit cost is homicide (£ 3.2 m.) [35]. 
Thefts from businesses make up almost 90 % of business crime but 
account for approximately half of the total estimated costs of crime 
against businesses (£ 4.2 bn), as each crime has a low impact on society. 
In contrast, robberies and burglaries against businesses – estimated to 
cost £ 2 bn and £ 1.6 bn respectively – make up over 40 % of the costs 
of crime, but account for only 5 % of all crimes against businesses [35]. 
The total costs of crimes are shown in the Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 – Total costs of crimes by selected cost category: evidence 
from England and Wales, 2015–2016 [35, p. 7] 
 
Crimes Estimated total costs of 
crime, £ 
Estimated total number of 
crimes 
Individual crimes 
Homicide 1.8 bn 570 
Violence with injury 15.5 bn  1 104 930  
Violence without injury 5.1 bn 852 900 
Robbery 2.2 bn 193 470 
Domestic burglary 4.1 bn 695 000 
Theft of vehicle 0.7 bn 68 000 
Theft from vehicle 0.5 bn 574 110 
Criminal damage - arson 0.2 bn 22 620 
Fraud 4.7 bn 3 616 460 
Cyber crime 1.1 bn 2 021 330 
Commercial crimes 
Commercial robbery 2.0 bn 136 150 
Commercial burglary 1.6 bn 102 570 
Commercial theft 4.2 bn 4 312 970 
 
Total estimated costs of crimes against individuals for selected 
periods are depicted in the Fig. 2.3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.3 – Total estimated costs of crimes against individuals [35, p. 9] 
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Conclusions 
1. The brief literature review highlights three key economic 
frameworks that can be used to explain a persistent social problem in 
modern society, crime and delinquency: the rational model, the present-
oriented or myopic model, and the radical political economic model. 
Based on a cost-benefit analysis, an individual’s decision to engage in 
crime in the rational model is consistent in the short-and long-term. 
Present-oriented individuals, however, focus on the short-term benefits 
without particular concern for the long-term consequences of their 
actions. The radical political economic model focuses on the following 
key political and socio-economic factors that sustain crime: relative 
deprivation, poverty and inequality, unemployment, and class conflict. 
2. The economic approach supports the concept of deterrence by 
which economists contend that crime will be reduced by raising the 
expected costs of illegal activities to potential criminals. The easiest 
challenge to the economic approach comes in the matter of violent 
crimes, crimes of passion or acts that are essentially spontaneous 
responses to targets of opportunity. Conversely, the easiest application 
of the economic model is to those crimes where the motive is itself 
largely economic, involving calculation and planning, e. g. 
embezzlement, professional cargo hijacking, confidence rackets, tax 
evasion and espionage.       
3. Crime does not just affect individuals. Communities which 
experience higher levels of crime are also adversely affected: people 
may become frightened inside or outside their own home; home 
insurance premiums can rise; property prices are affected; homeowners 
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can find it more difficult to sell their property; new businesses may 
avoid the area. Because of crime, existing businesses may close down 
due to: repeated thefts and loss of income; costs of repairing damage 
from vandalism; loss of customers in the area. 
 
End-of-chapter tasks 
1. Decide on advantages and drawbacks of the economic models. 
2. Compare the economic and social approaches to criminal behavior.  
3. Relate crimes to the rational choice approach.    
4. Illustrate the costs of crime against individuals and businesses.     
5. Interpret the primary and secondary economic impact of crime.     
6. Discuss the problem of gun control in terms of economics.   
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3.1. Driving Forces for Transnationalization of an Organized Crime 
 
Organized crime was characterized, in 1994, as “group 
organization to commit crime; hierarchical links or personal 
relationships which permit leaders to control the group: violence, 
intimidation and corruption used to earn profits or control territories or 
markets; laundering of illicit proceeds both in furtherance of criminal 
activity and to infiltrate the legitimate economy; the potential for 
expansion into any new activities and beyond national borders; and 
cooperation with other organized transnational criminal groups” [69]. 
Transnational organized crime suggests in simple terms the 
movement of persons, goods and services across sovereign national 
jurisdiction in a manner devoid of acceptable norms and standards [58]. 
This type of organized crime has three basic manifestations: it tends to 
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operate at a regional or global level, it mobilizes extensive cross-border 
connections and, above all, has the ability to challenge both national and 
international authorities [68]. 
There are major factors largely responsible for the preponderance 
of transnational crime, namely [58]:  
– the development of global markets; 
– advancement in technology, efficient communication and 
transport which have accelerated the movement of people, products, 
money and of course criminals; 
– the deregulation of the financial systems of many developed 
economies whereby many bottlenecks in international trade and 
commerce are removed; 
– political developments, especially the demise of old totalitarian 
regimes of East and Central Europe and the emergence of new markets 
oriented democracies, causing existing international criminal 
organizations to seek new frontiers; 
– the increased volume complexity of international transactions 
which help to disguise criminal activity; 
– the depressed economy of most developing countries which 
creates the conducive fertile ground for the gestation of crime networks 
and operation. 
So, organized crime is transnationalized mainly as a result of 
economic globalization. Nowadays, organized crime is increasingly 
global. Let’s analyze some key driving forces facilitating the 
transnationalization of organized crime [68].  
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The rapidity and the possibilities provided today by innovative 
technologies applied to transportation, together with a political 
commitment to global free trade, have increased the flow of licit as well 
as illicit goods. This situation has been aggravated as far as the most 
lucrative business of organized crime, that is drug trafficking, is 
concerned, since producing and consumption countries are in different 
continents, although distances tend to be reduced or even disappear with 
the increased use of synthetic drugs. In a symbiotic type of relationship, 
criminal organizations have combined the exploitation of business 
opportunities and routes opened up in the international market with the 
historically accumulated knowledge of contraband, which had always 
been very resistant to the action of the state. Thus, a very lucrative mix 
of old and new illicit activities were generated where specialization and 
widening of markets did not seem to be contradictory tendencies. In this 
regard, it is not a mere coincidence that the activities and even the 
abuses carried out by large multinational firms, rather uncontrolled at 
the international level due to the lack of antidumping agreements and the 
increasingly more intense search for competitiveness, lay down the usual 
precedents for the introduction of organized crime.  
The growth in world trade has been accompanied, or even favored, 
by a revolution in the financial networks. Remarkable technological 
progress in communications, as well as efforts of the banking 
institutions to develop new options to avoid paying state taxes and to 
satisfy the growing demands of the transnational companies, together 
with the huge amount of money in circulation within the system and the 
ease with which it can be transferred at high speed, have greatly favored 
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a basic stage in any illegal business: money laundering, that is the 
control of money, obscuring its illegitimate origin and its ownership, 
then legalizing profits. The general lack of supervision on international 
financial activities, albeit recent efforts to introduce a certain degree of 
control, in addition to the complexity of such operations, make it 
extremely difficult to enforce regulations. Should any country undertake 
to reinstate the control on the flow of capital, this would not have the 
desired effect but, on the contrary, could lead to a rapid relocation of 
capital, loss of earnings for the powerful banking sector and greater 
complexity as regards the financial instruments. Moreover, for many 
countries which receive these illegal funds they compose a substantial 
part of their economies, and a radical approach to the issue would 
eventually inflict strong economic and social hardship. Actually, these 
activities are carried out on a large scale in many countries, which are 
chosen according to factors such as banking secrecy and facilities to 
operate with tax havens, corruption levels, police training, the power of 
financial institutions and the currency exchange controls. 
In addition, technological progress made in communication 
systems and the transfer of information have had other effects on the 
evolution of organized crime. On the one hand, it has allowed the 
flexibilization of organizational structures and has enabled them to 
function in networks which tend to maximize profits and elude the state 
security forces. On the other hand, it allows the reduction of 
accumulated paperwork and so eliminates much incriminating evidence 
which could facilitate repressive police action. However, as an 
underlying trend, there has been a change in the nature of threats to 
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national security, which previously were related with great accumulation 
of power, resources and territory, and are now associated with the 
generation and control of information. Regarding this point, new 
vulnerabilities appear in the security defenses of the states as the 
criminal organizations, with their enormous financial potential, can 
access information which they may eventually use to improve and 
expand their business. 
The globalization of information through mass media, which 
allows the immediate presentation to the whole world of well-being 
enjoyed in developed countries, the parallel appearance of a multiplicity 
of regional conflicts, and the progress made in transportation, have led 
to an important increase in immigration flows and the gradual creation 
of ethnic networks throughout the globe. Despite the vast majority of 
immigrants being respectful to the laws of the host countries, criminal 
organizations have taken advantage of this ethnic dispersal so as to 
develop their own transnational networks within which they are in 
permanent contact through advanced communications systems. 
Although the main criminal groups still have a strong national identity 
and haven headquarters from where they co-ordinate their activities, the 
precarious living conditions of many immigrants facilitates their 
expansion into new markets. Ethnic links, with their systems of loyalty, 
solidarity and sanctions often superimposed on the legislation of the 
countries where immigrants live, indirectly facilitates the implantation 
of organized crime. Police intervention among these groups is hindered 
by language and cultural traits, which are strengthened by kinship ties 
leading to group solidarity and suspicion of national authorities. This 
80 
 
situation is further worsened by inappropriate action taken by 
administration agencies which do not make the distinction between 
members of criminal organizations and people located in a wider social 
segment, who generally tend to be those who suffer the damage of 
discriminatory practices. Regarding this point, the existence of frontiers 
which have become increasingly porous has produced a partial shift in 
police action, from border control to the surveillance of specific social 
groups, eventually criminalizing certain ethnic communities. A 
determining factor in this change has been the inconsiderate and alarmist 
treatment of both immigration and organized crime given by certain 
mass media. Parallel to this process, multicultural urban areas are 
growing fast, functioning as nuclei of the world economic system. To a 
certain extent, these plural cities can be regarded as the heirs of those 
classical port towns which were central to the first global networks of 
organized crime. Such cities provide a combination of elements, which 
include power centers, highly developed financial and banking systems, 
significant economic inequalities, a cosmopolitan population which 
guarantees anonymity, the relaxation of social control and ethnic 
diversity, all of which can intentionally or unintentionally facilitate the 
penetration and maintenance of transnational criminal networks. 
Organized crime is also familiar with the rapid spread of 
technological progress in other domains than those already mentioned. 
In fact, owing to its enormous economic potential, large criminal groups 
have faster and more efficient access to technological resources than the 
average person experienced in the field. It is common knowledge, for 
instance, their ability to acquire and deploy any kind of new device, 
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which they also continually experiment with. This progress is especially 
relevant with respect to drugs, as has been shown by the spread of new 
synthetic narcotic substances, in the field of weapons and in the forgery 
of all types of goods. Moreover, their access to new control and 
communications technology is achieved more quickly than the security 
forces responsible for pursuing such criminal organizations, the 
becoming less vulnerable to state repression. But progress in transport 
and communications technologies has also given rise to the 
multiplication of social contacts and the immediate transmission of any 
kind of novelty, this paving the way for experimentation with new drugs 
and very often for uncontrolled abuse. The excess of wealth and an 
environment where massive consumption takes place in the context of 
industrialized countries have created new recreational and leisure 
opportunities accompanied by an increase in illicit goods and services. 
The fact that a part of these sought after goods and services is legally 
prohibited has aided the growth of some specialized branches of 
organized crime and the expansion of old groups into new, lucrative 
business. 
 
3.2. Transnational Organized Crime as a Global Challenge 
 
In the past quarter century (namely, since the end of the Cold 
War), global governance has failed to keep pace with economic 
globalization. Therefore, as unprecedented openness in trade, finance, 
travel and communication has created economic growth and well-being, 
it has also given rise to massive opportunities for criminals to make their 
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business prosper. Organized crime has diversified, gone global and 
reached macro-economic proportions: illicit goods are sourced from one 
continent, trafficked across another, and marketed in a third. Mafias are 
today truly a transnational problem: a threat to security, especially in 
poor and conflict-ridden countries. Crime is fuelling corruption, 
infiltrating business and politics, and hindering development. And it is 
undermining governance by empowering those who operate outside the 
law [85, 79]: 
– drug cartels are spreading violence in Central America, the 
Caribbean and West Africa; 
– collusion between insurgents and criminal groups (in Central 
Africa, the Sahel and SouthEast Asia) fuels terrorism and plunders 
natural resources; 
– smuggling of migrants and modern slavery have spread in 
Eastern Europe as much as South-East Asia and Latin America; 
– in so many urban centers authorities have lost control to 
organized gangs; 
– cybercrime threatens vital infrastructure and state security, 
steals identities and commits fraud; 
– pirates from the world’s poorest countries (the Horn of Africa) 
hold to ransom ships from the richest nations; 
– counterfeit goods undermine licit trade and endanger lives; 
– money-laundering in rogue jurisdictions and uncontrolled 
economic sectors corrupts the banking sector, worldwide; 
– environmental crimes. 
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A wide ranging inventory of organized criminal activities include 
the supply of illegal goods and services, such as the production and 
trafficking of drugs, trading in weapons, children, organs, illegal 
immigrants or nuclear material, gambling, usury, forgery and hired 
killings; the sale of stolen property, especially luxury cars, animals and 
works of art; helping out legitimate companies in illegal matters such as 
breaking environmental or labor laws; the use of legal networks for 
illicit activities including the management of transport companies for 
drug trafficking or construction investment to money laundering; finally, 
systematic predatory action such as piracy, extortion and kidnapping 
[68]. 
The term “transnational organized crime”, also known by the 
acronym TOC, is used to describe all serious profit-motivated criminal 
actions of an international nature. It is not static; it is a constantly 
changing industry, always prepared to adapt to markets and create new 
forms of crime. It is an illicit business which does not respect borders or 
laws, and that transcends cultural, social, linguistic and geographical 
boundaries [79].  
TOC is a threat to peace and human security, it leads to human 
rights violations and undermines the economic, social, cultural, political 
and civil development of societies around the world. The vast sums of 
money involved can compromise legitimate economies and have a direct 
impact on governance, for example through corruption and the practice 
of buying votes. TOC has a detrimental effect on the development of a 
country. Not only does it benefit from the institutional weakness that 
prevails in fragile and conflict-affected countries and regions – it also 
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exacerbates conflict, fragility and violence. In the context of a long-term 
conflict in particular, coupled with arbitrary rule-setting and weak 
formal institutions, TOC emerges as a profitable source of income. 
Illegal networks profit from violence and anti-state insurgency 
movements. Informal, traditional institutions at subnational jurisdictions 
can effectively be hijacked by criminal networks and subjected to the 
rule of the delinquents. Thus, even traditional institutions based on 
social control with normative rule-settings can be permeated and taken 
over by TOC. The trafficking of illegal goods from a fragile state to a 
stable state, and the occurrence of TOC in the latter, are evidence that 
organized crime is not limited to developing or fragile states but is 
increasingly a globalized phenomenon. 
The different forms of transnational organized crime present 
different challenges. All, however, impact negatively on countries or 
regions [79]: 
1. Trafficking in firearms is an important part of TOC in two 
ways. Firstly, illegal trade in weapons with the intention of making high 
profits is classed as TOC per se. Secondly, these weapons are often used 
to control territory of limited statehood or to arm groups directly related 
to TOC. 
2. The impact of illicit financial flows (IFF) on a country is 
immense: tax evasion, corruption and illegal trade erode state 
revenues, lead to the misallocation of resources, and weaken the state’s 
monopoly on the use of force. Moreover, organized crime uses multiple 
forms of corruption to infiltrate all branches of government, and often 
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economies and societies as a whole. Law enforcement is suppressed and 
top-level political support often involved. 
3. Fisheries crime undermines resource conservation, and 
threatens food security and livelihoods. It destabilizes vulnerable coastal 
regions due to limited law enforcement capabilities, and is linked to 
other serious crimes including money laundering. Unreported and 
unregulated fishing is a common practice that is a serious contributory 
factor in the depletion of certain species and the damaging of 
ecosystems. 
4. Poaching and illicit trade in wildlife is not only a serious 
global environmental issue and a threat for the conservation of often 
critically endangered species like elephant and rhino, but also 
increasingly threatens the livelihoods and security of the affected 
population. Criminal networks and in some cases terrorist organizations 
generate significant revenues through trafficking wildlife products, 
weakening statehood, security and governance in the affected countries 
and regions. 
5. Illegal logging and trade in timber and timber products 
undercut efforts to conserve the world’s remaining forests, and with 
them not only important sources of income, but ultimately ecosystem 
services which are essential for human wellbeing. The illegal trade both 
in precious wood and other timber products benefits only a few, not 
infrequently organized crime groups, and deprives local people, 
especially marginalized groups and often indigenous people, of their 
livelihoods. 
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Besides striving for power, TOC focuses on making profit. These 
profits are hidden from the tax authorities and usually channeled through 
secrecy jurisdictions. This also leads to considerable loss in state 
revenues [79]. Finally, organized crime leads to problems of democratic 
governability as it provokes financial instability, distortions and 
inefficiency in the markets, making the production and distribution 
processes less impersonal and so leads to structural flaws in the 
economy, which have a negative effect on the citizens and on the 
stability of the political system. Some of these alterations spring from 
the illegal activity itself and imply an inefficient share out of income in 
comparison with the working of the legitimate market as the distributor 
of earnings. Other abnormalities are connected explicitly with how the 
earnings generated are used illicitly. There are multiple facets which 
demonstrate these inefficiencies [68]: 
1. There is the coercion exercised on certain segments of the 
population or territory, which is the usual practice of criminal groups 
and becomes an efficient protection racket which replaces or overlaps 
with the protection provided by the state, distorting prices. The costs are 
internalized and increase the prices of the goods and services subject to 
these extralegal taxes. This also implies a challenge to the state, which is 
the only entity which can legitimately impose taxes. Moreover, it 
discourages the free participation of individuals in the market as 
businessmen and, if the coercion is directed against the financial system, 
it puts the channels of investment and the citizens’ savings at risk.  
2. Illegal drug trafficking, a fundamental activity of some groups 
providing them with huge earnings, means an extra burden for the 
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treasury due to the costs of drug addiction treatments, the costs of 
repressing traffic and consumers and the loss of productivity for the 
economy in general. 
3. The loss of legitimization of the political regime and the 
expansion of violence connected with organized crime mean additional 
costs for business activity. The increased cost of resolving conflicts, 
whether this be legal or extralegal, and the cost of protecting the rights 
acquired become barriers for the entry and the permanence in the market 
of legitimate participants. In these circumstances, the possibilities for 
national and international investment are considerably reduced and 
conditions arise for the massive flight of productive capital. 
4. Organized crime is capable of destroying the efficacy of the 
state as a third party able to enforce compliance with the contracts which 
are generated in an economy. In the absence of this state activity, which 
throughout time has been seen to be the most effective instrument due to 
economies of scale and the guarantee of impartiality as long as there is 
stability, those involved would have to find a new body or person able to 
carry out this task, which would make the contracting process more 
expensive. In this regard, the climate of certainty usually generated by 
the state and put at risk by the large criminal organizations could 
collapse, and this would lead to the encouragement of a short term 
perspective on economic investment, which concentrates especially on 
immediate returns and contributes minimally to rational economic 
planning and long term economic growth. Thus, even in the presence of 
a well organized and predictable form of corruption, an important 
section of the economy would be subjected to high degrees of 
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uncertainty. The withdrawal of the state as third party to contracts, 
validating pacts and exchanges between persons through coercion, gives 
organized crime new opportunities to occupy more social spaces and 
direct the economy and society in general towards more simple, 
personalized structures which are contrary to economic efficiency. 
5. The large-scale illegality of organized crime itself usually leads 
to less productive investment for the general economic system. Business 
investment is made in order to launder capital and not for reasons of 
growth and long term returns. It is directed at markets which generate 
little or no added value and are often very dependent on external 
resources and investment. As regards property, widely employed as a 
means to launder capital, strong, generous demand by organized crime 
contributes to the appreciation of housing price with the consequent cost 
for the families and the state, which complies with almost universal 
constitutional precepts as regards this point. Moreover, the participation 
of companies which are fronts for money laundering and not for 
generating profits, and being competitive in the marketplace, allow these 
companies to sell their goods or services under the cost price, which 
means that legal businesses are pushed out of the market unable to 
compete in these unfair circumstances.  
6. The criminal organizations constitute a threat to one of the main 
sectors of the economy, the financial sector, as it promotes unscrupulous 
financial institutions and erodes legitimate institutions through complex 
schemes for laundering money, which can finally undermine the 
citizens’ confidence in these financial entities. 
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7. The combined effects of organized crime in the economic field 
are inflation, the ineffective distribution of income, the break up of the 
free market and state regulation of the economy, a substantial loss of 
productivity, a short term view of investment which is counterproductive 
as regards prolonged economic growth, and, occasionally, monetary 
overvaluation. Concerning the financial system in particular, the 
volatility of capital in the hands of criminal groups hinders correct 
action in economic policy and destabilizes the banking institutions and 
the financial markets in general, which can lead in turn to a profound 
economic crisis. 
8. Organized crime provokes economic imbalance and long 
periods of economic recession, seriously damaging international 
competitiveness in an environment which is becoming more and more 
globalized.  
9. In countries with economies which are highly dependent on the 
criminal productive system, even addicts of the system, to use a term 
from drug dependence, any attempt to eradicate this and return to 
efficiently-run markets, political system and society in general would 
provoke economic recession and the resulting social response. 
10. Under some specific circumstances, organized crime can pose 
a direct threat to liberal democracy. The more serious threat to the 
democratic institutions by organized crime is then its activity from 
outside the political system. The result of this might be the collusion or 
alliance of these groups with insurgent terrorist or guerrilla groups. 
Although there are substantial differences between the two types of 
organizations, they may reach agreements on tactics in order that their 
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interests may prevail against those of the state. These alliances, which 
can end up accumulating substantial destabilizing potential, mean an 
increased impunity and much more destructive capacity for the 
subversive organizations. In this area, the state would have to confront a 
substantial challenge of an insurgent nature which would provide the 
chance to discredit democracy as a system able to solve problems of 
coexistence without the resort to violence. This threat could grow in the 
next millennium, when control of tons of nuclear material could be lost 
and a large part of this material could fall into the hands of smugglers 
owing to the political disorganization in the counties which used to be 
within the orbit of the former soviet block. Such nuclear resources could 
be used to challenge democratic governments from other countries as 
well as from domestic or international subversive groups with extremist 
political, religious or nationalist doctrines. 
Moreover, criminal groups undermine human rights through 
violence (at levels that are often as high or higher than in conflict zones), 
they persecute communities, business and state officials with extortion 
and threats; they destabilize peace and security by sustaining wars 
through resourcing armed groups and terrorists, and frustrating or 
warping peace processes; they distort politics and undercut governance 
through corruption, influence trading and the funding of political parties; 
they promote species depletion and climate change through burgeoning 
illegal wildlife trade, illegal fishing and sustaining trade in timber and 
charcoal; and they undermine trust in the now essential networks of 
global trade and communication [78]. 
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The information about estimated annual costs and revenues 
generated by TOC is given in the Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 – Estimated annual costs and revenues generated by TOC [91] 
 
Crimes Estimated annual dollar value 
Money laundering $1.3 to $3.3 trillion 
Bribery Significant portion of $1 trillion 
Narcotics trafficking $750 billion to $1 trillion 
Counterfeited and pirated products $500 billion 
Environmental crime 
(illegal wildlife trade, logging, trade in 
CFCs, and toxic waste dumping) 
$20 to $40 billion 
Human trafficking (2.4 million victims) $21 billion 
Credit card fraud $10 to 12 billion 
Fire arms $170 to $320 million 
 
Organized crime is considered to be a changing and flexible 
phenomenon. Many of the benefits of globalization such as easier and 
faster communication, movement of finances and international travel, 
have also created opportunities for transnational organized criminal 
groups to flourish, diversify and expand their activities. Traditional, 
territorial-based criminal groups have evolved or have been partially 
replaced by smaller and more flexible networks with branches across 
several jurisdictions. Nowadays, victims, suspects, organized criminal 
groups and proceeds of crime may be located in many states. Moreover, 
organized crime affects all states, whether as countries of supply, transit 
or demand. As such, modern organized crime constitutes a global 
challenge that must be met with a concerted, global response [62].  
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3.3. Transnational Organized Crime in Specific Countries and 
Regions 
 
The countries with the best and worst criminal situation in the 
world are shown in the Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 – Organized Crime Index in 2018 [63] 
 
Best-performing  
countries 
Index Worst-performing 
countries 
Index 
Finland 6.8 Haiti 3.3 
Iceland 6.5 Chad 3.2 
Singapore 6.5 Peru 3.2 
Oman 6.4 Yemen 3.2 
Estonia 6.2 Macedonia, FYR 3.2 
Brunei Darussalam 6.1 Mozambique 3.2 
New Zealand 6.1 Mali 3.0 
Luxembourg 6.0 Jamaica 3.0 
Lesotho 6.0 Colombia 3.0 
Norway 6.0 Honduras 2.8 
Switzerland 6.0 Venezuela 2.6 
Portugal 6.0 Guatemala 2.6 
United Arab Emirates 5.9 Mexico 2.5 
Czech Republic 5.9 El Salvador 1.6 
 
Transnational organized crime manifests itself in various regions in 
different ways [91]. 
United States. Transnational criminal organizations commit 
numerous crimes in the United States targeting US businesses, 
consumers, and government programs. Specialized criminal networks 
feature prominently in the trafficking of drugs, movement of contraband 
items, counterfeiting of goods, and smuggling of humans into the United 
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States. The US is a source of illicit weapons and cash for criminals in 
Latin America, the Caribbean, and, to a lesser degree, Canada. 
Canada. Asia-based TOC groups smuggle precursor chemicals 
into Canada to produce illicit synthetic drugs – primarily ecstasy. A 
variety of TOC networks smuggle ecstasy and high-potency marijuana 
southbound and cocaine northbound across the US-Canada border. 
United Kingdom. TOC in the UK generates enormous economic 
revenue – between $32 billion and $64 billion per year – from large-
scale human smuggling, drug trafficking, financial fraud, and mass 
marketing scams. 
Italy. The dumping of hazardous wastes and trash appears to be 
one of the most significant sources of illicit income for Italy’s Camorra 
criminal organization, topping its narcotics, prostitution, and 
embezzlement activities. “Ndrangheta”, considered to be Italy’s greatest 
organized crime threat, is believed responsible for 80 percent of 
Colombian cocaine imported into Western Europe.  
Balkans. TOC continues to use the region’s strategic location to 
traffic weapons, drugs, people, and contraband between Asia and 
Europe. TOC and corruption of public officials and institutions are 
impeding Balkan countries’ progress toward democracy and economic 
self-sufficiency. 
China. Transnational criminal organizations are becoming 
common players in all stages of intellectual property rights crime – from 
manufacturing to distribution. Other networks are engaged in 
cybercrime, illicit finance, drug trafficking, and the diversion of 
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precursor chemicals, including those from India, that are used to process 
heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine. 
Caucasus. The black market for nuclear material is dominated by 
multiple networks of transnational smugglers. 
Russia, Eurasia, and Romania. In some instances, links among 
organized crime, big business, and corrupt officials threaten economic 
growth and prospects for democratic governance. TOC-linked 
businesses have entered sensitive markets such as energy, 
telecommunications, and precious metals. Some of the most 
sophisticated transnational criminals conducting cybercrimes are based 
in Russia and Romania. 
North Korea. North Korean entities maintain ties with crime 
networks to earn hard currency. 
US/Mexican Border. In addition to drug trafficking, transnational 
organized criminals are involved in human, money, and weapon 
smuggling. 
Mexico. The Government of Mexico is waging an historic 
campaign against transnational criminal organizations, which pose a 
threat to Mexico’s national security. Many of the drug organizations are 
expanding into human trafficking and smuggling, extortion, and 
kidnapping for ransom. 
Central America. Central America is a key area of converging 
threats, where criminal organizations exploit the region as a haven for 
illicit finance and engage in drug, weapon, and human trafficking. The 
spiraling wave of transnational crime and violence is threatening the 
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region’s prosperity and can cost up to 8 percent of its GDP, according to 
the World Bank. 
Caribbean. Trafficking and smuggling routes in the region have 
led to increased levels of crime, violence, and corruption. As the Merida 
Initiative and the Central America Regional Security Initiative make 
progress in Mexico and Central America, traffickers may increase their 
use of smuggling routes in the Caribbean. 
Bolivia. Bolivia’s cocaine trade is expanding. Increasing numbers 
of Colombian, Mexican, and Eastern European drug traffickers have 
relocated to Bolivia and have established relationships with Bolivian 
drug organizations. Bolivia is a source of cocaine that fuels South 
America’s transatlantic cocaine trade to West Africa and Europe. 
Triborder Area: Brazil/Argentina/Paraguay. Numerous 
organized criminal networks and terrorist groups use the region for illicit 
activities, such as arms and drug trafficking, money laundering, product 
piracy, and other criminal activities, capitalizing on its strategic location, 
history of contraband smuggling, and corrupt officials. 
Venezuela. This country is a permissive environment for terrorist 
and drug organizations and a major departure point for cocaine bound 
from South America for the United States, Europe, and western Africa. 
Corruption and a lack of judicial independence hinder effective 
prosecution. It is unclear to what extent the Venezuelan Government 
provides support to foreign terrorist organizations. 
Afghanistan and Colombia. The proceeds from poppy/coca 
farming and heroin/cocaine production continue to provide insurgent 
and extremist groups with stable sources of financing beyond the reach 
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of governments. Afghanistan’s democratic future is threatened by 
terrorist groups that derive funding from the drug trade and kidnapping. 
Ninety percent of the world’s heroin comes from opium poppy 
cultivated in Afghanistan. 
Gulf Region. A variety of TOC figures – including gray arms 
dealers, narcotics traffickers, and terrorist financiers – work in or 
through the region, including the United Arab Emirates, taking 
advantage of the strategic location as regional trading, financial, and 
transportation hubs. Weak or inadequate terrorist financing legislation is 
another vulnerability in the region, particularly in Kuwait. 
Sahel, West Africa, and East Africa.  Sahel-based smugglers 
purchase or steal needed weapons from black markets and sell them to 
al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM also 
conducts kidnapping for ransom to generate funding in West and North 
Africa. Drug traffickers increasingly are exploiting West and East 
African countries as transit points because they can bribe inspectors, 
judges, and ministers. In many of these states, bribery has eroded even 
basic law enforcement capacity. Nascent or undeveloped controls and 
insufficient legal frameworks contribute to the regions’ exploitation by 
terrorist financiers and money launderers. 
Somalia. Piracy attacks off Somalia/Gulf of Aden skyrocketed 
from 22 in 2006 to 217 in 2019, according to the International Chamber 
of Commerce. 
Asia/Pacific. The economic importance of the region heightens the 
threat that TOC poses to intellectual property rights. Human smuggling 
and money laundering are also rampant in parts of Asia. 
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Globally. TOCs are eroding market integrity, disrupting 
competition, and putting the public health at risk with fake 
pharmaceuticals, which account for 10 percent of all pharmaceuticals.  
Transnational organized crime problems vary across different 
conflict zones (see the Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 – Global distribution of TOC problems [85] 
 
TOC problems Estimated extent Estimated 
value (US $) 
Potential effects 
1 2 3 4 
Trafficking in 
persons 
To Europe for 
unethical 
exploitation 
70 000 victims 
(annual) 
3 billion Human rights 
violations 
Smuggling of 
migrants  
From Latin 
America to 
North America 
3 million entries 
(annual) 
6.6 billion 
(income for 
smugglers) 
Irregular migration, 
vulnerability of 
migrants 
From Africa to 
Europe  
55 000 migrants 
(annual) 
150 million 
(income for 
smugglers) 
Irregular migration, 
death of migrants 
Cocaine  From the 
Andean region 
to North 
America  
196 tons 
 
38 billion Addiction; drug 
related crime, 
corruption and 
violence in 
the Andean region; 
links with 
illegal armed groups 
in the Andean 
region; 
destabilization 
and corruption in 
neighbouring states, 
Central America 
and Mexico 
From the 
Andean region 
to Europe 
124 tons 34 billion Addiction, drug 
related crime 
and violence, 
destabilization 
and corruption in 
Andean 
countries, the 
Caribbean and 
West Africa 
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Continuation of the Table 3.3 
   
TOC problems Estimated extent Estimated 
value (US $) 
Potential effects 
1 2 3 4 
Heroin  From 
Afghanistan to 
the Russian 
Federation 
70 tons 13 billion Addiction, spread of 
HIV/AIDS; increase 
in organized 
crime, funding for 
criminals 
and insurgents, 
corruption 
From 
Afghanistan to 
Europe  
87 tons 20 billion Addiction, increase 
in organized crime; 
funding for criminals 
and insurgents, 
corruption 
Trafficking 
of firearms 
From the United 
States to Mexico 
20 000 weapons, 
mostly handguns 
20 million Rising deaths in 
Mexico’s drug 
cartel wars 
From eastern 
Europe to the 
world  
At least 
40 000 
Kalashnikovs 
At least 33 
million 
Death and instability 
Trafficking 
of natural 
resources 
Wildlife from 
Africa and 
South-East Asia 
to Asia 
Elephant ivory: 
75 tons 
Rhino horn:  
800 kg 
Tiger parts: 150 
tiger skins and 
about 1 500 kg of 
tiger bones 
Elephant 
ivory: 
62 million 
Rhino horn: 8 
million 
Tiger parts: 5 
million 
Tigers and black 
rhinos may 
become extinct in 
the wild; 
impact on South-
East Asia 
wildlife unclear; 
promotion 
of corruption and 
organized 
crime 
Timber from 
South-East Asia 
to the European 
Union and Asia 
10 million 
cubic meters 
3.5 billion Deforestation, loss 
of habitat, loss of 
species, climate 
change, increased 
rural poverty, 
irregular migration, 
flooding, 
soil erosion 
Product 
counterfeiting  
Consumer goods 
from Asia to 
Europe  
Some two billion 
articles per year 
8.2 billion Loss of product 
safety and 
accountability, loss 
of revenue 
Medicine from 
Asia and to 
South-East Asia 
and Africa 
Billions of dose 
units 
1.6 billion Death, drug-resistant 
pathogens 
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Continuation of the Table 3.3 
 
TOC problems Estimated extent Estimated 
value (US $) 
Potential effects 
1 2 3 4 
Maritime 
piracy 
Off the cost of 
Somalia 
217 attacks 100 million Difficulties in 
establishing 
Government 
authority, 
negative impact on 
local 
and international 
commerce 
Cybercrime Identity theft  Around 1.5 
million victims 
1 billion Increase in the costs 
of credit, depressive 
effects on the 
economy, loss of 
trust in e-commerce 
 
Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but 
they are also diversifying their activities. The result is a convergence of 
threats that have evolved to become more complex, volatile, and 
destabilizing. 
 
3.4. United Nation’s Response to the Transnational Organized 
Crime 
 
Organized crime involves the illegal activity of groups of people or 
organizations commonly for the purposes of obtaining money and 
influence. This illegal activity can consist of the illegal transportation of 
humans, money, and objects, commonly connected to violence and 
corruption. Transnational organized crime can be conducted between 
individuals and groups over national borders. Because of this, it directly 
or indirectly affects every member state of the United Nations [11].  
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The United Nations’ response to the transnational organized crime 
is the global effort in tackling criminal matters. Organized crime and 
illicit trafficking affects almost all of the priorities and values which the 
United Nations was established to uphold. The United Nations is 
uniquely positioned to develop a new and more holistic framework for 
response. Across its diverse organs and bodies, the UN has become 
increasingly cognisant of the threat presented by organized crime to its 
core mandates. The Security Council has become increasingly seized of 
the matter. In 2016 alone, resolutions have been passed on the 
intersection between human trafficking and conflict (S/RES/2331); 
smuggling of migrants (S/RES 2312); as well as to address the role of 
criminal groups and illicit flows in contexts as diverse as Libya, Guinea-
Bissau (S/RES/2267), Colombia (S/RES/2261); Afghanistan 
(S/RES/2274) and the DRC (S/RES/2277). 28 Resolutions referenced 
organized crime in 2014; and 24 in 2015 – a decade prior these numbers 
were in the low single digits. 
In 2016 alone the UN General Assembly and its Committees 
considered issues of illicit financial flows (A/RES/71/213); the world 
drug problem (A/RES/71/211); cybercrime, security and the right to 
privacy; human trafficking, and within the context of a moratorium on 
the death penalty (GA/11879), for which drug trafficking has become 
the leading cause of judicial executions. Addressing organized crime and 
illicit markets are explicitly included as targets in the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (SDGs) (A/RES/70/1), both directly and 
indirectly. Goal 16.4 has targets to reduce illicit financial flows and 
specifically to end organized crime. But more broadly, achieving 
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additional targets in the SDGs will require action against organized 
crime across a range of sectors, including [29]: 
– Goal 3 in health, where targets on AIDS prevalence (Goal 3.3), 
substance abuse (Goal 3.5) and access to safe, effective and quality 
healthcare (Goal 3.8) will require addressing the role of counterfeit 
medicines. 
– For environmental sustainability and biodiversity, Goal 15.7 on 
trafficking of wildlife is a critical concern, and Goals 14.4 and 14.6 that 
relate to addressing illegal fishing. 
– Goals supporting the achievement of safe and productive lives 
are also called into question, where trafficking in women and girls is an 
issue (Goal 5.2); trafficking in children (Goal 16.2), forced labour (Goal 
8.7) and the protection of migrant workers from exploitation (Goal 8.8). 
– Finally, promoting urban development and safe settlements will 
also require addressing criminal violence (Goal 11.1). 
The global recognition around the critical need to address 
organized crime and its impacts is gaining momentum, but answers 
appear in short supply. While United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) is one of the most ratified of 
UN treaties, equaling landmark global legislation such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) or the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, it falls short on tangible evidence of implementation. In the 
past years, efforts to put forward a review mechanism have stalled, 
leaving UNTOC with little way to measure progress.  
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The United Nations system assists Member States in their fight 
against transnational organized crime. A number of international 
conventions on drug control, and more recently the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols on human 
trafficking, migrant smuggling and trafficking of firearms, as well as the 
UN Convention against Corruption, constitute the key framework for a 
strategic response.  
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime is the main international instrument to counter organized crime 
and a critical tool for carrying out international cooperation. Adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly in 2000, it is supplemented by 
three protocols that target trafficking in persons, especially women and 
children; smuggling of migrants; and illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in firearms. With 189 States Parties at present, the 
Convention enjoys nearly universal adherence [100]. The United 
Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) is the guardian of the 
related international conventions [98]. 
UNODC was established to assist the UN in better addressing a 
coordinated, comprehensive response to the interrelated issues of illicit 
trafficking in and abuse of drugs, crime prevention and criminal justice, 
international terrorism, and political corruption. These goals are pursued 
through three primary functions: research, guidance and support to 
governments in the adoption and implementation of various crime-, 
drug-, terrorism-, and corruption-related conventions, treaties and 
protocols, as well as technical/financial assistance to said governments 
to face their respective situations and challenges in these fields [98]. 
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UNODC has the mission of making the world safer from crime, drugs, 
and terrorism. To be effective and sustainable, responses to these threats 
must include strategies covering the following areas [14]: 
1. Crime prevention, especially urban crime prevention; youth-
focused crime prevention; armed violence prevention; prevention of 
recidivism. 
2. Criminal justice reform:   police reform,   prosecution service,   
judiciary  (the courts),  access to legal defense and legal aid,   prison 
reform and alternatives to imprisonment,  and restorative justice. 
3. Justice for children. 
4. Support and assistance to victims.  
5. Gender in the criminal justice system.   
Crime prevention and criminal justice strategies must be gender-
responsive and respect the rule of law, therefore incorporating human 
rights law and principles. Acting as the custodian of the UN standards 
and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice, which promote 
human rights, UNODC assists Member States in reforming their 
criminal justice systems in order to be effective, fair and humane for the 
entire population. The work of UNODC in crime prevention and 
criminal justice reform is guided by the UN standards and norms on 
crime prevention and criminal justice. The UN standards and norms are 
sets of non-binding rules, principles, and guidelines relating to different 
aspects of criminal justice, such as juvenile justice, violence against 
women, protecting the rights of children, and prison reform. Most of the 
UN standards and norms are resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. 
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UNODC builds national, regional and transnational initiatives to 
prevent, confront and halt organized crime. The Office’s capacity 
building and technical assistance activities are geared towards 
strengthening the rule of law, working with law enforcement authorities, 
prosecutors, judges and other actors in countries and across regions 
where drugs, crime, corruption and terrorism threaten stability and 
security. Working with States around the world, the aim of UNODC is 
to foster good governance, robust criminal justice systems that observe 
human rights, security sector reform and, consequently, also sustainable 
development, through strengthening States’ capacities to prevent, 
confront and defeat transnational organized crime. In short, the Office 
[100]: 
1. Supports States in building their capacities to prevent, 
investigate and prosecute organized crime by providing technical 
assistance to develop crime prevention strategies, and build capacities 
for investigation and prosecution, including training staff of law 
enforcement, customs and border agencies, prosecutorial offices, the 
judiciary, financial intelligence units and other related officials. 
2. Promotes and strengthens international cooperation in criminal 
matters among law enforcement, judicial practitioners and other relevant 
actors through a variety of mechanisms, including through regional and 
inter-regional networks and anti-organized crime units, and the 
development of software tools and databases to share information. This 
includes providing support for the proper collection and analysis of 
criminal intelligence and electronic evidence, and assisting in training 
programmes.  
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3. Provides a range of tools and resources to assist Member States 
in their efforts to prevent and combat organized crime, helping relevant 
officials to more effectively and efficiently do their work, with better 
understanding of the issues in light of international good practice and 
applicable human rights standards. This includes providing support for 
the proper collection and analysis of legislation, case law and good 
practices, among others, including through the expansion of the 
SHERLOC knowledge management portal. 
Recognizing the multiple causes of crime and as the custodian of 
the United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and 
criminal justice, UNODC promotes strategies, plans, and programmes, 
which are multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary, and which favour civil 
society participation. Such strategies and action plans are underpinned 
by the basic principles for the prevention of crime [13]: 
1. Government leadership at all levels is required to create and 
maintain an institutional framework for effective crime prevention. 
2. Socio-economic development and inclusion refer to the need 
to integrate crime prevention into relevant social and economic policies, 
and to focus on the social integration of at-risk communities, children, 
families, and youth. 
3. Cooperation and partnerships between government ministries 
and authorities, civil society organizations, the business sector, and 
private citizens are required given the wide-ranging nature of the causes 
of crime and the skills and responsibilities required to address them. 
4. Sustainability and accountability can only be achieved if 
adequate resources to establish and sustain programmes and evaluation 
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are made available, and clear accountability for funding, 
implementation, evaluation and achievement of planned results is 
established. 
5. Knowledge base strategies, policies and programmes need to 
be based on a broad multidisciplinary foundation of knowledge, together 
with evidence regarding specific crime problems, their causes, and 
proven practices. 
6. Human rights/rule of law/culture of lawfulness the rule of law 
and those human rights which are recognized in international 
instruments to which Member States are parties must be respected in all 
aspects of crime prevention, and a culture of lawfulness actively 
promoted. 
7. Interdependency refers to the need for national crime 
prevention diagnoses and strategies to take into account, where 
appropriate, the links between local criminal problems and international 
organized crime. 
8. The principle of differentiation calls for crime prevention 
strategies to pay due regard to the different needs of men and women 
and consider the special needs of vulnerable members of society. 
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) reviews and analyzes 
the global drug situation, considering the interrelated issues of 
prevention of drug abuse, rehabilitation of drug users and supply and 
trafficking in illicit drugs. It takes action through resolutions and 
decisions. The Commission was established by the Economic and Social 
Council as one of its functional commissions on 16 February 1946. The 
Commission assists the Council in supervising the application of the 
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international drug control treaties. It also advises the Council on all 
matters pertaining to the control of narcotic drugs, psychotropic 
substances and their precursors. The CND has important normative 
functions under the international drug control conventions. It is 
authorized to consider all matters pertaining to the aims of the 
Conventions and see to their implementation. As a treaty organ under 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) and the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances (1971) the Commission decides, on the basis of 
recommendations by the World Health Organization (WHO), to place 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances under international control. 
Pursuant to the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988) the Commission decides, upon the 
recommendation of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 
to place precursor chemicals frequently used for the manufacture of 
illicit drugs under international control. The Commission may also 
decide to remove or modify international control measures over drugs, 
psychotropic substances or precursors [97]. 
The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
(CCPCJ) was established by the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) resolution 1992/1, upon request of General Assembly (GA) 
resolution 46/152, as one of its functional commissions. The 
Commission acts as the principal policymaking body of the United 
Nations in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice. ECOSOC 
provided for the CCPCJ’s mandates and priorities in resolution 1992/22, 
which include improving international action to combat national and 
transnational crime and the efficiency and fairness of criminal justice 
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administration systems. The CCPCJ also offers Member States a forum 
for exchanging expertise, experience and information in order to develop 
national and international strategies, and to identify priorities for 
combating crime. In 2006, the GA adopted resolution 61/252, which 
further expanded the mandates of the CCPCJ to enable it to function as a 
governing body of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), and to approve the budget of the United Nations Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund, which provides resources for 
technical assistance in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice 
worldwide. The CCPCJ coordinates with other United Nations bodies 
that have specific mandates in the areas of crime prevention and 
criminal justice, and is the preparatory body to the United Nations Crime 
Congresses. Declarations adopted by the congresses are transmitted 
through the CCPCJ and the ECOSOC to the GA for endorsement. The 
CCPCJ implements the outcome of the congresses into concrete action 
through decisions and resolutions, many of which are recommended for 
adoption by the ECOSOC or, through the ECOSOC, by the GA. 
Intersessional meetings of the CCPCJ are regularly convened to provide 
policy guidance to UNODC. Towards the end of each year, the CCPCJ 
meets at a reconvened session to consider budgetary and administrative 
matters as the governing body of the United Nations crime prevention 
and criminal justice programme [82]. 
The growing problem of transnational organized criminal networks 
has stimulated countries to cooperate in joint approaches to tackle the 
issue. Transnational organized crime is a cross-cutting issue at both 
national and international levels, and cannot be limited to a single policy 
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area. It is a global problem that can only be addressed if organizations in 
various sectors cooperate across borders as part of a multilevel 
approach: international police cooperation, security and intelligence 
services, the media, non-governmental organizations, private national 
and international business, and bilateral and multilateral development 
agencies must all be involved [79]. 
 
3.5. The American Strategy on Combating Transnational Organized 
Crime 
 
Transnational organized crime has expanded dramatically in size, 
scope, and influence. Transnational organized criminals are threatening 
US interests by [91]: 
1) co-opting some governments and weakening governance in 
others; 
2) forging alliances with government elements including security 
services and big business figures; 
3) undermining competition in strategic markets; 
4) providing funding and logistical support for terrorist/insurgent 
activities; 
5) stealing intellectual property; 
6) expanding narcotrafficking and engaging in arms smuggling and 
human trafficking; 
7) using cyber technologies to perpetrate sophisticated frauds; 
8) using facilitators who operate in the licit and illicit worlds and 
provide services to criminals and terrorists alike. 
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For decades, the United States and other countries have dismantled 
scores of criminal organizations around the world. The U.S. experience 
with La Cosa Nostra, as well as Colombia’s experience with the 
Medellin and Cali Cartels – and even the FARC – prove that it is 
possible to constrain, shrink, disrupt and dismantle criminal and 
insurgent groups once considered to be untouchable. 
This Strategy builds upon such past experience. Today the threat 
from TOC is more complicated because criminal networks are more 
fluid and are using increasingly sophisticated tactics. TOC can exploit 
the interconnected nature of our modern trading, transportation, and 
transactional systems that move people and commerce throughout the 
global economy and across our borders. Countering TOC today requires 
an integrated and comprehensive approach. This Strategy sets out such 
an approach to raise international awareness about the reality of the 
TOC threat to international security; galvanize multilateral action to 
constrain the reach and influence of TOC; deprive TOC of its enabling 
means and infrastructure; shrink the threat TOC poses to citizen safety, 
national security, and governance; and ultimately defeat the TOC 
networks that pose the greatest threat to national security. TOC presents 
sophisticated and multi-faceted threats that cannot be addressed through 
law enforcement action alone. Accordingly, we will establish an 
interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group to identify those TOC 
networks that present a sufficiently high national security threat as to 
merit the focused use of complementary law enforcement and non-law 
enforcement assets and that may be vulnerable to whole-of-government 
responses. The Working Group will ensure the coordination of all 
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elements of national power to effectively protect our borders, people, 
economy, and financial system from the threats posed by the most 
dangerous and sophisticated of these transnational criminal networks. 
This Strategy sets out five overarching policy objectives that are 
consistent with the vision and priorities of the National Security Strategy 
[76]: 
1. Protect Americans and their partners from the harm, violence, 
and exploitation of transna­tional criminal networks. Our priority is the 
safety, security, and prosperity of American citizens and the citizens of 
partner nations. We will target the networks that pose the gravest threat 
to citizen safety and security, including those that traffic illicit drugs, 
arms, and people – espe­cially women and children; sell and distribute 
substandard, tainted and counterfeit goods; rob Americans of their 
prosperity; carry out kidnappings for ransom and extortion; and seek to 
terrorize and intimidate through acts of torture and murder. 
2. Help partner countries strengthen governance and transparency, 
break the corruptive power of transnational criminal networks, and sever 
state-crime alliances. The United States needs willing, reliable and 
capable partners to combat the corruption and instability generated by 
TOC and related threats to governance. We will help international 
partners develop the sustainable capacities necessary to defeat 
transnational threats; strengthen legitimate and effective public safety, 
security, and justice institutions; and promote universal values. We will 
also seek to sever the powerful strategic alliances that form between 
TOC and states, including those between TOC networks and foreign 
intelligence services. 
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3. Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks 
and protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system from TOC 
penetration and abuse. TOC networks – using bribery, fraud, and 
violence – have the capacity to disrupt economic activity and put 
legitimate busi­nesses at a distinct competitive disadvantage. We will 
attack the financial underpinnings of the top transnational criminals; 
strip them of their illicit wealth; sever their access to the financial 
system; expose their criminal activities hidden behind legitimate fronts; 
and protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system. 
4. Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest 
threat to national security, by targeting their infrastructures, depriving 
them of their enabling means, and preventing the criminal facilitation of 
terrorist activities. We will target, disrupt, and defeat the TOC networks 
that pose the greatest threat to the safety and security of Americans and 
U.S. national security interests. These include criminal networks – 
including transnational criminal gangs – that traffic drugs, bulk cash, 
arms, people, sensitive documents, or other contraband. Further, we will 
seek to prevent collaboration between criminal and terrorist networks 
and deprive them of their critical resources and infrastructure, such as 
funding, logistical support for transportation, staging, procurement, safe 
havens for illicit activities, and the facilitation of services and materiel, 
which could include WMD material. 
5. Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and 
public-private partnerships to defeat transnational organized crime. We 
will build new partnerships – with industry, finance, academia, civil 
society and non-governmental organizations – to combat TOC networks 
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that operate in the illicit and licit worlds. We will also fight criminal 
networks with an alliance of legitimate networks, and ensure the 
freedom of the press so that the media and journalists may safely expose 
the harms inflicted by TOC. We will expand and deepen our 
understanding, cooperation, and information sharing at home with State 
and local agencies, with foreign partners, and with multilateral 
institutions. Internationally, we will further international norms against 
tolerating or sponsoring crime in all its forms, including in cyberspace.  
Actions to combat TOC [77]: 
1. Reduce the demand for illicit drugs in the United States, thereby 
denying funding to illicit trafficking organizations. 
2. Continue to attack drug trafficking and distribution networks 
and their enabling means within the United States to reduce the 
availability of illicit drugs. 
3. Sever the illicit flow across U.S. borders of people, weapons, 
currency, and other illicit finance through investigations and 
prosecutions of key TOC leadership, as well as through the targeting of 
TOC networks’ enabling means and infrastructure. 
4. Identify and take action against corporate and governmental 
corruption within the United States. 
5. Work with Congress to secure ratification of the Inter American 
Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials. 
6. Seek accession to the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing 
of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and 
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Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. 
This strategy is organized around a single, unifying principle: to 
build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat 
transnational organized crime and related threats to our national security 
– and to urge the American partners to do the same. 
 
Conclusions 
 
1. Transnational organized crime (TOC) suggests in simple terms 
the movement of persons, goods and services across sovereign national 
jurisdiction in a manner devoid of acceptable norms and standards. This 
type of organized crime has three basic manifestations: it tends to 
operate at a regional or global level, it mobilizes extensive cross-border 
connections and, above all, has the ability to challenge both national and 
international authorities. 
2. There are major factors largely responsible for the 
preponderance of transnational crime, namely: the development of 
global markets; advancement in technology; the deregulation of the 
financial systems; political developments; the depressed economy of 
most developing countries. 
3. In order to measure the criminal situation in the particular 
country, the Organized Crime Index is used. In 2018, the top-3 countries 
with the best criminal situation were Finland, Iceland and Singapore. 
The top-3 countries with the worst criminal situation were Guatemala, 
Mexico and El Salvador. 
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4. The United Nations’ response to the transnational organized 
crime is the global effort in tackling criminal matters. It established the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC) and United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC). 
UNTOC is the main international instrument to counter organized crime 
and a critical tool for carrying out international cooperation. UNODC 
was established to assist the UN in better addressing a coordinated, 
comprehensive response to the interrelated issues of illicit trafficking in 
and abuse of drugs, crime prevention and criminal justice, international 
terrorism, and political corruption. 
 
End-of-chapter tasks 
 
1. Analyze a global nature of the organized crimes. 
2. Estimate how TOC is globally distributed.  
3. Explain how TOC manifests itself in various regions.  
4. Value the costs of TOC. 
5. List the countermeasures taken to combat TOC. 
6. Predict the future scenarios of TOC development.  
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CHAPTER 4. TERRORISM AS A GLOBAL THREAT 
 
4.1. Defining and Classifying the Terrorism 
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4.1.  Defining and Classifying the Terrorism  
 
Nowadays terrorism is considered as one of the most pressing 
problems of the contemporary world. Political scientists, psychologists, 
politicians, and the mass media constantly wonder what will be the next 
action of Hamas, Hezbollah or Al-Qa’ida. Terrorist threats are not a new 
phenomenon, nor are they limited to a specific geographical or cultural 
area. It can be said that almost every continent has encountered the 
cruelty and the effects of terrorist attacks, and the terrorist methods have 
been used especially wherever the weak have fought against the strong. 
Terrorism is an extreme expression of the fragmentation of social life, as 
it involves the infringement of all existing moral and legal standards, as 
well as the violations of public order on a micro-social and international 
scale [73]. 
There is no single or universal accepted definition of terrorism. 
Let’s use several approaches to defining it [81]. 
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1. The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives”.   
2. The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated 
use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce 
or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are 
generally political, religious, or ideological”. 
3. The State Department defines terrorism as an activity, directed 
against persons involving violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 
which would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction 
of the U.S.; and is intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping to 
include the use of certain weapons of mass destruction. 
4. The United Nations’ definition of terrorism states that “all war 
crimes will be considered acts of terrorism,” in which case most every 
government in the world has committed terrorism, though few have ever 
faced justice or were even disgraced for doing so. 
Derived from the definitions, terrorism is [81]: 
1) a specific type of violence. It can be international or domestic; 
2) perpetrated against civilians, not normally at military targets or 
combat-ready troops; 
3) calculated. The selection of a target is neither spontaneous nor 
random; 
4) motivated by political, religious, or ideological objectives; 
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5) intended to produce fear. It is a psychological act conducted for 
its impact on an audience; 
6) carried out by subnational groups and not by the army of a 
country. 
Terrorism’s sole purpose is to use the psychological impact of 
violence or of the threat of violence to effect political change. 
The UK the Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as [70]: the use 
or threat of action designed to influence the government or an 
international governmental organization or to intimidate the public, or a 
section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a political, 
religious, racial or ideological cause; and it involves or causes: 
– serious violence against a person; 
– serious damage to a property; 
– a threat to a person’s life; 
– a serious risk to the health and safety of the public;  
– serious interference with or disruption to an electronic system. 
According to the National Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, there are six distinct types of terrorism 
[94]. All of them share the common traits of being violent acts that 
destroy property, invoke fear and attempt to harm the lives of civilians. 
1. Civil disorder – is a sometimes violent form of protest held by a 
group of individuals, usually in opposition to a political policy or action. 
They are intended to send a message to a political group that “the 
people” are unhappy and demand change. The protests are intended to 
be non-violent, but they do sometimes result in large riots in which 
private property is destroyed and civilians are injured or killed. 
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2. Political terrorism – is used by one political faction to 
intimidate another. Although government leaders are the ones who are 
intended to receive the ultimate message, it is the citizens who are 
targeted with violent attacks. 
3. Non political terrorism – is a terrorist act perpetrated by a 
group for any other purpose, most often of a religious nature. The 
desired goal is something other than a political objective, but the tactics 
involved are the same. 
4. Quasi terrorism – is a violent act that utilizes the same methods 
terrorists employ, but does not have the same motivating factors. Cases 
like this usually involve an armed criminal who is trying to escape from 
law enforcement utilizing civilians as hostages to help them escape. The 
law breaker is acting in a similar manner to a terrorist, but terrorism is 
not the goal. 
5. Limited political terrorism – acts are generally one time only 
plots to make a political or ideological statement. The goal is not to 
overthrow the government, but to protest a governmental policy or 
action. 
6. State terrorism – defines any violent action initiated by an 
existing government to achieve a particular goal. Most often this goal 
involves a conflict with another country. 
Another classification of types of terrorism includes the following 
issues [81]: 
1. Nationalist terrorism: 
1.1. Nationalist terrorists seek to form a separate state for their own 
national group, often by drawing attention to a fight for “national 
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liberation” that they think the world has ignored. This sort of terrorism 
has been among the most successful at winning international sympathy 
and concessions. 
1.2. Nationalist terror groups have tended to calibrate their use of 
violence, using enough to rivet attention but not so much that they 
alienate supporters abroad or members of their base community. 
1.3. Nationalist terrorism can be difficult to define, since many 
groups accused of the practice insist that they are not terrorists but 
freedom fighters. 
2. Religious terrorism: 
2.1. Religious terrorists seek to use violence to further what they 
see as divinely commanded purposes, often targeting broad categories of 
foes in an attempt to bring about sweeping changes. 
2.2. Religious terrorists come from many major faiths, as well as 
from small cults. 
2.3. Religious terrorists can sanction almost limitless violence 
against a virtually open-ended category of targets: that is, anyone who is 
not a member of the terrorists’ religion or religious sect. 
3. State-sponsored terrorism: 
3.1. State-sponsored terrorist groups are deliberately used by 
radical states as foreign policy tools. 
3.2. A cost-effective way of waging war covertly, through the use 
of surrogate warriors or “guns for hire”. 
3.3. With enhance resources at their disposal; state-sponsored 
terrorist groups are often capable of carrying out more deadly attacks 
than other terrorists, including building and airplane bombings. 
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4. Left-wing terrorism: 
4.1. Left-wing terrorists are out to destroy capitalism and replace it 
with a communist or socialist regime. Because they see most civilians as 
suffering from capitalist exploitation, left-wing terrorists sometimes 
have limited their use of violence to avoid hurting the victims they say 
they want to save. 
4.2. Left-wing terrorists sometimes focus instead on such tactics as 
kidnapping tycoons or symbolically bombing monuments. 
5. Right-wing terrorism: 
5.1. Right-wing terrorists are among the least organized terrorists, 
often associated with neo-Nazi street rioting in Western Europe, 
especially in the early 1980s. These groups, often dominated by 
skinheads, seek to do away with liberal democratic governments and 
create fascist states in their place. 
5.2. Neofascist terrorists frequently attack immigrants and refugees 
from the developing world and are both racist and anti-Semitic. 
6. Anarchist terrorism: 
6.1. From the 1870s until about 1920, anarchist terrorism was a 
major global phenomenon. 
6.2. Revolutionaries seeking to overthrow established governments 
launched a wave of bombing and assassinated a series of heads of state. 
6.3. One such victim was President William McKinley, killed in 
1901 by a young Hungarian refugee influenced by anarchist sentiments. 
One more classification of the forms of terrorism deserves special 
attention [48]: 
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1. The new terrorism: the modern terrorist environment that arose 
during the end of the 20th century, culminating in the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. The new terrorism is 
characterized by the threat of mass casualty attacks from dissident 
terrorist organizations, new and creative organizational configurations, 
transnational religious solidarity, and redefined moral justifications for 
political violence. 
2. State terrorism: terrorism committed by governments against 
perceived enemies. State terrorism can be directed externally against 
adversaries in the international domain or internally against domestic 
enemies. 
3. Dissident terrorism: terrorism committed by nonstate 
movements and groups against governments, ethno-national groups, 
religious groups, and other perceived enemies. 
4. Religious terrorism: terrorism motivated by an absolute belief 
that an otherworldly power has sanctioned – and commanded – the 
application of terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith. 
Religious terrorism is usually conducted in defense of what believers 
consider to be the one true faith. 
5. Ideological terrorism: terrorism motivated by political systems 
of belief (ideologies), which champion the self-perceived inherent rights 
of a particular group or interest in opposition to another group or 
interest. The system of belief incorporates theoretical and philosophical 
justifications for violently asserting the rights of the championed group 
or interest. 
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6. International terrorism: terrorism that spills over onto the 
world’s stage. Targets are selected because of their value as symbols of 
international interests, either within the home country or across state 
boundaries. 
7. Criminal dissident terrorism: this type of terrorism is solely 
profit-driven, and can be some combination of profit and politics. For 
instance, traditional organized criminals accrue profits to fund their 
criminal activity and for personal interests, while criminal-political 
enterprises acquire profits to sustain their movement. 
8. Gender-selective terrorism: terrorism directed against an 
enemy population’s men or women because of their gender. Systematic 
violence is directed against men because of the perceived threat posed 
by males as potential soldiers or sources of opposition. Systematic 
violence is directed against women to destroy an enemy group’s cultural 
identity or terrorize the group into submission. 
Every type of terrorism utilizes distinct methods of violence to get 
their message across. They can be anything from assault weapons or 
explosive devices to toxic chemicals that are released into the air. These 
attacks may occur at any time or place, which makes them an extremely 
effective method of instilling terror and uncertainty into the general 
public. 
Terrorists are inspired by many different motives. These motives 
can be grouped into three categories [81]: rationale, psychological, and 
cultural.  
1. Rational motivation: 
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1.1. The rational terrorist thinks through their goals and options, 
making a cost-benefit analysis. Groups considering terrorism as an 
option ask a crucial question: can terrorism induce enough anxiety to 
attain its goals without causing a backlash that will destroy the cause and 
perhaps the terrorist themselves? 
2. Psychological motivation: 
2.1. Psychological motivation for terrorism derives from the 
terrorist’s personal dissatisfaction with his or her life and 
accomplishments. 
2.2. Terrorists do not even consider that they may be wrong and 
that others’ views may have some merit. 
2.3. Terrorists tend to project their own antisocial motivations onto 
others, creating a polarized “we versus they” outlook. They attribute 
only evil motives to anyone outside their own group. This enables the 
terrorists to dehumanize their victims and removes any sense of 
ambiguity from their minds. 
3. Cultural motivation: 
3.1. Cultures shape values and motivate people to actions that seem 
unreasonable to foreign observers. 
3.2. In societies in which people identify themselves in terms of 
group membership (family, clan, tribe), there may be willingness to self-
sacrifice seldom seen elsewhere. At times, terrorists seem to be eager to 
give their lives for their organization and cause. The lives of “others,” 
being wholly evil in the terrorists’ value system, can be destroyed with 
little or no remorse. 
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3.3. A major cultural determinate of terrorism is the perception of 
“outsiders” and anticipation of a threat to ethnic group survival. Fear of 
cultural extermination leads to violence, which, to someone who does 
not experience it, seems irrational. 
3.4. Religion may be the most volatile of cultural identifiers 
because it encompasses values deeply held. A threat to one’s religion 
puts not only the present at risk but also one’s cultural past and the 
future. Many religions, including Christianity and Islam, are so 
confident they are right that they have used force to obtain converts. 
Terrorism in the name of religion can be especially violent. Like all 
terrorists those who are religiously motivated view their acts with moral 
certainty and even divine sanctions. What would otherwise be 
extraordinary acts of desperation becomes a religious duty in the mind 
of the religiously motivated terrorist. This helps explain the high level of 
commitment and willingness to risk death among religious extremist 
groups. 
Contemporary terrorist actions [81]: 
1. Include the traditional assassinations, bombings, arson, hostage-
taking, hijacking, kidnapping, seizure and occupation of a building, 
attacks on a facility, sabotage, and perpetration of hoaxes. 
2. Newer categories of operations include ecological terrorism and 
the still largely potential “high-tech” terrorism using nuclear, biological, 
and chemical (NBC) weapons and materials. 
3. Target selection considerations are equally diverse but include 
the target's value in terms of its contribution to group goals, its 
accessibility given group capabilities, and the purpose of the attack, such 
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as to gain attention, collect resources, eliminate a threat, or demonstrate 
a capability. All these factors are reflected in the group’s organization 
and training. 
 
4.2. Global Trends in Terrorism 
 
The world has seen a substantial decrease in deaths from terrorism 
since 2014, with the most dramatic reductions occurring in Iraq and 
Nigeria. Increased counterterrorism coordination at both the state and 
international level, increasing political stability, the winding down of the 
Syrian civil war, and the collapse of ISIL have all played a role in 
reducing the impact of terrorism around the world. 
This current period of declining terrorism follows three previous 
trends in the global phenomenon. The current period of decline follows 
three previous terrorism trends since the 9/11. Between 2002 and 2007, 
terrorist attacks increased steadily, correlating with an increase in violent 
conflict in Iraq. This trend peaked in 2007, corresponding with the US 
troop surge, after which terrorism steadily fell, with deaths from 
terrorism dropping 35 per cent between 2007 and 2011. 
The third trend from 2011 to 2014 saw the level of global terrorism 
surge, with deaths from terrorism increasing by more than 350 per cent 
in just three years. This surge coincided with the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring, increased violent conflict in Iraq, the rise of ISIL, and the start of 
the Syrian civil war, as well as the re-emergence of Boko Haram in 
Nigeria. 
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Fig. 4.1– Global terrorism in numbers [31] 
As the intensity of terrorism has increased over the last two 
decades, its impact has also spread to more countries around the world. 
In 2001, 50 countries experienced at least one death from terrorism. This 
number dropped to 39 in 2004. However, since then the number of 
countries has grown steadily, with more than 60 countries experiencing 
at least one fatal attack in every year since 2012. This number peaked in 
2016, when 79 countries had at least one death from terrorism. The 
distribution of terrorist deaths has remained widespread even though the 
total number of deaths has decreased considerably. 
The increase in attacks and deaths across more countries has meant 
that the impact of terrorism is becoming more widespread, even as 
deaths from terrorism are decreasing. In 2002, the first year for which 
there was sufficient data to produce the GTI (Global Terrorism Index), 
44 countries recorded no impact from terrorism, meaning that there had 
not been a single death or attack in the previous five years. In 2017, that 
number had decreased to 26.  
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Fig. 4.2 – Economic impact of terrorism in 2017 [31] 
Despite a significant fall in the number of deaths from terrorism in 
Iraq, there was no change in the five countries most impacted by 
terrorism, which include Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan.   
 
Fig. 4.3 – Total terrorism deaths by countries [31] 
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Conflict continued to be the primary driver of terrorist activity for 
the countries most impacted by terrorism in 2017. 
In 2017, terrorist attacks in conflict countries averaged 2.4 deaths, 
compared to 0.84 deaths in non-conflict countries. Terrorist attacks are 
more lethal on average in countries with a greater intensity of conflict. 
In 2017, countries in a state of war averaged 2.97 deaths per attack, 
compared to 1.36 in countries involved in a minor armed conflict. There 
are numerous possible reasons for this difference. Countries in conflict 
have a greater availability of more military-grade small arms and  bomb-
making capabilities. Countries that are not in conflict tend to be more 
economically-developed and spend more on intelligence gathering, 
policing and counterterrorism. 
The difference in lethality between terrorist attacks in conflict and 
non-conflict countries can also be clearly seen by the distribution of 
deaths from terrorism. In non-conflict countries, 74 % of terrorist attacks 
from 2002 to 2017 resulted in no fatalities. By contrast, in conflict 
countries, less than half of all terrorist attacks resulted in no deaths, and 
there were 84 attacks that killed more than 100 people. 
However, terrorist attacks that killed high numbers of people have 
remained relatively rare in both conflict and non-conflict countries since 
2002, with only 2.2 % of attacks in non-conflict countries and 4.5 % of 
attacks in conflict countries killing more than ten people.  
The four terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in 2017 
were the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Taliban, Al-
Shabaab and Boko Haram. These four groups were responsible for       
10 632 deaths from terrorism, representing 56.5 % of total deaths in 
130 
 
2017. In 2012, just prior to the large increase in terrorist activity around 
the world, these four groups were responsible for 32 % of all deaths 
from terrorism. A decade ago, they accounted for just 6 %. 
The past decade has experienced the largest surge in terrorist 
activity in the past fifty years. These four groups are responsible for      
44 % of the deaths in the decade. However, all of the groups other than 
Al-Shabaab have experienced falls in terrorist activity in the past few 
years.  
The impact of terrorism is receding in the Middle East, new threats 
are emerging elsewhere, most notably in Africa and Southeast Asia. 
Deaths from terrorism in Iraq fell 56 % between 2016 and 2017, 
with preliminary data suggesting an even greater fall in 2018. While it 
still remains the world’s deadliest terrorist group, ISIL’s decline 
contributed to a 56 % reduction in deaths in Iraq between 2016 and 
2017. 
ISIL’s control of territory and associated revenue streams have 
plunged over the past two years. ISIL lost 60 % of its territory and 80 % 
of its financial capacity between 2015 and 2017. Latest estimates 
suggest that ISIL now holds just one per cent of its former territory. The 
main financial losses suffered by the group consisted of foregone tax 
and oil revenue. Currently, the group’s primary revenue stream is 
extortion. 
Today, ISIL holds control over only scattered territories along the 
Syria-Iraq border.  As the prospects for a territorial caliphate have 
diminished severely, so has the feasibility of ISIL-related recruitment to 
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Iraq and Syria. However, the group’s ideology, frequency of attacks and 
the underlying reasons for its existence continue to persist. 
Al-Qa’ida has historically been most active in the Middle East, but 
its focus has now turned towards Africa. Between 2015 and 2017, 69 % 
of terror-related deaths caused by the group occurred in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Seizing on the power vacuum left by the Arab Spring, Al-Qa’ida’s 
movement into Africa has been the result of careful planning under the 
leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Outside of the Middle East, the 
group’s affiliates have gained traction throughout Africa, most notably 
in the Maghreb and Sahel regions and at the Horn of Africa. 
Over the past three years, many Southeast Asian countries have 
experienced a second wave of Islamist terrorism. The first wave came 
between 2002–2008 when the Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front and Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiya (JI) were responsible for 301 and 
274 deaths respectively. The second wave has come from ISIL-affiliated 
groups and separatist movements in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand, with 292 deaths across 348 
incidents recorded in 2017 alone. 
The Philippines and Myanmar both experienced their deadliest 
years on record in 2017, and Southeast Asia as a whole recorded a 36 
per cent increase in deaths from terrorism from 2016 to 2017. Just under 
97 per cent of deaths in the broader Asia-Pacific region occurred in 
Southeast Asia.  
The Global Terrorism Index is given in the Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 – The Global Terrorism Index in 2017 [31] 
 
Country Score Country  Score 
Iraq 9.75 Colombia 5.61 
Afghanistan 9.39 United Kingdom 5.61 
Nigeria 8.66 Saudi Arabia 5.48 
Syria 8.32 France 5.48 
Pakistan 8.18 Palestine 5.33 
Somalia 8.02 Burundi 5.32 
India 7.57 Nepal 5.30 
Yemen 7.53 Russia 5.23 
Egypt 7.35 Lebanon 5.15 
Philippines 7.18 China 5.11 
Congo 7.06 Burkina Faso 4.81 
Turkey 7.04 Chad 4.75 
Libya 6.99 Germany 4.60 
South Sudan 6.76 Mozambique 4.58 
Central African 
Republic 
6.72 Israel 4.58 
Cameroon 6.62 Indonesia 4.54 
Thailand 6.25 Angola 4.47 
Sudan 6.18 Iran 4.40 
Kenya 6.11 Greece 4.29 
United States of 
America 
6.07 South Africa 4.26 
Ukraine 6.05 Tunisia 4.09 
Mali 6.02 Belgium 4.06 
Niger 6.00 Sri Lanka 4.05 
Myanmar 5.92 Spain 4.02 
Bangladesh 5.70 Sweden 3.94 
Ethiopia 5.63 Uganda 3.93 
 
The most fatal terrorist attacks in 2017 are described in the Table 
4.2. 
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Table 4.2 – The most fatal terrorist attacks in 2017 [32] 
 
Country Date Group Deaths Description 
Somalia 14.10.2017 Al-Shabaab 588 A suicide bomber detonated an 
explosives-laden truck outside the 
Safari Hotel at the K5 intersection 
in Hodan neighbourhood, 
Mogadishu, Somalia 
Egypt 24.11.207 Sinal Province 
of the Islamic 
State 
311 Assailants detonated an explosive 
device and opened fire on Al-
Rawda mosque in Al-Rawda, Beir 
al-Abd, North Sinai, Egypt 
Iraq 17.03.2017 
 
ISIL 230 Assailants stormed a residential 
building and took civilians 
hostages in Maawsil al-Jadidah 
neighbourhood, Mosul, Nineveh, 
Iraq 
Iraq 04.06.2017 ISIL 200 Assailants abducted 200 Turkmen 
civilians from Tal Afar, Nineveh, 
Iraq. The hostages were executed 
on July 4, 2017 
Iraq 01.06.2017 ISIL 163 Snipers opened fire on fleeing 
civilians in Zanjili neighbourhood, 
Mosul, Iraq 
Libya 18.05.2017 Misrata 
Brigades  
141 Assailants attacked Brak al-Shati 
Airbase near Brak, Wadi Al 
Shatii, Libya. 
CAR 08.05.2017 Union for peace 
in Central 
Africa (UPC) 
133 Assailants attacked civilians in 
Alindao, Basse-Kotto, Central 
African Republic (CAR) 
Syria 02.10.2017 ISIL 128 Assailants overtook the town and 
abducted approximately 128 
residents in Qaryatayn, Homs, 
Syria. All 128 hostages were 
executed 
Syria 15.04.2017 Jaysh Al-Islam 127 A suicide bomber detonated an 
explosives-laden vehicle near an 
evacuation bus convoy in 
Rashidin neighbourhood, Aleppo, 
Syria 
CAR 13.05.2017 Anti-Balaka 
Militia 
108 Assailants armed with projectiles 
and firearms attacked Muslim 
civilians and a UN 
Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in the CAR 
base 
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A fall in the intensity of conflict in the Middle East, the decline of 
ISIL, and an increase in counterterrorism activity has meant that the total 
number of deaths from terrorism declined for the third consecutive year, 
falling by 27 % to 18 814 deaths in 2017. This compares to 25 774 the 
year before. The number of deaths has now fallen 44 % from its peak in 
2014. 
 
4.3. The Economic Impact of Terrorism 
 
The global economic impact of terrorism peaked in 2014 and has 
since declined in line with the decline of terror-related deaths committed 
by ISIL. The global economic impact of terrorism was US $ 52 billion in 
2017, a 42 % decline from 2016. This is the third consecutive year of 
decline in the cost of terrorism from its peak in 2014 of US $ 108 
billion. The economic impact in 2017 was less than half the impact seen 
in 2014 [32]. 
Countries suffering from armed conflict experience a significantly 
higher economic impact from terrorism. 
 Afghanistan is the country most affected by the economic impact 
of terrorism as a percentage of GDP at 12.8 %. Afghanistan has 
experienced a consistent increase in the level of violence from terrorism 
and ongoing conflict over the past three years. Iraq is the only other 
country that experienced costs of terrorism greater than ten % of its total 
economic activity, with the economic impact of terrorism equivalent to 
10.8 % of Iraqi GDP [32].  
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Table 4.3 shows the ten countries with the highest economic 
impact from terrorism as a percentage of their GDP in 2017. 
 
Table 4.3 – The ten worst affected countries by economic impact of 
terrorism as percentage of GDP, 2017 [32] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The economic impact of terrorism model includes costs from 
deaths, injuries and property destruction. The model also includes losses 
in economic activity, where terrorism causes more than 1 000 deaths. 
 Deaths from terrorism accounted for 72 % of the global economic 
impact of terrorism.  
Indirect GDP losses are the second largest category at 15 % of the 
total.  
Property destruction is estimated at two per cent of the global 
economic impact of terrorism. However, property cost estimates are 
missing for a large number of incidents.  
Table 4.4 shows the breakdown of the economic impact of 
terrorism by category. 
 
Country % of GDP 
Afghanistan 12.8 % 
Iraq 10.8 % 
Syria 5.8 % 
Somalia 5.0 % 
South Sudan 3.9 % 
Central African Republic 3.6 % 
Nigeria 2.6 % 
Libya 1.8 % 
Egypt 0.8 % 
Yemen 0.7 % 
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Table 4.4 – Breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism, 2017 [32] 
 
Category  Percentage 
Death 72 % 
GDP loss 25 % 
Property destruction 2 % 
Injures 1 % 
 
Deaths account for 72 % of the economic impact of terrorism. The 
economic impact of terrorism is smaller than many other forms of 
violence, accounting for approximately 0.4 % of the total global cost of 
violence in 2017, which was an estimated $14.76 trillion, equivalent to 
12.4 % of global GDP [32]. 
 This is a very conservative estimate of the costs associated with 
terrorism and only calculates globally quantifiable and comparable 
costs. It does not take into account the costs of counterterrorism or 
countering violent extremism, nor the impact of diverting public 
resources to security expenditure away from other government activities. 
Nor does it calculate any of the longer-term economic implications of 
terrorism from reduced tourism, business activity, production and 
investment.  
Studies from developed and developing countries have tried to 
quantify at a more granular level the adverse effects of terrorism on the 
economy. For example [32]: 
1) after the outbreak of terrorism in the Basque country in Spain in 
the late 1960s, economic growth declined by 10 %; 
137 
 
2) a study of the economic impact of terrorism in Israel found that 
per capita income would have been ten per cent higher if the country had 
avoided terrorism in the three years up to 2004; 
3) results from research on Turkey show that terrorism has severe 
adverse effects on the economy when the economy is in an expansionary 
phase. 
The level of economic disruption is relatively large and long-
lasting for small and less diversified economies. In contrast, advanced 
and diversified economies are economically more resilient and have 
shorter recovery periods from incidents of terrorism. These effects are 
mainly explained by the ability of the diversified economies to reallocate 
resources, such as labour and capital, from the terrorism-affected 
sectors. Advanced and more peaceful countries also have more resources 
and better institutions to avert future terrorism. 
Let’s analyze the impact of terrorism on developing countries. The 
limited short-term economic impact of the attacks on advanced 
economies helped allay fears over the fallout on developing countries. 
The widening of bond spreads, the fall in commodity prices and the 
weakening of currencies that plagued many emerging markets soon after 
the attack, have been quickly, if sometimes only partly, reversed. If 
domestic demand recovers as expected in OECD countries, prospects for 
emerging markets should improve further. Over the longer term 
however, the overall impact of the terrorist attacks on developing 
countries could be substantial. This impact could come from three main 
channels: shipping costs, the tourism industry and workers’ remittances 
[20]: 
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1. The effect of the proposed tightening of security on the cost of 
trading internationally is likely to be asymmetrical. Developing country 
exports often have higher ad valorem transportation costs (notably bulky 
commodities and perishable goods transported by air) and should thus be 
affected disproportionately. A “certification” procedure with selected 
foreign ports could be discriminatory if developing country ports fail to 
qualify. “Know-your-partner” initiatives, whereby pre-registered 
intermediaries go through simplified border procedures, may also favour 
large trading companies over smaller developing country-based firms. 
These proposed measures risk creating a “slow lane” for developing 
country exports, increasing relative compliance costs and eroding their 
competitiveness. 
2. Heightened fear of travelling following the attacks led to a 
number of cancellations and a drop in new bookings. Reservations 
world-wide fell by an estimated 12 to 15 % in October 2001 compared 
with the previous year, and had still not fully recovered by early 2002 
according to the World Tourism Organization. In developing countries, 
travel services account on average for about 7 per cent of total exports of 
goods and services and 2 to 3 % of GDP. The number is considerably 
higher in the Caribbean, the South Pacific and for some countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa region (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia) as well as in South and Southeast Asia (Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Vietnam). The drop in tourism traffic has also been 
asymmetrical, with some of the countries that depend most heavily on 
the industry experiencing the largest number of cancellations. Although 
the tourism industry is expected to recover as consumers gradually 
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revert to a business-as-usual attitude towards travelling, the increase in 
the perception of risk for some destinations is likely to be more 
permanent. 
3. For security reasons, visa requirements and the control of illegal 
immigration have started to be tightened in advanced countries. This has 
the potential to lower the number of developing country workers 
employed abroad, affecting the level of remittances. The fact that a 
disproportionate share of these emigrants work in the tourism industry 
(hotels especially) should also affect transfers. Emigrants’ remittances 
are an important source of income for most of Central America, the 
Caribbean and South Asia, as well as for some countries in the Pacific 
and in Southeast Asia. Although the exact level of transfers is difficult to 
determine, since part of them transit through unofficial channels, 
emigrants’ remittances are higher than exports for several countries. 
Besides the loss-of-life and sometimes life-changing injuries for 
the victims, terrorism leads to significant economic effects, with 
businesses, cities and nations losing billions in the aftermath of attacks. 
Calculations show that terrorism has a large negative association with 
economic growth in Europe. Between 2004 and 2016, the 28 EU 
member states lost around €180 billion in GDP terms due to terrorist 
attacks. Let’s take a closer look at some findings concerning the cost of 
terrorism in the Europe [83]: 
1. Terrorism is negatively associated with economic growth in 
Europe. The 28 EU member states have lost around €180 billion in GDP 
terms due to terrorism between 2004 and 2016. 
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2. The UK (€43.7 billion) and France (€43 billion) were the 
nations that suffered the highest economic losses in GDP terms due to 
terrorism. This was closely followed by Spain (€40.8 billion) and then 
Germany (around €19.2 billion). 
3. The extensive coverage of terrorist attacks through the multiple 
media and social media channels has led to an exponential growth of 
eyewitnesses of terror attacks. This means that even those not directly 
involved in attacks may be psychologically affected. 
4. The psychological impacts of witnessing terror attacks can lead 
to people and companies changing their behaviours, which has a direct 
impact on the economies of EU nations. For example, EU citizens are 
likely to consume more and save less, with this leading to an increase in 
consumption; however, there is also likely to be a decrease in savings 
and investment rates by companies. 
5. Despite the economic losses in GDP terms, consumer 
purchasing habits remained relatively stable across the EU and 
sometimes even increased in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. There is 
also no significant change in the share of government expenditure from 
EU member states relative to their GDP in light of terrorism. 
6. The negative effects on EU economic growth following 
terrorism tend to be short-lived and only apply within the year of the 
terrorist incident. For example, the tourism sector, despite taking a 
significant economic hit initially, seems to return to normal within one 
to three months following a terrorist attack. 
7. The human and physical capital costs of terrorism in the EU 
were estimated to be an additional €5.6 billion between 2004 and 2016. 
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These include the costs of homicides through lost life-time earnings, 
injuries through medical treatment costs and property damage costs. 
8. More terrorist attacks are associated with lower levels of life 
satisfaction and happiness among the EU population. Terrorist attacks 
also lower EU citizens’ trust in fellow citizens, national political 
institutions, the legal system and the police. 
 
4.4. Counter-Terrorism Measures 
 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
implements effective measures to countering terrorism, as a serious 
crime that has no justification, whatever its motivation or origin may be.  
OSCE participating States agree that terrorism is one of the most 
significant threats to peace, security and stability, as well as to the 
enjoyment of human rights and social and economic development, in the 
OSCE area and beyond. Terrorism seeks to undermine the very values 
that unite the OSCE. At the same time, participating States 
unequivocally reject the association of terrorism with any particular 
race, nationality or religion. The organization is therefore resolute in 
implementing effective measures to prevent and combat terrorism, in all 
its forms and manifestations, as a serious crime that has no justification, 
whatever its motivation or origin may be. 
The OSCE makes a comprehensive contribution to international 
efforts against terrorism led by the United Nations, addressing the 
manifestations of terrorism, as well as the various social, economic, 
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political and other factors, which might engender conditions in which 
terrorist organizations could engage in recruitment and win support.  
The OSCE promotes a co-operative and co-ordinated approach to 
countering terrorism at all levels, including co-ordination among 
national authorities, co-operation among states, co-operation with 
relevant international and regional organizations and, where appropriate, 
establishment of public-private partnerships between state authorities, 
the private sector (business community, industry), civil society and the 
media. These efforts are guided by and supportive of the United Nations 
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant resolutions of the UN 
Security Council, in accordance with the OSCE Consolidated 
Framework for the Fight against Terrorism. 
Strategic focus areas for OSCE counter-terrorism activities [12]: 
1. Promoting the implementation of the international legal 
framework against terrorism and enhancing international legal co-
operation in criminal matters related to terrorism. 
2. Countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to 
terrorism, following a multidimensional approach. 
3. Preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorism. 
4. Countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. 
5. Promoting dialogue and co-operation on counter-terrorism 
issues, in particular, through public-private partnerships between State 
authorities and the private sector (business community, industry), as 
well as civil society and the media. 
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6. Strengthening national efforts to implement United Nations 
Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
7. Strengthening travel document security. 
8. Promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the context of counter-terrorism measures.  
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy on the 8th of September 2006. The strategy is a 
unique global instrument to enhance national, regional and international 
efforts to counter terrorism.   
Through its adoption that all Member States have agreed the first 
time to a common strategic and operational approach to fight terrorism, 
not only sending a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in all its 
forms and manifestation but also resolving to take practical steps 
individually and collectively to prevent and combat it. Those practical 
steps include a wide array of measures ranging from strengthening state 
capacity to counter terrorist threats to better coordinating United Nations 
system’s counter-terrorism activities. 
 The General Assembly reviews the Strategy every two years, 
making it a living document attuned to Member States’ counter-
terrorism priorities. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the form 
of a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288) 
composed of four pillars [96]: 
1) addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; 
2) measures to prevent and combat terrorism; 
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3) measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat 
terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that 
regard; 
4) measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule 
of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.  
Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of 
terrorism [96]:  
1. To continue to strengthen and make best possible use of the 
capacities of the United Nations in areas such as conflict prevention, 
negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, rule of law, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding , in order to contribute to the successful 
prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged unresolved conflicts. 
The OSCE recognizes that the peaceful resolution of such conflicts 
would contribute to strengthening the global fight against terrorism. 
2. To continue to arrange under the auspices of the United Nations 
initiatives and programmes to promote dialogue, tolerance and 
understanding among civilizations, cultures, peoples and religions, and 
to promote mutual respect for and prevent the defamation of religions, 
religious values, beliefs and cultures. In this regard, the OSCE welcomes 
the launching by the Secretary-General of the initiative on the Alliance 
of Civilizations. The OSCE also welcomes similar initiatives that have 
been taken in other parts of the world. 
3. To promote a culture of peace, justice and human development, 
ethnic, national and religious tolerance, and respect for all religions, 
religious values, beliefs or cultures by establishing and encouraging, as 
appropriate, education and public awareness programmes involving all 
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sectors of society. In this regard, the OSCE encouragse the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to play a key 
role, including through inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue and dialogue 
among civilizations. 
4. To continue to work to adopt such measures as may be 
necessary and appropriate and in accordance with our obligations under 
international law to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act 
or acts and prevent such conduct. 
5. To reiterate our determination to ensure the timely and full 
realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major 
United Nations conferences and summits, including the Millennium 
Development Goals. The OSCE reaffirms its commitment to eradicate 
poverty and promote sustained economic growth, sustainable 
development and global prosperity for all. 
6. To pursue and reinforce development and social inclusion 
agendas at every level as goals in themselves, recognizing that success 
in this area, especially on youth unemployment, could reduce 
marginalization and the subsequent sense of victimization that propels 
extremism and the recruitment of terrorists. 
7. To encourage the United Nations system as a whole to scale up 
the cooperation and assistance it is already conducting in the fields of 
rule of law, human rights and good governance, to support sustained 
economic and social development. 
8. To consider putting in place, on a voluntary basis, national 
systems of assistance that would promote the needs of victims of 
terrorism and their families and facilitate the normalization of their lives. 
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In this regard, the OSCE encourages States to request the relevant 
United Nations entities to help them to develop such national systems. 
The OSCE will also strive to promote international solidarity in support 
of victims and foster the involvement of civil society in a global 
campaign against terrorism and for its condemnation. This could include 
exploring at the General Assembly the possibility of developing 
practical mechanisms assistance to victims. 
Measures to prevent and combat terrorism within the Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy [96]: 
1. To refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, participating 
in, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and to take 
appropriate practical measures to ensure that our respective territories 
are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the 
preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed 
against other States or their citizens. 
2. To cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, in accordance 
with our obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe 
haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle of extradite or 
prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts 
to participate in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of 
terrorist acts or provides safe havens. 
3. To ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of 
perpetrators of terrorist acts, in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of national and international law, in particular human rights law, refugee 
law and international humanitarian law. The OSCE will endeavor to 
conclude and implement to that effect mutual judicial assistance and 
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extradition agreements, and to strengthen cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies. 
4. To intensify cooperation, as appropriate, in exchanging timely 
and accurate information concerning the prevention and combating of 
terrorism. 
5. To strengthen coordination and cooperation among States in 
combating crimes that might be connected with terrorism, including 
drug trafficking in all its aspects, illicit arms trade, in particular of small 
arms and light weapons, including man-portable air defence systems, 
money laundering and smuggling of nuclear, chemical, biological, 
radiological and other potentially deadly materials. 
6. To consider becoming parties without delay to the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and to the 
three protocols supplementing it, and implementing them. 
7. To take appropriate measures, before granting asylum, for the 
purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not engaged in terrorist 
activities and, after granting asylum, for the purpose of ensuring that the 
refugee status is not used in a manner contrary to the provisions set out 
in paragraph 1 of this section. 
8. To encourage relevant regional and sub-regional organizations 
to create or strengthen counter-terrorism mechanisms or centres. Should 
they require cooperation and assistance to this end, the OSCE 
encourages the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee and its 
Executive Directorate and, where consistent with their existing 
mandates, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and the 
International Criminal Police Organization, to facilitate its provision. 
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9. To acknowledge that the question of creating an international 
centre to fight terrorism could be considered, as part of the international 
efforts to enhance the fight against terrorism. 
10. To encourage States to implement the comprehensive 
international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force’s 
Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, recognizing that States may 
require assistance in implementing them. 
11. To invite the United Nations system to develop, together with 
Member States, a single comprehensive database on biological incidents, 
ensuring that it is complementary to the International Criminal Police 
Organization’s contemplated Biocrimes Database. The OSCE also 
encourages the Secretary-General to update the roster of experts and 
laboratories, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures, 
available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of alleged use. 
In addition,  the OSCE notes the importance of the proposal of the 
Secretary-General to bring together, within the framework of the United 
Nations, the major biotechnology stakeholders, including industry, 
scientific community, civil society and governments, into a common 
programme aimed at ensuring that biotechnology’s advances are not 
used for terrorist or other criminal purposes but for the public good, with 
due respect to the basic international norms on intellectual property 
rights. 
12. To work with the United Nations, with due regard to 
confidentiality, respecting human rights and in compliance with other 
obligations under international law, to explore ways and means to: 
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– coordinate efforts at the international and regional level to 
counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the Internet; 
– use the Internet as a tool for countering the spread of terrorism, 
while recognizing that States may require assistance in this regard. 
13. To step-up national efforts and bilateral, sub-regional, regional 
and international co-operation, as appropriate, to improve border and 
customs controls, in order to prevent and detect the movement of 
terrorists and to prevent and detect the illicit traffic in, inter alia, small 
arms and light weapons, conventional ammunition and explosives, 
nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons and materials, 
while recognizing that States may require assistance to that effect. 
14. To encourage the United Nations Counter Terrorism 
Committee and its Executive Directorate to continue to work with 
States, at their request, to facilitate the adoption of legislation and 
administrative measures to implement the terrorist travel-related 
obligations, and to identify best practices in this area, drawing whenever 
possible on those developed by technical international organizations 
such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World 
Customs Organization and the International Criminal Police 
Organization. 
15. To encourage the Committee established pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1267 (1999) to continue to work to strengthen the 
effectiveness of the travel ban under the United Nations sanctions 
regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and 
entities, as well as to ensure, as a matter of priority, that fair and 
transparent procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on its 
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lists, for removing them and for granting humanitarian exceptions. In 
this regard, the OSCE encourages States to share information, including 
by widely distributing the International Criminal Police Organization-
United Nations Special Notices concerning people subject to this 
sanctions regime. 
16. To step up efforts and co-operation at every level, as 
appropriate, to improve the security on manufacturing and issuing 
identity and travel documents and to prevent and detect their alteration 
or fraudulent use, while recognizing that States may require assistance in 
doing so. In this regard, the OSCE invites the International Criminal 
Police Organization to enhance its database on stolen and lost travel 
documents, and the OSCE will endeavor to make full use of this tool as 
appropriate, in particular by sharing relevant information. 
17. To invite the United Nations to improve co-ordination in 
planning a response to a terrorist attack using nuclear, chemical, 
biological or radiological weapons or materials, in particular by 
reviewing and improving the effectiveness of the existing inter-agency 
co-ordination mechanisms for assistance delivery, relief operations and 
victim support, so that all States can receive adequate assistance. In this 
regard, the OSCE invites the General Assembly and the Security 
Council to develop guidelines for the necessary co-operation and 
assistance in the event of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass 
destruction. 
18. To step up all efforts to improve the security and protection of 
particularly vulnerable targets such as infrastructure and public places, 
as well as the response to terrorist attacks and other disasters, in 
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particular in the area of civil protection, while recognizing that States 
may require assistance to that effect.  
 
Conclusions 
 
1. Terrorism is an extreme expression of the fragmentation of 
social life, as it involves the infringement of all existing moral and legal 
standards, as well as the violations of public order on a micro-social and 
international scale. 
2. There are different types of terrorism: nationalist terrorism, 
religious terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, left-wing terrorism, right-
wing terrorism, anarchist terrorism, and etc. Terrorists are inspired by 
many different motives. These motives can be grouped into three 
categories: rationale, psychological, and cultural.  
3. The increase in attacks and deaths across more countries has 
meant that the impact of terrorism is becoming more widespread, even 
as deaths from terrorism are decreasing. In 2002, the first year for which 
there was sufficient data to produce the Global Terrorism Index, 44 
countries recorded no impact from terrorism, meaning that there had not 
been a single death or attack in the previous five years. In 2017, that 
number had decreased to 26.  
4. The economic impact of terrorism model includes costs from 
deaths, injuries and property destruction. The model also includes losses 
in economic activity, where terrorism causes more than 1,000 deaths. 
Deaths from terrorism accounted for 72 % of the global economic 
impact of terrorism. Indirect GDP losses are the second largest category 
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at 15 % of the total. Property destruction is estimated at two per cent of 
the global economic impact of terrorism. 
5. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) implements effective measures to countering terrorism, as a 
serious crime that has no justification, whatever its motivation or origin 
may be.  
 
End-of-chapter tasks: 
 
1. Define the global terrorism. 
2. Explain the motives behind the terrorist attacks. 
3. Classify the types of terrorism. 
4. Indentify terrorist organizations and their global impact. 
5. Use the Global Terrorism Index to report its expansion.  
6. Arrange the counter-terrorism measures.     
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CHAPTER 5. HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
 
5.1. Criminalization of Human Trafficking 
5.2. Human Smuggling 
5.3. Human Trafficking in Numbers 
5.4. Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
Key words: human trafficking, human smuggling, organized crime, 
forced labor, sweatshops, modern slavery, human rights   
 
5.1. Criminalization of Human Trafficking 
 
Trafficking in persons is a serious crime and a grave violation of 
human rights. Every year, thousands of men, women and children fall 
into the hands of traffickers, in their own countries and abroad. Almost 
every country in the world is affected by trafficking, whether as a 
country of origin, transit or destination for victims.  
The United Nations defines human trafficking as [103] “the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position 
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation”. 
Elements of human trafficking. On the basis of the definition 
given above, it is evident that trafficking in persons has three constituent 
elements [38]: 
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1. The act (what is done): recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons. 
2. The means (how it is done): threat or use of force, coercion, 
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving 
payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim. 
3. The purpose (why it is done): for the purpose of exploitation, 
which includes forced labour, slavery or similar practices and the 
removal of organs. 
A person who has been trafficked may [103]: 
1) show signs that their movement is controlled; 
2) have false identity or travel documents; 
3) not know their home or work address; 
4) have no access to their earnings; 
5) be unable to negotiate working conditions; 
6) work excessively long hours over long periods; 
7) have limited or no social interaction; 
8) have limited contact with their families or with people outside 
of their immediate environment; 
9) think that they are bonded by debt.  
Trafficking in persons is a truly global phenomenon: in data 
recently reported to UNODC, victims from at least 127 countries were 
detected, and 137 countries reported having detected victims. While this 
sample may not be representative of the entire victim pool, two thirds of 
the victims reported were women, and 79 % of the victims were 
subjected to unethical exploitation. The European Union has one of the 
best documented pools of victims of trafficking for the purposes of 
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unethical exploitation, with a greater variety of nationalities (at least 95) 
than any other part of the world [85].  
With the end of the Cold War, a large number of labourers of all 
sorts moved from Eastern to Western Europe. Some of these labourers 
were involved into unethical exploitation, and not all came voluntarily. 
51 % of human trafficking victims detected in Europe were from the 
Balkans or the former Soviet Union, in particular Romania, Bulgaria, 
Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova [85]. But 
this appears to be changing, as women trafficked from other parts of the 
world are becoming more prominent. In many instances, women, some 
of whom may have once been victims themselves, play an important role 
in exploiting the victims.  
The traffickers are often of the same nationality as the victim, 
although there are important exceptions. The techniques used to recruit 
victims seem to vary by source country: in Eastern Europe, for example, 
victims may be collected through employment agencies, while in West 
Africa, family and social networks are utilized.  
Experts estimated that there are 140 000 trafficking victims in 
Europe, generating a gross annual income of US$ 3 billion for their 
exploiters. With an average period of exploitation of two years, this 
would suggest over 70 000 new entries every year. The trend appears to 
be stable. 
The origins of trafficking victims detected in West and Central 
Europe are represented in the Table 5.1.   
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Table 4.1 – The origins of trafficking victims detected in West and 
Central Europe [85] 
 
Regions of origin Percentage  
Balkans  32 % 
Former Soviet Union  19 % 
South America 13 % 
Central Europe  7 % 
Africa  5 % 
East Asia  3 % 
Others  21 % 
 
The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, which 
supplements the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, is 
cast broadly enough to encompass a wide range of forms of exploitation, 
but in practice, two major categories of transnational activity can be 
identified: 
– trafficking for the purposes of unethical exploitation; 
 – labour exploitation, including the use of child labour.  
Trafficking for the purpose of forced labour appears to be 
limited to labour-intensive enterprises with rigid supply curves: 
typically, the so called dirty, dangerous or demeaning jobs. As a country 
develops and public welfare protections are established, fewer citizens 
are willing or able to take on these jobs at an internationally competitive 
wage. In some circumstances, demand for trafficked labour, including 
the labour of children, can be generated. Coerced labour is more 
profitable for short-run productions. The longer the exploitation, the 
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lower the net productivity of the coerced labourer and the greater the 
risk to the offender. Labourers are forced to work at the sweatshops.  
Sweatshop is a workplace in which workers are employed at low 
wages and under unhealthy or oppressive conditions. In England, the 
word sweater was used as early as 1850 to describe an employer who 
exacted monotonous work for very low wages. “Sweating” became 
widespread in the 1880s, when immigrants from eastern and southern 
Europe provided an influx of cheap labour in the United States and 
central Europe. An increase in industrialization in the 20th century saw 
sweatshops emerge in parts of Latin America and Asia, a trend that 
accelerated with increased demand for consumer goods in the West and 
a lowering of international trade barriers. 
Sweatshops often involve poverty-level wages, excessive hours of 
labour, and unsafe or unhealthful workplace conditions. Certain social 
and economic conditions are necessary for sweatshops to be possible 
[22]:  
– a mass of unskilled and unorganized labourers, often including 
children; 
– management systems that neglect the human factor of labour;  
– lack of accountability for poor working conditions, or failure of 
governments to intervene on the behalf of workers. 
Historically, the sweatshop has depended on homework (literally, 
work done in the home) and the development of contracting. In the 
homework system, members of a family receive payment for piecework 
done in their own home or in a residence that has been converted into a 
small factory. In contracting, individual workers or groups of workers 
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agree to do a certain job for a certain price. Sometimes they carry out 
this contract themselves; sometimes they sublet it to subcontractors at 
lower prices. This arrangement can lead to labour exploitation (often of 
women, children, and, in the developed world, undocumented workers 
or recent immigrants), erratic employment, and poor quality in the final 
product. When trade is brisk, extremely long hours are worked in 
seriously overcrowded workrooms. When trade is slack, the 
subcontractors – whose overhead costs are far lower than those of 
factory employers – typically dismiss workers without consideration. 
One of the earliest objectives of factory and minimum-wage legislation 
was to improve conditions for workers.  
In the 19th century, sweatshops were common in the manufacturing 
of shoes, soap, cigars, and artificial flowers. Conditions have tended to 
be worse in large cities, where sweatshops can be hidden in slum areas. 
Although legislation had by the middle of the 20th century controlled 
sweatshops in most developed countries, the system was still operating 
in many countries in Asia, where large numbers of people were engaged 
in homework and in small factory shops. Factors contributing to the 
control of sweatshops in the 20th century included the growth of 
national labour laws, pressures from trade unions, the political influence 
of labour parties, social awareness stemming from activism, and, on the 
part of industry, recognition of the efficiencies of factory production and 
increased interest in human relations. Around the world, 
the International Labour Organisation has attempted to raise labour 
standards in countries where sweatshops are still common. Sweatshops 
in the garment and shoe industries became headline stories in the 1990s 
159 
 
when popular American brands were discovered to have been made in 
sweatshops in the United States and its territories and in overseas 
factories. 
There are many factors that can render a source country vulnerable 
to human trafficking, the most commonly cited of which is poverty. But 
there are many poor countries that do not seem to produce large numbers 
of trafficking victims, so poverty alone is not enough to explain the 
phenomenon. 
 
5.2. Human Smuggling 
 
 Human smuggling and trafficking are rapidly growing 
transnational criminal activity that involve the recruitment, movement, 
and delivery of migrants from a sending region to a destination. The two 
activities are differentiated as follows: smuggled migrants have a 
consensual relationship with their smugglers and are free at the end of 
their journey, while trafficked persons are enslaved and exploited by 
their traffickers.  
The United Nations has adopted a legislative framework to define 
human smuggling and trafficking.  Distinct protocols were adopted on 
the two crimes in 2000 in conjunction with the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The adoption of 
these protocols in tandem with the convention reflects the international 
understanding that human smuggling and trafficking are part of 
organized crime. Human smuggling and trafficking are thought to be the 
most lucrative forms of organized crime after drug trade.  
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Let’s consider human trafficking and smuggling from the 
European perspective. These criminal activities into the above 
mentioned region have grown since the 1980s. Emigrants are attracted 
by generous welfare support and perceived economic advantages, as 
well as the demand in Western Europe for “Three-D” workers – those 
willing to take dirty, dangerous, and degrading jobs that national citizens 
are unwilling to do. The increase can also be attributed to a number of 
converging global factors in the past few decades: economic crises in 
Asia; the conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; and poverty in the 
global south have all encouraged emigration.   
Human smuggling and trafficking are not evenly distributed across 
Europe. According to the United Nations, five countries of Western 
Europe – Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands – have recorded 
the highest number of trafficking victims. These same countries are also 
principal destinations for individuals who enlist the services of human 
smugglers.  
The next largest hubs of human trafficking are Austria, Denmark, 
France, Spain, and Switzerland. Greece and Spain are not only recipient 
countries for unauthorized migrants but also have been exploited by 
transnational smuggling organizations because of their geographic 
location on the periphery of Europe. 
Different regions of Europe receive victims from different source 
countries. Europol identified five major hubs of organized crime [71]. 
Each is connected to particular source countries, and specializes in 
certain types of labor placement. The five hubs are: in the northwest, the 
Netherlands and Belgium; in the northeast, the Baltic states and 
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Kaliningrad; in the southeast, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece; in the 
south, southern Italy; and in the southwest, Spain and Portugal. 
The southwest hub (Spain and Portugal) receives victims from the 
Iberian Peninsula and redistributes them throughout Europe according to 
market demand. Chinese victims often work in textile sweatshops, 
Eastern Europeans in agriculture, while Roma children are forced to beg 
and commit thefts.  
The southern criminal hub (southern Italy) is a transit and 
destination area for individuals who come from North and West Africa, 
Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and China. They work in the textile 
industry, entertainment sector, elder and child care, and construction.        
The major source countries of smuggling and trafficking victims 
were identified by Europol as Bulgaria, Moldova, Nigeria, Romania, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine. In many cases, trafficking to Europe is 
facilitated by members of victims’ own migrant communities. Identified 
source countries include some of the poorest nations in Europe [71].  
Among child victims, leading source regions are Eastern Europe, 
North Africa and Asia. A significant number come from the Middle East 
and the Indian subcontinent by way of Turkey and often Balkans. Most 
of these children, defined as trafficking victims, will work in illegal 
labor markets.  
The Arab Spring had a significant impact on illegal immigration 
into Western Europe. Many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who were 
working in North Africa when the unrest started escaped to Europe.  
There are many routes into Europe from different regions of the 
world – North Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe and Asia [71]. 
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These routes change over time as traffickers and smugglers adapt to 
enforcement and effective border patrols. The accession of the Czech 
Republic and Poland into the European Union in 2004 reduced the use 
of routes across these countries, as borders control were tightened with 
training and support from the European Union. By contrast, the 
accession of Romanian and Bulgaria to the European Union in 2007 has 
not been as successful in shutting off Balkan smuggling rings. These 
countries still suffer high levels of corruption at the borders and in law 
enforcement generally. Many of the routes used for humans are the same 
as those used for traded goods.  
The primary transit routes are across the Mediterranean, the 
Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Turkey. The individuals trafficked into 
Europe usually travel by air, sea, and land. The most recently identified 
route is from North Macedonia, through Serbia and Hungary, and into 
Austria. Entry from the Baltic Sea and through the northern parts of 
Europe is less common. Many routes – whether from Africa, China, or 
Afghanistan and Pakistan – are circuitous and involve long distances. 
The routes from Latin America are more direct; those smuggled and 
trafficked often fly straight to Spain or Portugal [71].  
  For migrants from Nigeria, there are many routes from exit point 
of Lagos into Europe. These routes change and reorganize on a constant 
basis to avoid intervention by the police or immigration patrol guards. 
During the civil conflict in Libya, new routes were used as smugglers 
and traffickers exploited the internal chaos in Libya to move individuals 
from sub-Saharan to Italy’s island of Lampedusa. Overall, 
approximately 8 % of unauthorized migrants from North Africa enter 
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Europe by sea [71]. And a significant number enter legally by air, then 
stay on beyond their visa authorization.  
Trafficking and smuggling are logistically complicated, and the 
barriers to entry these activities have created an enormous variety of 
facilitators who assist those seeking illegal entry into the particular 
region, ranging from small groups to complex international 
organizations. Other facilitators are not part of criminal networks, but 
instead either knowingly or unknowingly aid the process. For example, 
employment agencies are often used to facilitate the movement of 
victims, apartment owners may rent apartments to smuggled and 
trafficked individuals, and businesses – particularly in the travel and 
entertainment industries – may employ smuggled or trafficked workers.     
Traffickers are logistics specialists who can move individuals 
across vast distances. They often require numerous safe houses along the 
way where they can lodge their human cargo until it is safe to move 
them further. For individuals traveling the Balkan route into Western 
Europe, these safe houses are often in Turkey and Eastern Europe.  
Routes are often indirect, as traffickers carefully avoid policed roads, 
border checkpoints, and jurisdictions where there is efficient and honest 
law enforcement.   
 
5.3. Human Trafficking in Numbers 
 
Human trafficking can be a transnational process where victims are 
recruited abroad and transported across borders into another country 
where they are exploited for labor and/or unethical activity. However, 
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human trafficking can also be a domestic phenomenon, where little or no 
transportation is required. 
Human trafficking as a global problem. According to a 
September 2017 report from the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
and Walk Free Foundation [39]: 
1. An estimated 24.9 million victims are trapped in modern-day 
slavery. Of these, 16 million (64 %) were exploited for labor, 4.8 million 
(19 %) were unethically exploited, and 4.1 million (17 %) were 
exploited in state-imposed forced labor. 
2. Forced labor takes place in many different industries. Of the 16 
million trafficking victims exploited for labor: 
– 7.5 million (47 %) forced labor victims work in construction, 
manufacturing, mining, or hospitality; 
– 3.8 million (24 %) forced labor victims are domestic workers; 
– 1.7 million (11 %) forced labor victims work in agriculture.  
3. 71 % of trafficking victims around the world are women and 
girls and 29 % are men and boys. 
4. 15.4 million victims (75 %) are aged 18 or older, with the 
number of children under the age of 18 estimated at 5.5 million (25 %). 
5. The Asia-pacific region accounts for the largest number of 
forced laborers – 15.4 million (62 % of the global total). Africa has 5.7 
million (23 %) followed by Europe and Central Asia with 2.2 million   
(9 %). The Americas account for 1.2 million (5 %) and the Arab States 
account for 1 % of all victims.  
6. Human trafficking does not always involve travel to the 
destination of exploitation: 2.2 million (14 %) of victims of forced labor 
165 
 
moved either internally or internationally, while 3.5 million (74 %) of 
victims of sexual exploitation were living outside their country of 
residence. 
7. Victims spend an average of 20 months in forced labor, although 
this varied with different forms of forced labor. 
Human trafficking as a big business. Human trafficking earns 
profits of roughly $150 billion a year for traffickers, according to the 
ILO report from 2014. The following is a breakdown of profits, by 
sector [39]: 
– $99 billion from commercial unethical exploitation; 
– $34 billion in construction, manufacturing, mining and utilities; 
– $9 billion in agriculture, including forestry and fishing; 
– $8 billion dollars is saved annually by private households that 
employ domestic workers under conditions of forced labor. 
While only 19 % of victims are trafficked for unethical 
exploitation earns 66 % of the global profits of human trafficking. The 
average annual profits generated by each woman in forced unethical 
servitude ($100 000) is estimated to be six times more than the average 
profits generated by each trafficking victim worldwide ($21 800), 
according to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE). OSCE studies show that unethical exploitation can yield a 
return on investment ranging from 100 % to 1 000 %, while an enslaved 
laborer can produce more than 50 % profit even in less profitable 
markets (e.g., agricultural labor in India). In the Netherlands, 
investigators were able to calculate the profit generated by two 
traffickers from a number of victims. One trafficker earned $18 148 per 
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month from four victims (for a total of $127 036) while the second 
trafficker earned $295 786 in the 14 months that three women were 
unethically exploited according to the OSCE.  
While unethical exploitation generates profits, forced labor saves 
costs. In one case, Chinese kitchen workers were paid $808 for a 78-
hour work week in Germany. According to German law, a cook was 
entitled to earn $2 558 for a 39-hour work week according to the OSCE.  
Number of people in forced labour worldwide (estimates by the 
2012 International Labour Organization) [102]: 
– 24.9 million people across the world; 
– 11.7 million in Asia and Pacific; 
– 3.7 million in Africa; 
– 1.8 million in Latin America and the Caribbean; 
– 1.5 million  in developed economies (US, Canada, Australia, 
European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand); 
– 1.6 million in Central, Southeast and Eastern Europe (non-EU) 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States; 
– 600 000 in the Middle East; 
– 16 million people in the private economy; 
– 14.2 million are in labour exploitation in industries such as 
agriculture, construction, domestic work and manufacturing; 
– 10 million children are in forced labour; 
– 4.1 million are forced to work under governments and military 
rules. 
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According to the 2017 State Department Trafficking in Persons 
(TIP) report, there were only 14 894 prosecutions and 9 071 convictions 
for trafficking globally in 2016 [39]:  
– 1 251 prosecutions, 1 119 convictions and the identification of  
18 296 victims occurred in Africa; 
– 2 137 prosecutions, 1 953 convictions and the identification of    
9 989 victims occurred in East Asia & the Pacific;  
– 2 703 prosecutions, 1 673 convictions, and the identification of 
11 416 victims occurred in Europe;   
– 996 prosecutions, 1 187 convictions, and the identification of      
3 292 victims occurred in the Near East;  
– 6 297 prosecutions, 2 193 convictions, and the identification of 
14 706 victims occurred in South & Central Asia; 
– 1 513 prosecutions, 946 convictions, and the identification of      
8 821 victims occurred in the Western Hemisphere. 
Of the estimated 16 million forced labor victims worldwide, only  
1 038 cases of forced labor were prosecuted globally in 2016, according 
to the US Department of State. In 2016, the Department of Justice 
convicted a total of 439 human traffickers, up from 297 in 2015 and 184 
in 2014. 
 
5.4. Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
 
Human trafficking violates human rights, which are declared by 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. This Declaration remains 
as relevant today as it was on the day in 1948 that it was proclaimed and 
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adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The extraordinary 
vision and resolve of the drafters produced a document that, for the first 
time, articulated the rights and freedoms to which every human being is 
equally and inalienably entitled.  
This Declaration is a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ 
of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by 
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms 
and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the 
peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of 
territories under their jurisdiction [99]. 
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall 
be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status 
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty. 
Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person. 
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Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and 
the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. 
Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a 
person before the law. 
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and 
against any incitement to such discrimination. 
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights 
granted him by the constitution or by law. 
Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile. 
Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of 
his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 
Article 11. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to 
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public 
trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. No 
one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal 
offence was committed. 
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Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
law against such interference or attacks. 
Article 13. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and 
residence within the borders of each State. Everyone has the right to 
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. 
Article 14. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution. This right may not be invoked in the 
case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from 
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
Article 15. Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality. 
Article 16. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due 
to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a 
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free 
and full consent of the intending spouses. The family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society 
and the State. 
Article 17. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as 
in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
property. 
Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
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religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance. 
Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
Article 20. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association. No one may be compelled to belong to an 
association. 
Article 21. Everyone has the right to take part in the government 
of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 
Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall 
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures. 
Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to 
social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and 
international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and 
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality. 
Article 23. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of 
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection 
against unemployment. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the 
right to equal pay for equal work. Everyone who works has the right to 
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just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an 
existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by 
other means of social protection. Everyone has the right to form and to 
join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including 
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. 
Article 25. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, 
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control. Motherhood and childhood are 
entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or 
out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
Article 26. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be 
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary 
education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education 
shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally 
accessible to all on the basis of merit. Education shall be directed to the 
full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or 
religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for 
the maintenance of peace. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind 
of education that shall be given to their children. 
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Article 27. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the 
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author. 
Article 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order 
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be 
fully realized. 
Article 29. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone 
the free and full development of his personality is possible. In the 
exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society. These rights and freedoms 
may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations. 
 
Conclusions 
 
1. The United Nations defines human trafficking as “the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position 
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
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achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation”. 
2. Trafficking in persons is a truly global phenomenon: in data 
recently reported to UNODC, victims from at least 127 countries were 
detected, and 137 countries reported having detected victims. There are 
140 000 trafficking victims in Europe, generating a gross annual income 
of US$ 3 billion for their exploiters. With an average period of 
exploitation of two years, this would suggest over 70 000 new entries 
every year. The trend appears to be stable. 
3. Policy solutions that are likely to reduce human trafficking 
flows need to be multifaceted, addressing a variety of contributing 
factors simultaneously. Primarily, policymakers must address the 
demand for the migrants through education, prevention efforts, and 
prosecution; harmonize policy efforts both within and across countries 
so that traffickers don’t just move to take advantage of the most 
permissive regulatory environment; decrease the profits of traffickers; 
and improve labor laws so that legal migrants may fill in the demand for 
the work that currently employs smuggled migrants.   
 
End-of-chapter tasks 
 
1. Distinguish between human trafficking and smuggling. 
2. Try to reason why human trafficking is a global issue. 
3. Define the elements of human trafficking. 
4. Debate the problem of human trafficking in numbers. 
5. Identify the most vulnerable individuals to human trafficking. 
6. Suggest policy solution to reduce trafficking flows. 
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CHAPTER 6. COMMERCIAL СRIMES IN GLOBAL 
DIMENSION 
 
6.1. Corruption Across Nations 
6.2. Transnational Money Laundering 
6.3. Commercial Fraud and Embezzlement 
Key words: corruption, bribery, CPI, money laundering, cash 
smuggling, commercial fraud, check fraud, embezzlement     
 
6.1. Corruption Across Nations 
 
Defining corruption can be a challenge. It takes many forms, and 
perpetrators are skilled in developing new ways to be corrupt and cover 
their tracks. Corruption may be defined as the abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain. It captures three elements of corruption [101]: 
1. Public and private sectors. Corruption occurs in both the 
public and private sectors. This includes media and civil society 
actors. Actors can be individuals, companies, or organizations such as a 
political parties. 
2. Abuse of power. Corruption involves abusing power held in 
a state institution or a private organization. 
3. Benefit. Both sides involved in the corrupt act benefit, either 
in terms of money or undue advantage. 
Sometimes the “advantage” gained may not be “undue” or clear-
cut, but is nonetheless an advantage. For example, in some corrupt 
societies people can only secure access to public health or education if 
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they pay bribes. In such situations, those who can afford to pay have an 
advantage over those who cannot. The bribe-giver's ‘benefit’ is merely 
that which is anyway his or her rightful due. Bribe-takers receive an 
advantage for carrying out functions that are anyway their duty to 
perform. 
Grand vs petty corruption. We often describe corruption as 
either “grand” or “petty” and “administrative”. 
Grand corruption. Grand corruption typically takes place at the 
public sphere's top tiers, and within the highest levels in private 
business. It includes actors that make rules, policies and executive 
decisions. It often involves large sums of money. Grand corruption is 
also often called political corruption, highlighting the negative 
influence of money in political processes, campaigns and political 
parties. 
Petty/administrative corruption. Small-scale, administrative or 
petty corruption is the everyday corruption at the interface between 
public institutions and citizens. We find petty corruption as bribery 
linked to the implementation of existing laws, rules and regulations – for 
example when civil servants issue documents only if they receive a 
payment that is higher than the advertised official price for this 
service. Petty corruption also refers to the abuse of power in daily 
situations. For example, traffic police take payments from taxi drivers in 
return for not going after them for the breach of traffic rules. Usually, 
modest sums of money change hands in each case. However, when petty 
corruption is endemic, it can result in great costs. It can place stress on 
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the functioning of state systems – similar to the effect of grand 
corruption. 
Often, it is not clear where petty corruption ends and grand 
corruption begins. For example, political corruption, in addition to the 
features above, can also encompass vote buying and other forms of petty 
corruption. And junior officials who demand illegal payments from 
citizens may do so because their managers demand a cut of their salaries 
in return for having been hired. These managers may have superiors 
who, in turn, expect money from them. This corrupt chain may stretch 
all the way up to senior state officials. 
Corruption impedes development. Corruption undermines 
economic development and threatens state security. It also undermines 
democratic values. UN member states acknowledge the threat corruption 
poses to development and have included Goal 16 into the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development – calling on states to “substantially reduce 
corruption and bribery in all their forms”. 
Financial costs of corruption [101]: 
1. Officials in public institutions force citizens to pay for services 
that should be free. 
2. Corrupt politicians pillage state budgets. 
3. Decision makers distort public spending as they focus on 
activities that yield large bribes, such as major public works. 
4. International companies avoid highly corrupt environments – 
economic development is slower than it would be with more foreign 
investment. 
The cost of corruption to society  
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Human lives. When people cannot get access to healthcare, safe 
places to live and clean water, their lives are at risk. When buildings 
collapse because developers have bribed their way out of adhering to 
health and safety standards, the lives of occupants are at risk, too. 
Trust. Corruption has more than just financial costs. It reduces 
public trust and citizens’ willingness to participate in society. For 
example, citizens who perceive politicians as corrupt may not bother to 
vote in elections, get engaged in politics, or pay taxes. 
Human rights. Human rights are violated as a result of corruption. 
For example, courts violate the fundamental right of access to justice 
when they only hear cases if parties bribe staff and judges . 
Inequality. Corruption perpetuates inequality. Data shows that 
poor people suffer disproportionately from corruption. In modest income 
households, petty bribes to a nurse can cut deep into a family’s 
disposable income. 
Gender. Women sometimes bear worse consequences of 
corruption than men. For example, since women attend to family health 
issues more frequently, they receive more bribe requests from medical 
staff. In public life, female politicians may have less access to corrupt 
networks that generate votes and other support. 
Crime and conflict. Corruption is often linked to organized crime. 
It thrives in conflict and war. High levels of corruption can make 
prolonged conflict more likely, and push post-conflict societies back into 
war. Corruption also undermines the responsible management of natural 
resources. 
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Environment. Corruption can undermine climate change 
initiatives, as powerful actors bribe their way out of environmental 
responsibilities in pursuit of profits. 
In many countries, criminal and administrative laws prohibit 
various types of corrupt acts. The UN Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC) defines corrupt criminal behaviour that signatory states 
should include in their legal systems. Actions may be corrupt even if 
there is no law against them. The nature of corruption is often slippery 
and complex. It can evolve into new forms that criminal or 
administrative law does not capture. Therefore, anti-corruption 
practitioners emphasize prevention in addition to punishment. 
Common types of corruption include [101]: 
1. Bribery. We call it bribery when a person with entrusted 
authority accepts or asks for an undue advantage (money, but also other 
material or immaterial valuables) to exercise a function, or to exercise it 
in a particular way. 
2. Kickbacks. A kickback usually refers to a payment given in 
return for receiving a contract (for example, a building company that 
receives a government contract to build a road or other infrastructure). 
This payment goes to someone involved in awarding the contract. 
3. Foreign bribery. Bribery of foreign officials by private sector 
actors is also a crime in many countries. This means that bribes that take 
place outside a company’s country of origin may be punishable by the 
home country’s authorities. The OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions is an important international legal instrument that 
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criminalises foreign bribery, with a focus on the party paying the bribe 
(the “supply side”). The fact that not all countries prohibit such bribes 
illustrates the point above that not all corrupt acts are illegal. 
4. Trading in influence. Trading in influence – or influence 
peddling – is a form of corruption where, for example, a person exerts 
improper influence over a public or private sector decision-making 
process in return for an undue advantage. It is mostly people in 
prominent positions, with political power or connections, who trade in 
influence. These people abuse their channels of influence to gain money 
or favours. UNCAC recommends criminalizing this form of corruption, 
but not all countries do. 
Conditions that facilitate corruption. Corruption can grow in a 
variety of political and economic environments. It particularly thrives 
where accountable governance structures and processes are weak. 
However, weak governance does not necessarily always lead to corrupt 
acts – most people will still act honestly. 
Imperatives and incentives. Certain imperatives and incentives 
encourage people to engage in corruption. These may include, for 
example, low and irregular salaries for officials with large dependent 
families. Such officials may feel compelled to become corrupt. Social 
norms can also create incentives to participate in corruption. Some 
norms encourage giving favourable treatment to particular people – for 
example family members, or those affiliated with one's political group. 
Opportunities for personal enrichment. Actors holding 
extensive discretion over resource allocation in environments where 
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there is weak supervision likely have ample opportunities for corrupt 
enrichment. 
Means of corruption – access and control. Incentives and 
opportunity create possibility, but perpetrators need ways of actually 
engaging in corruption. These may include control over an 
administrative process – such as tendering – or having access to offshore 
accounts and money laundering methods. 
Limited risk of detection and punishment. Corruption will thrive 
where there are inadequate and ineffective controls. A lack of policing, 
detection and prosecution encourages corruption. Weak internal controls 
such as financial management, auditing, and personnel systems are also 
facilitating conditions. When authorities control and censor the media 
and civil society, corrupt politicians and officials have less to fear. 
Measuring corruption. Due to its nature, the scale of corruption is 
impossible to measure with complete accuracy. But there are informed 
estimates available, and Transparency International regularly publishes a 
number of assessments, surveys and indices which measure corruption: 
1. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 
2. Global Corruption Barometer.  
3. Bribe Payers Index.  
Corruption Perceptions Index allows to rank 180 countries and 
territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according 
to experts and businesspeople, uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly 
corrupt and 100 is very clean.  
In 2018, more than two-thirds of countries score below 50 on this 
year’s CPI, with an average score of just 43. While there are exceptions, 
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the data shows that despite some progress, most countries are failing to 
make serious inroads against corruption (Table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1 – Corruption Perceptions Index in 2018 [37] 
 
Country Score  Rank 
Top countries 
Denmark 88 1 
New Zealand 87 2 
Finland 85 3 
Singapore 85 4 
Sweden 85 5 
Switzerland 85 6 
Bottom countries 
North Korea 14 176 
Yemen 14 177 
South Sudan 13 178 
Syria 13 179 
Somalia 10 180 
 
The top countries are Denmark and New Zealand with scores of 88 
and 87, respectively. The bottom countries are Somalia, Syria and South 
Sudan with scores of 10, 13 and 13, respectively. While no country earns 
a perfect score on the CPI, countries that tend to do best also protect 
democratic rights and values. In the last seven years, only 20 countries 
significantly improved their CPI scores, including Estonia, Senegal, 
Guyana and Côte D’Ivoire. Equally troubling, 16 countries significantly 
decreased their scores, including Australia, Chile, Malta, Hungary and 
Turkey. With a score of 71, the United States lost four points since 2017, 
dropping out of the top 20 countries on the CPI for the first time since 
2011. The low score comes at a time when the US is experiencing 
threats to its system of checks and balances as well as an erosion of 
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ethical norms at the highest levels of power. Brazil dropped two points 
since 2017 to 35, also earning its lowest CPI score in seven years. 
Alongside promises to end corruption, the country’s new president has 
made it clear that he will rule with a strong hand, threatening many of 
the democratic milestones achieved to date. With a score of 59, the 
Czech Republic increased two points since 2017 and eight points since 
2014. However, events in the past year suggest gains may be fragile. 
The prime minister has been found guilty of conflict of interest in 
relation to his media holdings and accused of another conflict of interest 
over connections to a company that has received millions of euros in EU 
subsidies. 
The Global Corruption Barometer is the only world-wide public 
opinion survey on corruption. This is the world’s largest survey asking 
citizens about their direct personal experience of bribery in their daily 
lives, their perceptions of corruption challenges in their own countries, 
and their willingness to act against corruption. Some findings from this 
survey are represented in the Tables 6.2.–6.3. 
 
Table 6.2 – Places where the public sector is perceived to be most 
corrupt [64] 
 
Country Score 
Moldova 69 % 
Yemen 68 % 
Lebanon 67 % 
Liberia 65 % 
Venezuela 64 % 
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According to this survey, Moldova is considered to be the most 
corrupt country in the world.  
 
Table 6.3 – Places where the public sector is perceived to be least 
corrupt [64] 
Country Score 
Germany 6 % 
Switzerland 8 % 
Sweden 8 %  
Australia 10 % 
Netherlands 11 % 
 
The findings presented by the Global Corruption Barometer reflect 
global public opinion on corruption and the experience of bribery. 
Negative ratings of governments’ efforts to curb corruption suggest that 
more must be done to reduce public sector graft and clean up political 
institutions so that they act in the interests of citizens rather than in their 
own interests. There is a clear need to hold the corrupt accountable. 
Governments and other actors will have to win more trust before 
ordinary people change their views about the anti-corruption efforts of 
those in power. Particularly in countries such as Moldova, Yemen and 
Lebanon, where people perceived high levels of public sector 
corruption, and in Mexico, India, Liberia and Vietnam, which have very 
high rates of bribery for public services, the results suggest real and 
urgent issues that must be addressed. The good news is that there are 
many citizens around the world are ready and willing to help fight 
against corruption. However, governments must work harder and show 
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progress in their efforts to fight corruption if they are to convince 
citizens of real progress [64]. 
Addressing corruption. There are different elements of anti-
corruption work. However, there is no formula that will always work. 
How to address corruption always depends on the context. Experience of 
anti-corruption programming since the 1990s shows a constant tension 
between holistic and targeted approaches. Corruption results from a 
system of factors that facilitate and drive it. These factors range from 
individual attitudes to international opportunity structures – which points 
towards favouring holistic approaches. However, not all reforms are 
feasible in every setting. This, in turn, argues in favour of focused 
approaches, and to seek out context-specific opportunities. 
Decision-makers and practitioners must seek ways to reinforce 
anti-corruption programming approaches with inputs from other parts of 
the system. If civil society shall monitor budgets, the authorities must 
publish these in a useable way. Organizations like the World Bank, the 
United Nations, Transparency International and others have sought to 
capture what anti-corruption means. Their explanatory frameworks 
differ slightly, but there is a broadly agreed “menu” of anti-corruption 
efforts [101].  
Anti-corruption efforts should not just be aimed at strengthening 
specific institutions or functions that are weak. They should build and 
strengthen mutually-reinforcing systems that include a range of 
interdependent actors, institutions, laws and policies. Two corruption 
issues concern donor aid: 
1. Donor aid delivery modalities are vulnerable to corruption. 
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2. Aid flows may contribute to increased corruption levels in 
recipient countries. 
Researchers have studied which aid modalities are less vulnerable 
to corruption. Findings show little evidence that aid delivered through 
budget support is more or less prone to corruption than project support. 
However, evidence shows that for countries with both high levels of aid 
and corruption, there are compelling arguments against budget support. 
Donor aid can fuel corruption in recipient countries. It provides new 
resources to plunder.  
However, aid effectiveness depends on the quality of policymaking 
and governance – both within donor aid agencies and recipient country 
governance structures. Without good governance, aid effectiveness 
declines because of increased leakage of funds from development 
projects or national budgets. This is often due to corruption. Corruption 
may happen at all stages of aid disbursement. Programme design, the 
bidding process, the implementation phase, and even audits are at risk. 
Corruption can cause inefficient and incompetent companies to 
win contracts at excessive cost. It can lead to inappropriate and failed 
aid projects. The danger of corruption in development assistance is 
clear: aid is diverted from its original aims by corrupt politicians and 
officials. The perpetrators rather spend the funds on projects that allow 
for personal enrichment. Because of this, the funds never reach the 
poorest and most vulnerable citizens. 
 
 
 
187 
 
6.2. Transnational Money Laundering 
 
The goal of a large number of criminal acts is to generate a profit 
for the individual or group that carries out the act. Money laundering is 
the processing of these criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. 
This process is of critical importance, as it enables the criminal to enjoy 
these profits without jeopardising their source [66]. Money laundering is 
the process of making large amounts of money generated by a criminal 
activity, such as drug trafficking or terrorist funding, appear to have 
come from a legitimate source. The money from the criminal activity is 
considered dirty, and the process “launders” it to make it look clean. 
Money laundering is itself a crime [6]. 
Illegal arms sales, smuggling, and the activities of organized crime, 
including for example drug trafficking, can generate huge amounts of 
proceeds. Embezzlement, insider trading, bribery and computer fraud 
schemes can also produce large profits and create the incentive to 
“legitimize” the ill-gotten gains through money laundering. 
When a criminal activity generates substantial profits, the 
individual or group involved must find a way to control the funds 
without attracting attention to the underlying activity or the persons 
involved. Criminals do this by disguising the sources, changing the 
form, or moving the funds to a place where they are less likely to attract 
attention [6]. Criminals use a wide variety of money laundering 
techniques to make illegally obtained funds appear clean. Online 
banking and cryptocurrencies have made it easier for criminals to 
transfer and withdraw money without detection. 
188 
 
By its very nature, money laundering is an illegal activity carried 
out by criminals which occurs outside of the normal range of economic 
and financial statistics. Along with some other aspects of underground 
economic activity, rough estimates have been put forward to give some 
sense of the scale of the problem. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
conducted a study to determine the magnitude of illicit funds generated 
by drug trafficking and organized crimes and to investigate to what 
extent these funds are laundered.  The report estimates that in 2009, 
criminal proceeds amounted to 3.6 % of global GDP, with 2.7 %  (or 
USD 1.6 trillion) being laundered [52]. This falls within the widely 
quoted estimate by the International Monetary Fund, who stated in 1998 
that the aggregate size of money laundering in the world could be 
somewhere between two and five percent of the world’s gross domestic 
product.  Using 1998 statistics, these percentages would indicate that 
money laundering ranged between USD 590 billion and USD 1.5 trillion 
[52]. At the time, the lower figure was roughly equivalent to the value of 
the total output of an economy the size of Spain. 
However, the above estimates should be treated with caution.  
They are intended to give an estimate of the magnitude of money 
laundering. Due to the illegal nature of the transactions, precise statistics 
are not available and it is therefore impossible to produce a definitive 
estimate of the amount of money that is globally laundered every year.  
The FATF therefore does not publish any figures in this regard. 
Money laundering is essential for criminal organizations that wish 
to use illegally obtained money effectively. Dealing in large amounts of 
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illegal cash is inefficient and dangerous. Criminals need a way to deposit 
the money in legitimate financial institutions, yet they can only do so if 
it appears to come from legitimate sources. 
The process of laundering money typically involves three steps [6]:  
– placement;  
– layering;  
– integration.  
Placement puts the “dirty money” into the legitimate financial 
system. Layering conceals the source of the money through a series of 
transactions and bookkeeping tricks. In the final step, integration, the 
now-laundered money is withdrawn from the legitimate account to be 
used for whatever purposes the criminals have in mind for it. 
1. Placement. In the initial – or placement – stage of money 
laundering, the launderer introduces his illegal profits into the financial 
system. This might be done by breaking up large amounts of cash into 
less conspicuous smaller sums that are then deposited directly into a 
bank account, or by purchasing a series of monetary instruments 
(cheques, money orders, etc.) that are then collected and deposited into 
accounts at another location [52].  
2. Layering. After the funds have entered the financial system, the 
second – or layering – stage takes place. In this phase, the launderer 
engages in a series of conversions or movements of the funds to distance 
them from their source. The funds might be channelled through the 
purchase and sales of investment instruments, or the launderer might 
simply wire the funds through a series of accounts at various banks 
across the globe. This use of widely scattered accounts for laundering is 
190 
 
especially prevalent in those jurisdictions that do not co-operate in anti-
money laundering investigations. In some instances, the launderer might 
disguise the transfers as payments for goods or services, thus giving 
them a legitimate appearance [52]. Common layering tactics include 
[49]: 
1) wire transfers between bank accounts, often held in multiple 
names, at multiple banks, and in multiple countries; 
2) property or service transactions with shell companies (legal 
business entities that exist only on paper and perform no legitimate 
economic function); 
3) high-dollar purchases of tangible goods or commodities, such as 
yachts, luxury cars, and gold; 
4) purchases of real estate investment properties, including luxury 
homes and condominiums. 
3. Integration. Having successfully processed his criminal profits 
through the first two phases the launderer then moves them to the third 
stage – integration – in which the funds re-enter the legitimate economy. 
The launderer might choose to invest the funds into real estate, luxury 
assets, or business ventures. Examples of integration include [49]: 
1. Sale or transfer of high-dollar items purchased with laundered 
funds. 
2. Sale or transfer of real estate purchased with laundered funds. 
3. Legitimate purchases of securities or other financial instruments 
in the launderer’s or launderer’s legitimate business entities’ name(s). 
4. Legitimate transactions with legal entities controlled by the 
launderer or their associates. 
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There are many ways to launder money, from the simple to the 
very complex. One of the most common techniques is to use a 
legitimate, cash-based business owned by a criminal organization. For 
example, if the organization owns a restaurant, it might inflate the daily 
cash receipts to funnel illegal cash through the restaurant and into the 
restaurant's bank account. After that, the funds can be withdrawn as 
needed. These types of businesses are often referred to as “fronts” [6]. 
In another common form of money laundering, 
called smurfing (also known as “structuring”), the criminal breaks up 
large chunks of cash into multiple small deposits, often spreading them 
over many different accounts, to avoid detection. Money laundering can 
also be accomplished through the use of currency exchanges, wire 
transfers and “mules”, or cash smugglers, who sneak large amounts of 
cash across borders and deposit them in foreign accounts, where money-
laundering enforcement is less strict [6]. 
Other money-laundering methods involve investing in 
commodities such as gems and gold that can easily be moved to other 
jurisdictions, discreetly investing in and selling valuable assets such as 
real estate, gambling, counterfeiting, and using shell companies (inactive 
companies or corporations that essentially exist on paper only) [6]. 
Money laundering vectors and strategies [49]: 
1. Casinos and gambling venues. 
Gambling is an effective way to clean illicit funds. In a simple 
operation, a launderer or accomplice might use illicit funds to purchase 
casino chips, hold onto the pile for a period of days during which they 
may or may not actually gamble, and then cash the chips in for a check 
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made out to the chip-holder or a third party. More complex operations 
may involve multiple casinos in different countries or territories. If you 
need to transfer illicit funds from, say, the United States to China or vice 
versa, you might purchase chips at a casino in Las Vegas, ask the casino 
to transfer your credit to a sister property in Macau, and then have the 
Macau property cut you a check next time you’re there. Horse tracks are 
popular laundering vectors as well. In a typical scheme, the launderer 
pays a premium for a winning ticket, then exchanges the ticket at the 
cashier window for a check made out to the launderer or a third party. 
This arrangement has an added financial benefit (and potential legal 
liability) for the original ticketholder: Since the launderer pays cash for 
the ticket, the original holder can conceal the proceeds from state and 
federal tax authorities with relative ease. 
2. Cash smuggling. The proverbial suitcase stuffed with cash is 
one of the oldest money laundering vectors around. It’s also among the 
simplest, and consequently quite risky, especially in international 
operations that require customs clearance. Still, for criminals engaged in 
cash-heavy commercial activities, such as wholesale drug or arms 
dealing, smuggling large amounts of cash is the most straightforward 
way to physically transfer proceeds without using traditional banking 
networks. In an ironic twist, says the Peterson Institute, the prevalence 
of cash smuggling has actually increased in recent years due to the 
success of banks’ anti-laundering measures. U.S.-based people or 
entities generally have less trouble smuggling U.S. currency out of the 
United States, as federal authorities devote more resources to interceding 
large incoming cash shipments. 
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3. Life insurance policies. Life insurance policies are more lightly 
regulated than some other financial instruments, making them ideal 
money laundering vectors. Paul Manafort used a multimillion-dollar life 
insurance policy to launder funds – and, later, to put up collateral for his 
bail package. In a typical scheme, the launderer purchases a single-
premium life insurance policy that names the launderer or a trusted 
associate (often a relative or spouse) as the primary beneficiary. The 
launderer holds the policy for a period of time, then cashes out its value 
with a “clean” check from the insurer. In a more complex scheme, the 
launderer might draw directly upon the policy’s value (if permitted) or 
use it as collateral for a third-party loan from a bank or other financial 
institution. According to the Peterson Institute, clever launderers favor 
policies sold through intermediaries, which provide additional layers of 
separation between the policyholder and issuer. Years may elapse 
between a policy’s purchase and cash-out dates, further quelling 
regulators’ concerns. 
4. Securities. The securities industry is ripe for fraud and abuse, of 
which money laundering is just one aspect. One common securities-
aided laundering scheme, according to the Peterson Institute, involves 
the use of stock option transactions: simultaneous puts and calls 
representing mirror-image bets on a particular security’s price action, 
purchased with illicit funds. Under normal circumstances, the value of a 
given security’s put and call contracts rises and falls in roughly inverse 
relation, meaning the value of one of the two bets made by the launderer 
should increase. The launderer can sell the profitable contract and cancel 
the loss-making contract at any time before their expiration dates, likely 
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breaking even (or close to it) before accounting for transaction fees. The 
proceeds appear legitimate, complete with capital gains tax liability if 
applicable. 
5. Real estate. The lightly regulated real estate industry is awash 
in laundered funds. Laundering transactions often feature shell 
corporations – companies that exist for the sole purpose of holding other 
corporate entities or assets, whose ownership may or may not be 
anonymous – to conceal buyers’ true identities or the sources of their 
funds. Due to the high value of the assets involved and the inherent 
opacity of properly executed transactions, luxury real estate is a 
common wealth-sheltering tool for wealthy individuals based in 
authoritarian or corrupt countries, such as China and Russia. Particularly 
if they’re politically active or engaged in business activities that run 
counter to the ruling party’s interests, it’s safer for such individuals to 
invest in high-end properties in Miami, San Francisco, or Vancouver – 
expensive markets in politically stable countries – than to stash cash in 
home-country bank accounts. Even if they must subsequently sell their 
overseas real estate holdings at a loss, the alternative – entirely frozen or 
seized accounts – is worse. 
6. Currency exchange bureaus. Currency exchange bureaus are 
lightly regulated, deal in large amounts of cash, and routinely facilitate 
international value exchanges: all music to money launderers’ ears. The 
only real downside for launderers is currency exchange bureaus’ high 
exchange fees, which can range up to 8 %. That might make them less 
than ideal for frugal international travelers, but it’s a small price to pay 
for relatively low-risk laundering transactions. 
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In general, money laundering techniques can be grouped in the 
following way [53]: 
1. Bulk cash smuggling involves literally smuggling cash into 
another country for deposit into offshore banks or other type of financial 
institutions that honor client secrecy. 
2. Structuring, also referred to as “smurfing,” is a method in 
which cash is broken down into smaller amount, which are then used to 
purchase money orders or other instruments to avoid detection or 
suspicion. 
3. Trade-based laundering is similar to embezzlement in that 
invoices are altered to show a higher or lower amount in order to 
disguise the movement of money. 
4. Cash-intensive business occurs when a business that 
legitimately deals with large amounts of cash uses its accounts to deposit 
money obtained from both everyday business proceeds and money 
obtained through illegal means. Businesses able to claim all of these 
proceeds as legitimate income include those that provide services rather 
than goods, such as strip clubs, car washes, parking buildings or lots, 
and other businesses with low variable costs. 
5. Shell companies and trusts are used to disguise the true owner 
or agent of a large amount of money. 
6. Bank capture refers to the use of a bank owned by money 
launderers or criminals, who then move funds through the bank without 
fear of investigation. 
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7. Real estate laundering occurs when someone purchases real 
estate with money obtained illegally, then sells the property. This makes 
it seem as if the profits are legitimate. 
8. Casino laundering involves an individual going into a casino 
with illegally obtained money. The individual purchases chips with the 
cash, plays for a while, then cashes out the chips, and claims the money 
as gambling winnings. 
Common money laundering use cases [49]: 
1. Drug trafficking.  Drug trafficking is a cash-intensive business. 
Its supply chain is often formidably complex, crossing oceans and 
multiple international boundaries, and it’s usually illegal from start to 
finish. Though simplified and dramatized, the drug trafficking operation 
featured in the 1983 film “Scarface” nicely illustrates the complexity at 
play here. Its eponymous mafioso, played by Al Pacino, worked with a 
South American kingpin who ran a vast, vertically integrated cocaine 
operation. The kingpin grew coca on a sprawling Bolivian estate, 
processed the harvested plant material into cocaine, and leveraged a 
multimodal smuggling network (planes, boats, submarines) to get the 
finished product into the United States. On the U.S. side, Pacino’s 
character used a shady Miami bank to launder millions in cash proceeds, 
financing an ostentatious South Beach lifestyle (and steadily worsening 
cocaine habit). 
2. International terrorism. For ideologically motivated terrorist 
groups, money is a means to an end. Still, every terrorist organization – 
and lone wolves too – require some source of funds. Terrorism-related 
money laundering operations range from the breathtakingly simple to 
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the dizzyingly complex. According to an FBI report, the deadliest 
terrorist attack in American history cost no more than $400 000 to pull 
off. At no point during the planning process did any U.S. financial 
institution detect suspicious activity by any of the twenty 9/11 hijackers 
– likely because, per the FBI, “Al-Qa’ida funded the hijackers in the 
United States primarily by three unremarkable means: wire transfers 
from overseas to the United States; the physical transport of cash or 
traveler’s checks into the United States; and the accessing of funds held 
in foreign financial institutions by debit or credit cards” [49]. Terrorism-
related laundering is also complicated by the fact that some groups that 
directly or indirectly support terrorist activities have legitimate or 
apparently legitimate functions, such as political advocacy. For instance, 
while Hezbollah’s political arm is an established and functional (if 
antagonistic) presence in Lebanon’s parliament, its militant wing 
brazenly launders money from Iran and elsewhere to purchase weapons 
and support battlefield operations across the Middle East. 
3. Embezzlement. According to FindLaw, embezzlement is 
“defined in most states as theft/larceny of assets (money or property) by 
a person in a position of trust or responsibility over those assets…[and] 
typically occurs in the employment and corporate settings” [49]. 
Whether you take cash directly out of the cash register or mastermind a 
complex scheme to relieve your bank’s clients of funds held in their 
accounts, you’re committing embezzlement. The “Office Space” guys’ 
ill-fated scheme is a perfect example. Since embezzled funds are by 
definition illicit, their source needs to be concealed before they’re safe to 
spend. 
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4. Arms trafficking. Like drug traffickers, arms dealers trade in 
illegal, expensive products that need to be bought and sold off the books. 
But not all money laundering prosecutions arising out of arms 
trafficking investigations involve thousands of weapons and vast sums 
of money. This case, reported by MLive in 2015, is typical of an arms-
related laundering effort: It involved the sale of a relatively small 
number of illegal automatic weapons through the dark web, using 
cryptocurrencies to hide the provenance of transaction funds. 
The Internet has put a new spin on the old crime. The rise of online 
banking institutions, anonymous online payment services and peer-to-
peer (P2P) transfers with mobile phones have made detecting the illegal 
transfer of money even more difficult. Moreover, the use of proxy 
servers and anonymizing software makes the third component of money 
laundering, integration, almost impossible to detect – money can be 
transferred or withdrawn leaving little or no trace of an IP address. 
Money can also be laundered through online auctions and sales, 
gambling websites, and virtual gaming sites, where ill-gotten money is 
converted into gaming currency, then back into real, usable, and 
untraceable “clean” money. The newest frontier of money laundering 
involves cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin. While not totally 
anonymous, they are increasingly being used in blackmail schemes, the 
drug trade, and other criminal activities due to their relative anonymity 
compared with more conventional forms of currency [6]. 
As money laundering is a consequence of almost all profit 
generating crime, it can occur practically anywhere in the world. 
Generally, money launderers tend to seek out countries or sectors in 
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which there is a low risk of detection due to weak or ineffective anti-
money laundering programmes. Because the objective of money 
laundering is to get the illegal funds back to the individual who 
generated them, launderers usually prefer to move funds through stable 
financial systems. Money laundering activity may also be concentrated 
geographically according to the stage the laundered funds have reached. 
At the placement stage, for example, the funds are usually processed 
relatively close to the under-lying activity; often, but not in every case, 
in the country where the funds originate. With the layering phase, the 
launderer might choose an offshore financial centre, a large regional 
business centre, or a world banking centre – any location that provides 
an adequate financial or business infrastructure. At this stage, the 
laundered funds may also only transit bank accounts at various locations 
where this can be done without leaving traces of their source or ultimate 
destination. Finally, at the integration phase, launderers might choose to 
invest laundered funds in still other locations if they were generated in 
unstable economies or locations offering limited investment 
opportunities [52]. 
The integrity of the banking and financial services marketplace 
depends heavily on the perception that it functions within a framework 
of high legal, professional and ethical standards. A reputation for 
integrity is the one of the most valuable assets of a financial institution. 
If funds from criminal activity can be easily processed through a 
particular institution – either because its employees or directors have 
been bribed or because the institution turns a blind eye to the criminal 
nature of such funds – the institution could be drawn into active 
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complicity with criminals and become part of the criminal network 
itself. Evidence of such complicity will have a damaging effect on the 
attitudes of other financial intermediaries and of regulatory authorities, 
as well as ordinary customers. As for the potential negative 
macroeconomic consequences of unchecked money laundering, one can 
cite inexplicable changes in money demand, prudential risks to bank 
soundness, contamination effects on legal financial transactions, and 
increased volatility of international capital flows and exchange rates due 
to unanticipated cross-border asset transfers. Also, as it rewards 
corruption and crime, successful money laudering damages the integrity 
of the entire society and undermines democracy and the rule of the law 
[52]. 
Launderers are continuously looking for new routes for laundering 
their funds. Economies with growing or developing financial centres, 
but inadequate controls are particularly vulnerable as established 
financial centre countries implement comprehensive anti-money 
laundering regimes. Differences between national anti-money 
laundering systems will be exploited by launderers, who tend to move 
their networks to countries and financial systems with weak or 
ineffective countermeasures. Some might argue that developing 
economies cannot afford to be too selective about the sources of capital 
they attract. But postponing action is dangerous. The more it is deferred, 
the more entrenched organized crime can become. As with the damaged 
integrity of an individual financial institution, there is a damping effect 
on foreign direct investment when a country’s commercial and financial 
sectors are perceived to be subject to the control and influence of 
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organized crime. Fighting money laundering and terrorist financing is 
therefore a part of creating a business friendly environment which is a 
precondition for lasting economic development [52]. 
The possible social and political costs of money laundering, if left 
unchecked or dealt with ineffectively, are serious. Organized crime can 
infiltrate financial institutions, acquire control of large sectors of the 
economy through investment, or offer bribes to public officials and 
indeed governments. The economic and political influence of criminal 
organizations can weaken the social fabric, collective ethical standards, 
and ultimately the democratic institutions of society. In countries 
transitioning to democratic systems, this criminal influence can 
undermine the transition. Most fundamentally, money laundering is 
inextricably linked to the underlying criminal activity that generated it. 
Laundering enables criminal activity to continue [52]. 
Money is laundered in the international financial centers. The 
biggest financial centers are represented in the Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 – Offshore financial centers [88] 
 
Rank  Country Rank  Country 
1 British Virgin Islands 13 Bahamas 
2 Luxembourg 14 Western Samoa 
3 Hong Kong 15 Gibraltar 
4 Jersey 16 Monaco 
5 Bermuda 17 Seychelles 
6 Cyprus 18 Belize 
7 Taiwan 19 Guyana  
8 Malta 20 Liberia 
9 Mauritius 21 Marshall Islands 
10 Cayman Islands 22 St. Vincent  
11 Lichtenstein 23 Nauru 
12 Curacao 24 Anguilla 
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Governments around the world have stepped up their efforts to 
combat money laundering in recent decades, with regulations that 
require financial institutions to put systems in place to detect and report 
suspicious activity. The amount of money involved is substantial: 
according to a 2018 survey from PwC, global money laundering 
transactions account for roughly $1 trillion to $2 trillion annually, or 
some 2 % to 5 % of global GDP [6]. 
In 1989, the Group of Seven (G-7) formed an international 
committee called the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in an 
attempt to fight money laundering on an international scale. In the early 
2000s, its purview was expanded to combating the financing of 
terrorism. As of 2015, the FATF is comprised of 34 different countries, 
but the agency is always seeking to expand its membership to more 
regions. Headquartered in Paris, France, the FATF also works to combat 
the financing of terrorism.  
The FATF has developed recommendations to combat money 
laundering, and the agency has three functions in regards to this criminal 
activity [53]: 
1. Monitoring the progress of member countries in their anti-money 
laundering measures. 
2. Reviewing trends and techniques in money laundering, reporting 
these, as well as new countermeasures, to member countries. 
3. Promoting FATF anti-money laundering measures and standards 
globally. 
The United States passed the Banking Security Act in 1970, 
requiring financial institutions to report certain transactions to the 
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Department of the Treasury, such as cash transactions above $10 000 or 
any others they deem suspicious, on a suspicious activity report (SAR). 
The information the banks provide to the Treasury Department is used 
by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which can 
share it with domestic criminal investigators, international bodies or 
foreign financial intelligence units. 
While these laws were helpful in tracking criminal activity, money 
laundering itself wasn't made illegal in the United States until 1986, with 
the passage of the Money Laundering Control Act. Shortly after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the USA Patriot Act expanded money-laundering 
efforts by allowing investigative tools designed for organized crime and 
drug trafficking prevention to be used in terrorist investigations. 
The Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists 
(ACAMS) offers a professional designation known as a Certified Anti-
Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS). Individuals who earn CAMS 
certification may work as brokerage compliance managers, Bank 
Secrecy Act officers, financial intelligence unit managers, surveillance 
analysts and financial crimes investigative analysts. 
Anti-money laundering laws reflect an effort made the government 
to stop money laundering methods that involve financial institutions. 
Under the guidelines set forth by anti-money laundering, or “AML” 
financial institutions are required to verify large sums of money passing 
through the institution, and they are required to report suspicious 
transactions. It is estimated that money laundering is so prominent 
globally, that it is impossible for the Financial Action Task Force to 
produce estimates or figures as to its scope. 
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Since the BSA was created, many other legislative acts and money 
laundering regulations have came about to strengthen the movement. 
These include [53]: 
1. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, which prohibits 
engaging in any transactions involving proceeds generated from illegal 
activities. 
2. The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which expanded the definition 
of “financial institution” to include car dealers and real estate personnel, 
requiring them to file reports on transactions involving large amounts of 
currency. 
3. The 1992 Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, 
which requires more strict sanctions for violations of the BSA, and 
requiring additional verifications, recordkeeping, and reporting for wire 
transfers. 
4. The Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 requires 
banks to develop and institute training in anti money laundering 
examination procedures. 
5. The Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act 
of 1998 requires banking agencies to develop training for examiners. 
Unfortunately, as these money laundering regulations are put into 
place, criminals work to find new methods to prevent their activity from 
becoming detected or considered suspicious. 
In this age of electronic transactions to and from financial 
institutions around the globe, anti money laundering laws attempt to 
quell money laundering by requiring these institutions to identify and 
report suspicious activities. Technology has also paved the way for anti-
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money laundering software, detects large increases in account balances 
or large withdrawals, and which filters data and classifies it according to 
levels of suspicion. Software is also used to detect transactions with 
banking institutions in blacklisted or hostile countries. When such 
transactions are identified, the program alerts bank managers who then 
study the information and decide whether it should be reported to the 
government. 
The penalties for money laundering vary greatly depending on the 
circumstance and the amount of funds involved. The penalties may also 
vary if the acts occurred in more than one jurisdiction. In addition 
to imprisonment, punishment for money laundering may include large 
fines, restitution, and community service. Typically, the more money 
involved, the harsher the punishment. 
Money laundering is not uncommon, but some money laundering 
cases have met the spotlight due to the severity of the act, or the amount 
of money involved in the crime. Large-scale money laundering cases 
often involve global transactions. Below are some famous examples of 
money laundering cases [53]. 
In 2012, HSBC Holdings, a London-based company, paid nearly 
$2 billion in fines after it was discovered that the financial institution 
laundered money for drug traffickers, terrorists, and other organized 
crime groups throughout Iran. The laundering went on for many years 
before the activity was detected. 
In 2014, BNP Paribas, a French bank with global headquarters in 
London, pled guilty to falsifying business records after it was discovered 
the institution violated U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Sudan, and Iran. As 
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a result, BNP was forced to pay a fine of $8.9 billion which is the largest 
fine ever imposed for violating those sanctions. 
In the 1980s, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, a 
bank registered in Luxembourg and with offices in London, was found 
guilty of laundering an amount of money estimated to be in the billions 
for drug traffickers. 
 
6.3. Commercial Fraud and Embezzlement 
 
Fraud is a broad legal term referring to dishonest acts that 
intentionally use deception to illegally deprive another person or entity 
of money, property, or legal rights. Unlike the crime of theft, which 
involves the taking of something of value through force or stealth, fraud 
relies on the use of intentional misrepresentation of fact to accomplish 
the taking [47]. 
Fraud is the intentional use of false or misleading information in an 
attempt to illegally deprive another person or entity of money, property, 
or legal rights. In order to constitute fraud, the party making the false 
statement must know or believe that it is untrue or incorrect and 
intended to deceive the other party. Fraud may be prosecuted as both a 
criminal and civil offense. Criminal punishments for fraud can include a 
combination of prison, fines, and restitution to victims. 
In proven cases of fraud, the perpetrator – a person who carries out 
a harmful, illegal, or immoral act – may be found to have committed 
either a criminal offense or a civil wrong. In committing fraud, 
perpetrators may be seeking either monetary or non-monetary assets by 
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deliberately making false statements. For example, knowingly lying 
about one’s age to obtain a driver's license, criminal history to get a job, 
or income to get a loan may be fraudulent acts. A fraudulent act should 
not be confused with a “hoax”, – a deliberate deception or false 
statement made without any intention of gain or of materially damaging 
another person. Perpetrators of criminal fraud may be punished by fines 
and/or imprisonment. Victims of civil fraud may file lawsuits against the 
perpetrator seeking monetary compensation. To win a lawsuit claiming 
civil fraud, the victim must have suffered actual damages. In other 
words, the fraud must have been successful. Criminal fraud, on the other 
hand, can be prosecuted even if the fraud failed. In addition, a single 
fraudulent act may be prosecuted as both a criminal and civil offense. 
Thus, a person convicted of fraud in criminal court may also be sued in 
civil court by the victim or victims [47]. 
Fraud is an extremely serious legal matter. Persons who believe 
they have been the victim of fraud, or have been accused of committing 
fraud, should always seek the expertise of a qualified attorney. 
While the specifics of laws against fraud vary from state to state 
and at the federal government level, there are five essential elements 
necessary to prove in court that a crime of fraud has been committed 
[47]: 
1. A misrepresentation of a material fact: A false statement 
involving a material and pertinent fact must be made. The gravity of the 
false statement should be adequate to substantially affect the victim’s 
decisions and actions. For example, the false statement contributes to a 
person’s decision to purchase a product or approve a loan. 
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2. Knowledge of falsehood: The party making the false statement 
must know or believe that it is untrue or incorrect. 
3. Intent to deceive: The false statement must have been made 
expressly with the intent of deceiving and influencing the victim. 
4. Reasonable reliance by the victim: The level to which the 
victim relies on the false statement must be reasonable in the eyes of the 
court. Reliance on rhetorical, outrageous, or clearly impossible 
statements or claims may not amount to “reasonable” reliance. However, 
persons known to be illiterate, incompetent, or otherwise mentally 
diminished may be awarded civil damages if the perpetrator knowingly 
took advantage of their condition. 
Fraud comes in many forms from many sources. Popularly known 
as “scams,” fraudulent offers may be made personally or arrive through 
regular mail, email, text messages, telemarketing, and the internet.  
Commercial fraud is a legal term that relates to deceptive practices 
and illegal actions taken by corporate executives in significant positions 
of power within a company [36]. 
Although the wording may differ in each state, commercial fraud 
generally has several elements, including: 
1) the practice of deceit through information that is incorrect, 
incomplete or intentionally misleading; 
2) deceitful information causes the business being defrauded to 
make a purchase or give up some valuable asset; 
3) there are actual damages or loss as a result of the fraud. 
There are a number of ways that corporate executives can commit 
commercial fraud, including [36]: 
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1. Misappropriation of Corporate Funds – Taking money 
intended for business use and using that money for personal gain is a 
common type of commercial fraud. Corporate executives can commit 
this fraud by creating fake expense reports, deleting payments from 
vendors and clients, and not reporting sales and revenue. 
2. Making False Statements About Company’s Performance – 
Another type of commercial fraud occurs when a corporate executive 
knowingly makes false statements about the current and future prospects 
of a business to increase stock value or generate investment. 
3. Kickbacks – Kickbacks are payments that a third party pays to a 
corporate executive to obtain a contract, obtain favorable terms on a 
loan, or influence any type of order. An executive who accepts 
consistent kickbacks often faces corruption charges in addition to 
charges of receiving kickbacks. 
4. Insider Trading – The U. S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) defines insider trading as buying or selling a 
security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and 
confidence, while in possession of material [or] nonpublic information 
about the security. In other words, corporate executives who provide 
confidential information about their company to a third party in 
exchange for some type of financial gain are guilty of insider trading. 
This often occurs when a company is about to go public with a stock, 
and an executive tips off an investor ahead of time so that they can buy a 
significant amount of shares. 
One of the most common types of commercial fraud is check 
fraud, the use of paper checks to commit fraud. One of the main goals 
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of check fraud is identity theft – the gathering and use of personal 
financial information for illegal purposes. From the front of every check 
written, the identity thief can get the victim’s: name; address; phone 
number; bank name; bank routing number; bank account number; and 
signature. In addition, the store may add more personal information, 
such as date of birth and driver’s license number. This is why identity 
theft prevention experts recommend against using paper checks 
whenever possible. 
Common varieties of check fraud include [47]: 
1. Check theft: stealing checks for fraudulent purposes. 
2. Check forgery: signing a check using the actual drawer’s 
signature without their authorization or endorsing a check not payable to 
the endorser, both usually done using stolen checks. Counterfeit checks 
are considered the equivalent of forged checks. 
3. Check kiting: writing a check with the intent of accessing funds 
that have not yet been deposited in the checking account. Also referred 
to as “floating” a check, kiting is the misuse of checks as a form of 
unauthorized credit. 
4. Paper hanging: writing checks on accounts that are known by 
the perpetrator to have been closed. 
5. Check washing: chemically erasing the signature or other 
handwritten details from checks in order to allow them to be rewritten. 
6. Check counterfeiting: illegally printing checks using 
information from the victim’s account. 
According to the U. S. Federal Reserve, American consumers and 
businesses wrote 17.3 billion paper checks in 2015, four times the 
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number written in all of the countries of the European Union combined 
that year [47]. Despite the trend toward debit, credit, and electronic 
payment methods, paper checks remain the most often-used way of 
making large payments for expenses like rent and payroll. Clearly, there 
is still plenty of opportunity and temptation to commit check fraud. 
Potential penalties for conviction of fraud typically involve prison 
or probation, stiff fines, and repayment of fraudulently-acquired gains. 
Prison sentences can range from 6 months to 30 years for each separate 
violation. Fines for fraud can be very large. Convictions for mail or wire 
fraud can bring fines of up to $250 000 for each violation [47]. 
Frauds that harm large groups of victims or involve large sums of 
money can result in fines of tens of millions of dollars or more. For 
example, in July 2012, drug maker Glaxo-Smith-Kline pleaded guilty to 
falsely branding its drug Paxil as being effective in treating depression 
in patients under age 18. As part of its settlement, Glaxo agreed to pay 
$3 billion to the government in one of the largest health-care fraud 
settlements in U. S. history [47]. 
Embezzlement is defined as the misappropriation of funds or 
property by someone who lawfully controls such funds/property, 
without the knowledge of the owner. It is considered a crime under the 
federal criminal code and state statutes, and is punishable by jail time, 
fines, and/or restitution [75]. 
One of the most famous embezzlement cases in U.S. history was 
that of Bernie Madoff, who embezzled over $50 billion from investors 
through a Ponzi scheme [75]. A Ponzi scheme is an investment fraud 
that pays existing investors with funds collected from new investors. 
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Ponzi scheme organizers often promise to invest your money and 
generate high returns with little or no risk. But in many Ponzi schemes, 
the fraudsters do not invest the money. Instead, they use it to pay those 
who invested earlier and may keep some for themselves [65]. 
With little or no legitimate earnings, Ponzi schemes require a 
constant flow of new money to survive. When it becomes hard to recruit 
new investors, or when large numbers of existing investors cash out, 
these schemes tend to collapse. Ponzi schemes are named after Charles 
Ponzi, who duped investors in the 1920s with a postage stamp 
speculation scheme. Many Ponzi schemes share common characteristics 
[65]: 
1. High returns with little or no risk. Every investment carries 
some degree of risk, and investments yielding higher returns typically 
involve more risk. Be highly suspicious of any “guaranteed” investment 
opportunity. 
2. Overly consistent returns. Investments tend to go up and down 
over time. Be skeptical about an investment that regularly generates 
positive returns regardless of overall market conditions. 
3. Unregistered investments. Ponzi schemes typically involve 
investments that are not registered with the SEC or with state regulators. 
Registration is important because it provides investors with access to 
information about the company’s management, products, services, and 
finances. 
4. Unlicensed sellers. Federal and state securities laws require 
investment professionals and firms to be licensed or registered. Most 
Ponzi schemes involve unlicensed individuals or unregistered firms. 
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5. Secretive, complex strategies. Avoid investments if you don’t 
understand them or can’t get complete information about them. 
6. Issues with paperwork. Account statement errors may be a sign 
that funds are not being invested as promised. 
7. Difficulty receiving payments. Be suspicious if you don’t 
receive a payment or have difficulty cashing out. Ponzi scheme 
promoters sometimes try to prevent participants from cashing out by 
offering even higher returns for staying put. 
According to the U. S. Criminal Code, in order to charge a person 
with embezzlement, the prosecutor must prove four elements [75]: 
1) there was a trusted relationship between the person accused of 
embezzling funds and the institution or owner of the funds; 
2) the person was given control of the funds through employment; 
3) the person took the funds for private use; 
4) the person “acted with the intent to deprive the owner of the use 
of this property.” 
In order to prove embezzlement, a prosecutor must show that the 
defendant was “substantially in control” of the misappropriated funds. 
Substantial control can be demonstrated through employment status or 
contractual agreement. 
When proving embezzlement, it doesn’t matter whether the 
defendant remained in control of the funds. An individual can still be 
charged with embezzlement even if they transferred the funds to another 
bank account or a separate party. Embezzlement charges also hinge on 
intent. The prosecutor must show that the embezzler intended to use the 
funds for himself. 
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There are multiple types of embezzlement. For example, some 
embezzlers go undetected for years by “skimming off the top” of the 
funds that they are employed to control. This means that they take small 
amounts of money from a large fund over a long period of time, hoping 
that the missing amounts will go unnoticed. In other cases, an individual 
will take a large amount of money at once, then attempt to hide the 
embezzled funds or even disappear [75]. 
Embezzlement is generally considered a white-collar crime, but 
smaller forms of embezzlement also exist, such as taking funds from a 
cash register before balancing it at the end of a shift and adding extra 
hours to an employee timesheet. 
White-collar crime is nonviolent crime committed for financial 
gain. According to the FBI, a key agency that investigates these 
offenses, “these crimes are characterized by deceit, concealment, or 
violation of trust”. The motivation for these crimes is to obtain or avoid 
losing money, property, or services, or to secure a personal or business 
advantage [7]. 
Other forms of embezzlement can be more personal. If someone 
cashes their spouse or relative’s social security check for personal use, 
he or she can be brought up on embezzlement charges. If someone 
“borrows” money from a PTA fund, sports league, or community 
organization, they can likewise be charged with embezzlement. 
Jail time, restitution, and fines may vary based on how much 
money or property was stolen. In some states, embezzlement may also 
be a civil charge. A plaintiff might sue someone for embezzlement to 
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receive a judgment in the form of damages. If the court finds in favor of 
the plaintiff, the embezzler is liable for the sum of damages. 
Larceny is sometimes used interchangeably with embezzlement, 
even though the two terms are legally very different. Larceny is the theft 
of money or property without consent. According to U. S. federal code, 
larceny charges must be proved through three elements. Someone 
accused of larceny must have [75]: 
1. Taken funds or property. 
2. Without consent. 
3. With the intent to deprive the institution of the funds. 
The need for embezzlement as a separate charge arose out of these 
elements. People engaged in embezzlement schemes do in fact have 
consent to be controlling the funds they take. On the other hand, a 
defendant charged with larceny never lawfully possessed the funds. 
Larceny is commonly referred to as outright theft, while embezzlement 
can be viewed as a form of deception. 
The most famous embezzlement cases unsurprisingly come with 
the highest price tags. The startling sums of money taken by the 
defendants accused and convicted of fraud have made some of them 
household names [75].  
In 2008, an investment advisor named Bernie Madoff was arrested 
for taking over $50 billion in funds from investors – the largest 
embezzlement case in history. Madoff carried out his scheme undetected 
for years. His Ponzi scheme used money from new investors to pay off 
old investors, making them believe that their investments were a 
success. Madoff pled guilty in 2009 and received a 150-year prison 
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sentence for his conduct. The scandal rocked the investment banking 
world and altered the lives of the people and institutions who had 
invested their savings with Madoff.  
In 1988, four employees of the First National Bank of Chicago 
attempted to steal a total of $70 million in funds from three separate 
accounts: the Brown-Forman Corporation, Merrill Lynch & Company 
and United Airlines. They planned to charge the accounts with overdraft 
fees and transfer the money to Austrian bank accounts through three 
separate transfers. The employees were arrested by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation after the outrageously large overdraft fees were flagged. 
In 2012, a court sentenced Allen Stanford to 110 years in prison 
for embezzling over $7 billion. The international Ponzi scheme gave 
Stanford and his associates control of investors’ assets with the promise 
of returns from safe investments. Instead, prosecutors alleged that 
Stanford pocketed the money and used it to fund a luxurious lifestyle. 
Some of Stanford’s investors lost everything, including their homes, 
after a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation landed 
Stanford in prison. 
 
Conclusions 
 
1. Corruption may be defined as the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. It captures three elements of corruption: public and private 
sectors, abuse of power, and benefit. Grand corruption typically takes 
place at the public sphere’s top tiers, and within the highest levels in 
private business. It often involves large sums of money.  
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Small-scale, administrative or petty corruption is the everyday 
corruption at the interface between public institutions and citizens. Petty 
corruption also refers to the abuse of power in daily situations.  
2. Money laundering is the process of making large amounts of 
money generated by a criminal activity, such as drug trafficking or 
terrorist funding, appear to have come from a legitimate source. The 
money from the criminal activity is considered dirty, and the process 
“launders” it to make it look clean. Money laundering is itself a crime. 
3. Fraud is a broad legal term referring to dishonest acts that 
intentionally use deception to illegally deprive another person or entity 
of money, property, or legal rights. Unlike the crime of theft, fraud relies 
on the use of intentional misrepresentation of fact to accomplish the 
taking. Fraud is the intentional use of false or misleading information in 
an attempt to illegally deprive another person or entity of money, 
property, or legal rights.  
 
End-of-chapter tasks 
 
1. Reveal major factors contributing to the expansion of corruption.   
2. List the schemes of money laundering.  
3. Review the Corruption Perceptions Index. 
4. Explain how financial offshore centers perform.    
5. Relate the white-collar crimes to the organized crimes.   
6.  Comment on the most impressive embezzlement cases.   
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